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English Football’s Polanyian Moment – The ESL

Blog Post

English Football’s Polanyian Moment – The European Super League

Elite European football has long been commodified and progressively disembedded from its historic roots as a working class sport. In the UK a countermovement to this piecemeal disembedding has been sporadic and generally unsuccessful. The countermovement against the ESL in contrast was spontaneous, large-scale and apparently highly successful. A piece by Rowan Alcock.

April 25th, 2021

Rowan Alcock

Football has become an opiate for masses of people around the world, with irrational highs and more frequent lows. In Europe seasons can secure hundreds of millions of pounds and the chance of playing with the European elite, coupled with the possibility of spiralling down the leagues and potential bankruptcy. But for many, football is much more than that. Clubs are part of the local community, often with a heritage of over 100 years, they contribute to an individual’s collective identity (1) and clubs and fans often work within their community in a charitable capacity. In a society such as the UK, which has had a political project of undermining collective power for decades, football fans maintain a camaraderie which allows them to mobilise when their club, and therefore local community, is threatened. It was this mass-mobilisation that we witnessed in the latest episode of football’s multi-billion dollar soap opera – the European Super League.

Clearly there are numerous concurrent crises global society is facing, and one might argue the machinations of a sport where over-paid players run around at the behest of over-paid executives and billionaire owners is something that deserves little attention. However the 72 hour saga of the European Super League (ESL) can be seen as a Polanyian moment and highlights numerous Polanyian tropes with wider lessons for society. The ESL was concocted by the owners of eleven elite and highly decorated European football clubs as well as Tottenham Hotspur. Its aim was to create a league in which the twelve founding members (2) could never be relegated therefore securing them as long-term high-value financial assets. The model was said to be based on the American sports franchising model. Elite European football has long been commodified and progressively disembedded from its historic roots as a working class sport. In the UK a countermovement to this piecemeal disembedding has been sporadic and generally unsuccessful. The countermovement against the ESL in contrast was spontaneous, large-scale and apparently highly successful.

As Polanyi would have observed, ‘intellectual fashion played no role whatever’ (3) in the countermovement which united the opinions of politicians from across the political spectrum. From the socialist Jeremy Corbyn to the right-wing populist Victor Orbán, as well as Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, a politician immensely comfortable with ‘greed and capitalism’, (4) and Sir Keir Starmer, a politician immensely comfortable sitting on the fence, they all outwardly agreed that the ESL was a step too far.

Political ideology did not unite the countermovement, yet politics was everywhere. The manager of Liverpool Football Club, Jürgen Klopp, in his defence against accusations being levelled at Liverpool players, stumbled into a truth at the heart of most economic organisations – the general lack of worker democracy. The players and the management team were not consulted over the ESL ‘just like all employees’ (5), it was not their decision. More directly Leeds United manager, Marcelo Bielsa, argued, in terms that could have been spoken by Polanyi himself, that ‘the fundamental problem is the rich always aspire to be more rich without considering the consequences for the rest. As they gain more power they start demanding more privilege over the rest’ (6). Fans ran with numerous slogans including ‘Created By the Poor, Stolen By The Rich’.

These spontaneous moments that have the potential to create the foundations of a progressive politics were coupled and often interwoven with spontaneous reactions that could create the foundations of a reactionary politics – demonstrating Polanyi’s view that the countermovement always has two faces. Rio Ferdinand declared that ‘this is for me a war on football’ (7). Garry Nevil stated it was ‘a criminal act against football fans in this country, make no mistake about it’ and that the owners are ‘imposters’ they ‘are nothing to do with football in this country’ (8) the fans ‘need protecting’ and owners have ‘no loyalty to this country and these leagues’ ‘there isn’t a football fan in this country that won’t be seething, and shouldn’t be seething’ (9). James Cordon during his diatribe on the ESL posited the argument that the billionaire owners have ‘slowly but surely’ moved these teams away from the working-class foundations on which they were built, or in Polanyian terms have disembedded them from the local community, and that they ‘look at the historical fanbase of every single club with disdain’. His solution to the powerlessness of fans and the belief that ‘I don’t think we can do anything about it’ was to ‘remember the names of these owners… don’t forget the people that did this, it’s them it’s those owners… they took something so pure and so beautiful and they beat the love and the joy out of it’ (10).

