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F&L Blog – Against The Republic

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Against the Republic:

Fascism, Capitalist Crisis, and the Assault on Popular Sovereignty

by Pınar Bedirhanoğlu & Cenk Saraçoğlu

19.06.2026

What are the roots of today’s global fascist turn and where is it leading us? In this article, Pınar Bedirhanoğlu and Cenk Saraçoğlu argue that fascism is not a fixed regime type, but a counter-revolutionary political process triggered by deep capitalist crises. Moving beyond rigid historical checklists, the authors show how fascism systematically assaults “republican political rationality” – the institutional and ideological frameworks that allow ordinary people to act as active political subjects. They trace the current wave of global fascistization back to the backlash against popular uprisings following the 2007–08 financial crisis, itself a crisis of neoliberal capitalism. While contemporary movements differ in their rhetoric, their shared objective is to atomize societies and eliminate democratic restraints on capital accumulation. Addressing today’s fascist turn means recognizing it as a broader assault on popular empowerment and our ability to shape our collective future.

Understanding Today’s Fascist Turn Within the Historical Development of Capitalism

The renewed urgency with which fascism is discussed today is not merely an intellectual exercise. It reflects a widely shared intuition that what is unfolding across the world today cannot be understood by terms such as “democratic backsliding”, “competitive authoritarianism”, or “right-wing populism”. These conceptual debates often get stuck in a methodological dead end, evaluating fascism only by the degree with which it corresponds to past instances, such as interwar Germany and Italy.

This article differs from common approaches that use a checklist of features to decide whether the “fascist minimum”, in Robert Paxton’s words [1], is met. Instead, we draw on a historical materialist framework by investigating the question of what fascism means within the historical development of capitalism: what structural function it serves, what it targets, and why it recurs. Alberto Toscano’s 2023 book Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis [2] offers a decisive methodological starting point. Building on W.E.B. Du Bois’s characterization of late 19th century post-Reconstruction period in the US as a “counter-revolution of property” led by white supremacy, Toscano argues that fascism must be approached not as a fixed regime type or a coherent ideological formation, but as a historically fluid process intimately tied to the dynamics of capitalist crises. In this respect, “late fascism”, like “late capitalism” varies in form and content according to its conjuncture. According to Toscano, its genealogy can be traced back to racial capitalism and extends well beyond the interwar European cases that have dominated theoretical reflections.

We take up Toscano’s argument and seek to extend it in a specific direction: if fascism is a counter-revolutionary process whose form and content change with historical circumstances, then we need a clearer answer to a basic question: what exactly is it a revolution against?  

Fascism as a Counter-Revolution Against “Republican Political Rationality"

"[Today's fascist counter-revolution] does not merely suppress specific gains but works to eliminate the very conditions under which such gains become possible."

We argue that fascism consistently targets two interrelated terrains. The first consists of the ideological and political gains won through socialist and progressive struggles. The second is the ideological and institutional ground which enables working and lower social classes to be active political subjects in the first place. It is this second terrain – what we term republican political rationality – that gives today’s fascist counter-revolution its characteristic depth and reach. It does not merely suppress specific gains but works to eliminate the very conditions under which such gains become possible.

The concept of republican political rationality has its roots in the French Revolution, or more precisely, the long revolutionary conjuncture of the late eighteenth century. It was during this era that popular forces — the sans-culottes, the urban laboring poor, the peasantry, the colonized subjects of the Haitian Revolution — first entered onto the political stage. For the first time, the question of who rules and on what terms could no longer be settled among elites without responding to the cries and claims of the laboring majority. Thus, what the new, republican state form registered, however imperfectly and however much against the intentions of dominant classes, was this irreversible entry of the popular classes into politics.[3]

The political rationality – i.e. the logic or set of ideas – of the republican societal order and state structure builds on a specific conception of freedom, freedom as non-domination, as long emphasized by Philip Pettit.[4] Here, freedom is understood not only as the absence of interference but as the absence of subjection to arbitrary power. As such, we can define the republican political rationality as encompassing following principles:

  1. Popular sovereignty: the legitimacy of political authority derives from and must remain accountable to the people as a collective subject, not via divine mandate, dynastic right, or the will of a particular privileged group.
  2. Active citizenship: the political community is made up not of passive subjects but active participants – people who deliberate about and take responsibility for the common affairs of their polity and play an active role in designing the constitution and laws that organize social and political life.
  3. The priority of the public: the common good, the res publica, takes precedence over private interest; the state is accountable to the general will rather than to particular interests.

These principles do not constitute a coherent or tension-free doctrine but are better understood as the normative residue of social struggles. While capital forces the state to maintain the conditions for its accumulation, such as the protection of property and the “policing” of class conflict, the republican political form introduces into this equation a set of principles – such as popular sovereignty, active citizenship, non-domination – that are structurally in tension with the impositions of capital. This tension is what makes the republican state both a mechanism of bourgeois class rule and a terrain of popular struggle. This has significant implications for how we read both the historical instances of fascism and its contemporary forms.

How Neoliberalism Created the Conditions for Contemporary Fascism

In the interwar period, the fascist assault was directed simultaneously against the organized working-class movement – its parties, unions, and revolutionary organizations – and against the liberal-democratic institutional and ideological framework within which that movement had won its basis. The neoliberal era since the 1970-80s has been characterized by a systematic hollowing out of the gains achieved by social and working-class movements in inter- and post-war eras.[5] The financialization of social relations has atomized the working class and made collective political action increasingly difficult; the subordination of public policy to the demands of financial markets has reduced popular sovereignty; the technocratization of government has removed key decisions from the domain of democratic deliberation; and the dismantling of welfare institutions has eroded the material conditions of active citizenship.