But remember for what ends? A progressive remembers in order to create a mass movement to democratically change society for the betterment of the whole of society. However, in the current system in which billionaires have disembedded themselves from social norms and democratic accountability, to what ends do we remember? Often these ends are reactionary. This is Polanyi’s countermovement at work, spontaneously erupting due to a move to transform a social institution into a commodity for private profit, with two solutions – one progressive and one reactionary.

The ESL did come crumbling down in England after just 72 hours thanks to sustained pressure from almost every corner of English football; fans, managers, players, pundits… However, many believe it is only a matter of time before something similar will raise its head. In fact it was reported that UEFA’s solution to the greed of the ESL was even more debt fuelled money pumped into their own competitions (11). Another option proposed has been a new football regulator (12), however, if similar to other regulators in the UK, it is likely to be toothless, under resourced and captured by special interests. A government that wants ‘to do as little as it has to do’, according to Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden (13), is never going to solve deep structural problems. A better solution may, however, be presented by the German league, whose teams were not part of the initial 12 ESL founding members. The 50 +1 model, which guarantees a majority stake in football clubs in Germany for fans, could be the start of re-embedding football back into the communities it was born out of. Yet this is fraught with difficulties and as the popular wave of discontent towards the ESL subsides, due to its collapse, the Government is likely to brush any significant changes aside to concentrate on whatever new populist crusade arises, churning out faux victories while nothing significantly changes.

If the ESL had gone ahead, it is almost inevitable the German sides would have sold their souls and joined; the alternative would have been for them to forgo hundreds of millions of euro a year and become uncompetitive on the European stage. This demonstrates another Polanyian theme, islands of democracy are meaningless in the global oceans of the self-regulating market. Unless there are bridges linking islands of democracy, from the workplace, to the local community through to continents of democratic participation, democracy is unable to stand up to the tsunami of global financial capitalism. The message Polanyi clearly articulates is; unless all of us are protected from the negative social effects of the self-regulating market system then none of us are protected and that protection can only come from a deep and broad democratic society. Football becomes as important a place to embed within democratic norms as housing, labour, health and all systems we rely on for our social well-being. A democratic sphere of football can create a logic of democratic participation in society, protect other democratic institutions and may even become a model for more. Football may, importantly, also be a space that has a ready-made and hard to undermine mass-movement prepared to argue, and take to the streets, for radical changes, a movement that has the ear of national leaders. The Polanyian task is the same with this spontaneous countermovement as it is with all, to push it away from any form of reactionary politics and towards progressive solutions. Even though the ESL has crumbled there is still much more to play for.

1 Of course it must be stated that this collective identity can also have a darker tone of sectarian or racist othering and football fans’ hooliganism is well documented.
2 Founding member spots were also potentially available for three more clubs from France and Germany.
3 Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p.151.
4 Allegretti & Elgot, 2021, Covid: ‘greed’ and capitalism behind vaccine success, Johnson tells MPs, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/23/greed-and-capitalism-behind-jab-success-boris- johnson-tells-mps
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dg0_mHEjGOI
6 https://inews.co.uk/sport/football/leeds-made-a-valid-point-about-european-super-league-side-liverpool-at- elland-road-964141
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NC08HPDlJlA
8 Alan Shearer similarly suggested that the owners ‘are clearly removed from the heritage’ of the Premier League and its predecessor ‘they don’t have any sense of value of the clubs relationship with the fans and the communities’. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-56813206
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GP05EDm9EB8
10 https://twitter.com/JKCorden/status/1384339056700526595
11 https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/4/19/uefa-discussing-7-2bn-deal-with-centricus-to-halt-super- league
12 https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/football-regulator-not-off-table-082336415.html
13 Ibid

Rowan Alcock

is a recent Oxford DPhil graduate in politics. His thesis engaged with Polanyian theory to analyse Chinese food and environmental movements. He has published articles on Polanyi including a recent publication in New Political Economy entitled The Unconscious Countermovement and the Conscious Polanyian Movement.

Johnson and Orbán: Peacocks’ Feathers Fading

EU - Negotiations / Populism

Johnson and Orbán: Peacocks’ Feathers Fading

As a Covid-dominated year draws to a close, the implications of EU negotiations with two renegades deserve attention. Although the structural significance of their countries is very different, Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán have some common traits. Both have led populist movements that can be theorized as countermovements in the sense of Karl Polanyi (The Great Transformation, 1944). But what happens when the exemplary personalities of Eurosceptic populism start to lose their shine?

December 30th, 2020

Chris Hann

Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán

It is generally agreed that contemporary populism can only be understood as a countermovement (in the sense of Karl Polanyi) to accelerated globalization, including the neoliberalization of the European Union. Of course, even within Europe, populism comes in many guises. The United Kingdom organized a referendum in 2016 and in December 2020 finally completed its tortuous severance from the EU. Hungary has maintained a high level of rhetorical criticism of “Brussels” over a long period, but has no intention of withdrawal. Each of these Eurosceptic countries has a dominant personality. In this contribution I suggest that comparing Boris Johnson and Viktor Orbán illuminates more general political configurations of our age.

At first glance, the differences far outweigh the similarities. Like Britain, Hungary has a long history of aristocratic hierarchy. This was interrupted in the middle of the twentieth century, when socialist rule was imposed forcibly for four decades. Viktor Mihály Orbán is a man of the people, born in 1963 in the provinces and brought up without a silver spoon. As a bright pupil, he was admitted to study law at the country’s best university. Though he devoted a lot of his time to oppositional politics, he completed his degree in 1987. The disciplined Lebensführung was physical as well as mental: Viktor Orbán played football at a semi-professional level for many years. But his main focus was power and in 1990 he entered parliament at the first opportunity.

Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson was born in New York in 1964 and pampered from birth. From Eton (the most famous of England’s exclusive schools) he proceeded to Oxford, as so many Prime Ministers had before. He did not take a first, probably because of the dissolute lifestyle he shared with a whole generation of “toffs,” many of whom went on to make careers in the Conservative party. Unlike the humourless Orbán, Johnson cultivated a taste for the comic and the fantastic. He indulged this in his journalism for the Daily Telegraph, before reaching larger audiences through the television programme Have I Got News For You. Johnson consolidated his larger-than-life personality not in parliament, which he entered in 2001, but in maverick performances on public stages as Mayor of London (2008-2016). 

Viktor Orbán  has dominated his party for over thirty years (the Alliance of Young Democrats was very much his creation and to this day he has no serious rivals inside the party).  Boris Johnson’s path to the top in the Tory party was necessarily more complex. Yet both have established their populist credentials as politicians who go against the establishment grain. Orbán has frequently presented himself as an enfant terrible, determined to break socialist shackles that the early years of democracy left substantively untouched. Johnson has had to endure brash accents very different from his own in forging new alliances to transcend elite complicity in the dilution of British sovereignty. The Brussels deal negotiated by David Cameron (a rival since schooldays and drinking companion in Oxford’s Bullingdon Club) was simply not good enough. Unlike Orbán, Johnson is a social liberal (otherwise he would hardly have been elected and re-elected as mayor of a supremely cosmopolitan city). His profile is more like that of Donald Trump, who also inherited wealth, was sent to the best schools, and developed a colourful media personality as well as a reputation for philandering. How do such persons persuade voters that they sincerely believe in conservative values? How do they persuade them to support economic policies that contradict their interests?

 

Populist Negotiating in December 2020

Boris Johnson has notoriously dismissed those who would prioritize the economy ahead of sovereignty. This is what you might expect from an Etonian Oxford classicist, but the cavalier approach has inevitably been modified in the course of post-Brexit negotiations with Brussels.

Viktor Orbán’s background in a poorer country being so different, it should be no surprise that he has taken great pains to ensure that the Alliance of the Young Democrats is tightly allied with a new national bourgeoisie. Family members and chums from his village are among the most prominent beneficiaries of a system that redistributes transfer income from Brussels (intended to support “cohesion” in the less developed member states) to a new class of domestic capitalists. Even if the size of those transfers will diminish following Brexit, Orbán will never call a referendum on Hunexit. Even if he did, polls indicate that few Hungarians would support withdrawal, even within his own party, which is ostensibly hyper-critical of Brussels. Everyone knows that the Hungarian economy is too deeply locked into the EU.

If this dependency is so clear, why did Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen give in so cravenly in December 2020, after Orbán (together with Polish premier Mateusz Morawiecki) had vetoed the adoption of the next EU budget? At stake was the principle of connecting transfer income with observance of EU norms of law and governance. This is sometimes phrased in terms of “democratic values”. The principle has been strongly affirmed not only by the European Parliament but also by George Soros, who Orbán has pilloried for years as the author of a plan to flood Christian Europe with Muslim migrants. But for Merkel and von der Leyen it was urgent to have their budget approved forthwith. They therefore agreed to compromise: the buck was passed, and the contentious principle of linking economic redistribution to the values of liberal democracy will eventually be adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. No one knows when this might happen.

Was there a subplot in political economy? While the economies of Hungary and Poland do not matter much in the larger scheme of things, for German capital, especially the automotive branch, the Visegrád countries are important locations for outsourcing production. Within days of the Brussels decision, Mercedes-Benz confirmed a massive investment to produce electric cars at its factory in Kecskemét in Central Hungary, thereby securing thousands of jobs for many years to come. As usual, the funding depends on a significant contribution from the Hungarian government, which in turn will continue to benefit from the Brussels development support.  

Whether or not the German car bosses somehow made their preferences known, in December 2020 it was vital for Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen to salvage political unity. The stakes were different for George Soros, who lost no time in deploring the climbdown. Soros’s disappointment was, in turn, the best evidence for Orbán to prove to Hungarians that he was the real victor once again. He responded to Soros’s protest with a lengthy statement on the prime ministerial homepage, in which the philanthropist was once again denigrated as the “most corrupt man in the world”.[1]

Which populist is the more hypocritical? Is it Viktor Orbán, the man of the people who attacks the liberal cosmopolitanism of the EU but fights to hold on to its subsidies in the interests of his cronies? Or is it Boris Johnson, formerly a liberal Mayor of London, who has triumphed personally but must realise deep down that his successful Brexit campaign has plunged both economy and polity into spirals of uncertainty likely to last generations? 

 

Emotions and Economics

Viktor Orbán has compared his carefully rehearsed diplomatic manoeuvring towards Brussels (and Strasburg) with the courting dance rituals of the peacock. The analogy also works for his relationship to George Soros. In fact, every scrap of liberal critique from western professors and journalists is grist for the populist mill. Whenever a representative of the Hungarian opposition sides with western critics in the European Parliament, this is trumpeted in the media controlled by Viktor Orbán as a betrayal of the national cause. Yet whenever European institutions come close to implementing measures that would threaten the foundations of the regime, the peacock changes his strut and rattles his trail to proclaim victory.

Observers have long argued that this ritualized dance cannot continue indefinitely. Some liberals in the west and opposition leaders at home have interpreted the compromise struck in December 2020 as a death knell for Orbánism. They are confident that the European Court of Justice will confirm the decision to couple financial aid to liberal norms of governance. But this will not happen quickly, and by the time it does the peacock may have won another election, making it impossible for foreign inspectors of the rule of law to deny his democratic mandate.

Boris Johnson has behaved similarly when bringing forward legislation that flies in the face of international law, only to withdraw it at the appropriate tactical moment. He too is very much the preening type. Yet even before his personal encounter with the Covid virus, he was beginning to seem less boisterous. No personal trainer can do much to improve that much-abused body. With his incompetent management of the pandemic, the Johnson who used to entertain his compatriots is more and more perceived as an embarrassment, especially among the young. As for Viktor Orbán, though he remains passionate about football, citizens who observe him on television alongside other leaders at summit meetings comment on his increasingly awkward gait.

What is the fate of ageing peacocks when their feathers fade? Both Johnson and Orbán have been ruthless in reshaping their parties to suit their personal ambitions. Even before Covid, there was no disguising the poor quality of those who survived the culls. The idea of grooming a successor is unthinkable. Both confirm Ernest Gellner’s dictum that a successful populist is an oxymoron.[2] Short of fascism, it is impossible to routinize populist power. Margaret Thatcher was an earlier leader who ruffled feathers for a while, finding convenient external enemies in Argentinian generals and domestic ones in coal miners and the “wets” of her own party. But it could not go on forever. Eventually some of the radicals she had promoted combined to oust her, before themselves morphing into a new stratum of “grandees” that Johnson would trash in the next generation. Viktor Orbán has outlasted most populists through inventing an unprecedented plethora of enemies: Brussels bureaucrats, good-for-nothing Roma, the supreme speculator George Soros, and waves of Muslim migrants. But there must be a limit. December 2020 also saw the fragmented political opposition in Budapest pledge to unite behind common lists in order to put an end to the “Orbán system” in the parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2022.

It evidently suited both parties to delay the post-Brexit trade deal until there was no time left for detailed scrutiny and the eruption of further political controversy. It is unlikely that the cross-channel traffic chaos triggered by a mutation of the Covid virus just before Christmas played a decisive role. The EU certainly bargained harder with Johnson than it had with Orbán a few weeks earlier. Elements of deterrent and punishment were in play, even humiliation and Schadenfreude (this earlier loanword will surely outlast Willkommenskultur). As historian Ute Frevert has recently reminded us, in politics a great deal depends on the emotional dimension (The Politics of Humiliation. A Modern History. Oxford UP 2020). But when it comes to dealing with Britain, the economic component is vastly more important than it is in the case of peripheral Visegrád states. Boris Johnson has had to accept that the economy does matter after all (not least if he is to redeem promises to redistribute prosperity to the declining postindustrial regions that abandoned the Labour Party to support him). The EU can hardly allow unconditional market access to a turbo-capitalist competitor on its doorstep. But perhaps the need to sell all those postsocialist German cars is also important. The cars manufactured by Mercedes in Hungarian Kecskemét are not affordable for ordinary Hungarians. So long as the new electric production lines include vehicles with a steering wheel on the right, we can safely assume that Mercedes-Benz bosses are continuing to count on easy access to the British market.

[1] http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-response-to-george-soros/
[2] Isiah Berlin Archive: http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/bibliography/bib111bLSE.pdf (page 21)

Chris Hann

Director of the Max Planck Insitute for Social Anthropology
Halle, Germany

Sprawls in the park before the snow storm

IKPS Webinar

Sprawls in the park before the snow storm

A report about the IKPS webinar on „The political Trilemma of Social-Ecological Transformation – Lessons from Polanyi’s The Great Transformation“ by Lukas Tagwerker

23rd December, 2020

Advocating for a place based economy

Andreas Novy appears on screen on this December evening, behind him neatly filled shelves of books and his own computer screen is mirrowed in his glasses, creating blue lights in front of his eyes.

Linking the long term analysis with the short term analysis, says  Andreas Novy, means linking an event to its underlying dynamics. This is the specific quality of Karl Polanyi’s classic „The Great Transformation“ which Novy applies as a method for his article, a pre-version of which appeared a few years ago in the Brazilian context.

Advocating for a „place-based foundational economy“ Novy takes up the model of Dani Rodrik’s globalization trilemma: out of 1.Hyperglobalization 2.the Nation State and 3.Democracy only two at a time were compatible. Novy examines the historic globalization trilemma and re-interprets it linking the ongoing epochal changes with short term political conflicts.

The point in the article that upsets me most is Novy’s confession of history’s potential to somehow repeat itself: 

„It is possible that the errors of the 1930s, when the victory of fascism was made practically unavoidable by the liberals’ obstruction of any reform involving planning, regulation, or control, are being repeated“

Novy’s conceptualization of the current trilemma appears as a more narrow, more clear-cut trilemma. This time only one out of three options can be thought to be in place:

  1.  Liberal globalism, a kind of continuation of hyperglobalization, where the ideology of consumer sovereignty, commodification and financialization even in the foundational economy have rendered public institutions increasingly unable to provide well-being for citizens, thus paving the way for anti-liberal countermovements.
  2. Nationalistic capitalism, a reactionary countermovement against the destruction of (imaginary) „habitation“, that sustains the politics of unsustainability by committing the „civilizational rupture“ allying against human rights and climate policies. Social hierarchies are deepened in order to prolongue white supremacy and anti-egalitarian authoritarianism, the most crucial example being contemporary Brazil.
  3. Foundational ecomony based on planetary coexistence, that satisfies basic needs (health, autonomy,..) by collective provisioning rather than individual consumption. Socioeconomic democratization and common, public and regionalized provisioning of basic goods could put long-term social-ecological transformation at the centre and reconcile it with the short-term.

Andreas Novy is kneading his neck while elaborating on the trilemma and I notice behind him on the top of his studio book wall a single book shelf that is empty. I get a bit distracted by the empty book shelf and by the fact that it gives me at the same time feelings of envy and comfort.

A western-centric Trilemma?

The webinar now moves 4000 miles west, six hours back in time: in New York it is high noon and the Academic Councilor on the UN System, Franz Baumann greets the participants by announcing the arrival of the first snow storm to N.Y. in this season.

Franz Baumann is sitting in front of completely filled book shelves and starts his contribution with a diplomatic quotation from Karl Polanyi, marking the common ground from where his criticism of the just proposed ideas will follow:

„The transformation to this system from the earlier economy is so complete that it resembles more the metamorphosis of the caterpillar than any alteration that can be expressed in terms of continuous growth and development.“

Now Baumann attacks the article: the jargon of it, the „code-words, that are only understood by the members of the tribe“, not by others.

Not being an economist, some of the concepts strike Franz Baumann as „exotic“, namely: „progressive reglobalization“, „contested neoliberalism“ or „entangled territorialized forms of self-determination“. In the course of the webinar there is unfortunately no time to clarify this vocabulary.

Franz Baumann dismisses the proposed trilemma: „Three options? I see many more and I would have liked the terms defined and historically and spacially situated than just used as mantras.“

After defending notions of globalization that give space for global policies Franz Baumann dismisses the analysis of the trilemma-options again: „I rather find them western-centric.“

When denying the existence of the trilemma is a characteristic of global Liberalism, did Mr Baumann just implicitly out himself as its proponent, or would that be a logical fallacy?

Franz Baumann goes on to compare the historic transformations of the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution as „sprawls in the park“ in comparison with the convulsions that he fears will mark the end of the fossil fuel era. „We are moving into a horrendously dangerous situation, where climate tipping points will be crossed and what will happen to humanity slips out of human control. Therefore global heating is the greatest challenge humanity has ever faced. Global heating is the unprecedented global public policy responsibility. With emphasis on 1. unprecedented 2.global 3.policy 4.responsibility.“

In his ranking of attributes the word „public“ got lost.

After having described the current „Great Acceleration“ through demography and resource-use charts, Baumann concludes almost diplomatically: “I sympathize with the concept of foundational economy, that satisfies basic needs like physical health, autonomy, preconditions for effective participation in social life, but tell that to the people in Ghana or in Nigeria or in Chad”

 

Who does what why and with which individual, societal and ecological consequences?

Finally the economist Judith Dellheim is then appearing on the screen from Berlin sharing five recommendations regarding Andreas Novy’s article. Firstly Judith Dellheim poses a question in honour of Karl Polanyi’s analysis of specific detail: Who does what why and with which individual, societal and ecological consequences? The analysis of actors in global power relations and their metabolism with nature need more elaboration in order to develop strategies for a refoundation of the economy.

Secondly Dellheim recommends to re-read the Brundtland-report in the light of the situation of the global poor and with a focus on risks and potentials of new technologies. Dealing with the climate crisis while neglecting the crisis of biodiversity loss means to support those forces that are interested in Big Tech projects for highly centralized production. Local food producers depend on biodiversity though.

Her third recommendation invites to adopt a fresh look at history from the point of view of the majority of the global population, the historically colonized. Furthermore Dellheim asks us to re-think the terms „globalization“ as well as „deglobalization“. She views the former as a „global process of dissolution of the boundaries of primary and secondary accumulation“, the appropriation of surplus value, of bioresources, labor forces, brain drain, data, interest and debt repayment.

Finally Judith Dellheim recommends to look out for actors who could be possible alliance-partners to foster the „foundational economy based on planetary coexistence“, like Buen Vivir, Mother Earth, Commoning or the ecosocialist manifesto and she suggests to develop common actions and campaigns with them for the UN binding treaty or an international Corona tax for example.

A webinar about a subject-specific economic article, that is discussed also by non-economists, makes it adventurous to follow the language used in the arguments. I wonder if defending his ideas more rigorously against accusations of being „exotic“ could have helped opening a space for a common understanding of Andreas Novy’s „The political Trilemma of Social-Ecological Transformation“. But as announced, there will be more Webinars on this topic. Perhaps Novy will then be able to refute these accusations. 

Lukas Tagwerker

Austrian Journalist & Radio Producer
Works at the Austrian National Radio Station FM4 in Vienna

Watch the Webinar here: 

Policies of “war on terror” once again?

Debate on the Refugee Crisis

Policies of “war on terror” once again?

December 19th, 2020

Maria Markantonatou

Good news is rare in times of COVID-19 and fear, but it does, indeed, exist. Such good news was that in October 2020 the Greek court ruled that the neonazi party Golden Dawn is a “criminal organization”. The court sentenced to many years in prison not only the party’s boss, but also many of its members, who were found guilty for participating to various criminal acts such as the murder of an anti-fascist activist, a number of violent attacks on immigrants and trade unionists, possession of guns etc.

In many of his texts, Polanyi provided an economic theory of fascism and conceived the latter as a result of the tension between democracy and capitalism. Such a tension became evident in the Greek case: since 2010 the country’s creditors and domestic governments have imposed disciplinarian austerity and liberalization and attacked remaining institutions of social protection, a crisis management which led to the rise of Golden Dawn. The neonazi party was a Polanyian nightmare and a political trauma for democracy, but unfortunately traumas never end. Shortly after the conviction of Golden Dawn – a positive step for the democratization of political life and the safety of immigrants – a series of terrorist attacks by individuals inspired or guided by ISIS took place in France and Austria: asymmetric attacks spreading fear and insecurity. Can these horrible attacks be confronted with a new “war on terror” like the one initiated by G. W. Bush in 2001 after September 11 or policies reminiscent of religious wars operated by “Western” states following the reasoning about the “clash of civilizations”[1]?

“In an era, in which even spelling out some critique against stereotypes of whiteness is penalized, countermovements fighting institutional racism are important”

Such policies to cope with terrorist threats have led to the militarization of everyday life in European cities (military guarding of schools, churches, public spaces etc.), increased policing and surveillance, more privatization of security (CCTV systems, electronic surveillance etc.) and socio-spatial segregation (ghettoization, gated communities etc.). Most importantly, policies based on social polarization (Muslims vs “us, Westerners”) or the stigmatization of Muslims as being suspect of terrorism have resulted to forced deportations of immigrants, violations of their human rights in the name of constantly declared “states of emergency”, hardening of domestic legislation on immigration, the conscious neglect of the bad conditions in which they live in the camps of “Fortress Europe”, police oppression in cases of social protests organized by immigrants etc.

In an era, in which even spelling out some critique against stereotypes of whiteness is penalized (e.g. D. J. Trump’s Executive Order on Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping[2] or the British Conservative Party attacks on so called “critical race theory”[3]), countermovements fighting institutional racism such as Black Lives Matter are important. Equally important for democracy is to reject the political efforts of various governments across Europe identifying Muslims with jihadists, punishing and further marginalizing entire minorities as a response to individual terrorist attacks, and hardening laws against immigration and asylum seeking.

[1] Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schulster, New York, 2002
[2] See D. Trump’s, Executive Order on Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping, 22.09.2020, Available Online:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-combating-race-sex-stereotyping/
[3] Shand-Baptiste, Kuba, The government has no intention of taking racism seriously – and it is using MPs of colour to avoid criticism, Independent, 22.10.2020, Available Online: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/critical-race-theory-racism-kemi-badenoch-black-history-month-bame-discrimination-b1227367.html

Maria Markantonatou

Maria Markantonatou is Assistant Professor in Political Sociology at the Department of Sociology at University of the Aegean Lesvos, Greece. She is also an IKPS Board Member and organizer of this debate.

Read our other essays on the Refugee Crisis here: 

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