"The neoliberal erosion of republican political rationality is not yet fascism. It does, however, create the conditions for fascism."

The result is a procedural democracy stripped of its republican substance, reduced to the empty form of periodic elections that reproduce the management of accumulation by different political figures but do not alter its fundamental logic. This neoliberal erosion of republican political rationality is not yet fascism. It does, however, create the conditions for fascism. It produces the generalized political disorientation, the erosion of trust in democratic institutions, and the atomized social landscape on which a fascist counter-revolution can operate.

The Significance of the 2007-08 Crisis and Its Aftermath

The 2008 financial crisis was not merely an economic event. It was the explosive moment at which the accumulated contradictions of neoliberal capitalism could no longer be contained. The rapid delegitimization of existing political institutions and ideological frameworks, the material impoverishment of broad sections of the working class and middle strata, and the sudden visibility of the structural violence of capital produced what Antonio Gramsci would have called an organic crisis. The 2008 financial crisis was not merely a crisis of the economic realm but of the entire social formation, in which the old forms of hegemony could no longer be upheld. The result was a wave of popular political mobilization unprecedented in the post-Cold War era: the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Occupy Wall Street, Turkey’s Gezi Park uprising, the Indignados movement in Spain that eventually crystallized as Podemos, the student movements in Brazil… to name only a few. 

"The 2008 financial crisis was not merely a crisis of the economic realm but of the entire social formation, in which the old forms of hegemony could no longer be upheld."

These varied movements shared a common political grammar that is highly significant for our argument: not particular to a specific sector or identity group, but what can be recognized – in retrospect – as cries of republican political claims. Popular masses reclaimed the political institutions that had been captured by private and oligarchic interests. They reacted to the hollowing out of popular sovereignty by financial, technocratic and coercive strategies, which were systematically destroying the conditions of active citizenship and people’s capacity to participate meaningfully in shaping the collective conditions of life.

The counter-revolutionary response did not take long to respond, however. The violent repression and/or “hijacking” of the Arab Spring, the crushing of the Gezi movement, the defeat of Syriza’s opposition to EU-imposed austerity policies, the systematic containment of Occupy and the Indignados: these were the opening moves of what has become a globally converging, if not centrally organized, counter-revolutionary assault.

The Fascistization of Post-2008 Societies Around the World

"What followed was [...] a more far-reaching attempt to eliminate the very political, social, and ideological terrains from which popular challenges might re-emerge. This is what substantiates the use of the term 'fascistization'."

What followed was not limited to the reassertion of neoliberal policy, but a more far-reaching attempt to eliminate the very political, social, and ideological terrains from which popular challenges might re-emerge. This is what substantiates the use of the term fascistization, not because all its contemporary manifestations replicate the organizational or ideological forms of interwar fascism, but because the counter-revolutionary logic at work shares the same structural target: the conditions that enable everyone to be active political subjects.

This fascistization process has taken different forms in different national contexts. Trumpism and the MAGA movement combine the mobilization of racial and nativist resentment with a systematic assault on the institutional and legal constraints on executive power. In India, Modi’s BJP has deployed Hindu nationalist ideology to reconfigure the political community along exclusionary ethnic-religious lines, dismantling the constitutional protections that had, however imperfectly, sustained a plural political field. In Turkey, the AKP has combined right-wing populist mobilization with a subversive assault on the republican institutional and ideological framework of the state. In Brazil, Bolsonarismo represented not merely a right-wing government but an attempt to reorganize the terms of political conflict around the elimination of the social and political gains of the PT era.

In Europe, the picture is more complex, but its fundamental logic is the same. The electoral rise of far-right parties across almost all European countries represents something more than the predictable shift toward the right. These forces systematically undermine the democratic norms that structure political contestation – from equal citizenship regardless of origin, to the principle that political authority is accountable to the entire population rather than to an ethnically defined community. Crucially, we argue that these forces remain part of the fascistization process even when they are not in power. Their role is to reshape the political horizon by normalizing authoritarian and exclusionary ideas, weakening the republican foundations of popular political agency, and redirecting the energies unleashed by organic crises into nationalist channels rather than true emancipatory alternatives.

Fascistization vs. Our Common Future

What all these diverse manifestations of fascistization share is a goal of eliminating the republican political rationality. The particular institutional targets and ideological codes, and the specific combination of repression and mass mobilization through which consent is organized all vary in each national context. But the structural logic is the same: to annihilate the conditions of popular political subjectivity and to depoliticize, atomize, and reintegrate the popular classes under forms of identification and mobilization that preclude true collective agency. [6]

In this way, fascistizsation secures the conditions for the continued extraction and accumulation of capital, unhindered by social or political forces. Discussions on the extent to which contemporary forms align with historical examples overlook fascism’s broader purpose of dismantling our collective capacity to shape our common world – and risks distracting from the urgent need to form collective responses.

Pınar Bedirhanoğlu is Professor at Middle East Technical University, at the Department of International Relations. Her work focuses on global political economy, neoliberalism, financialization, and corruption.

Cenk Saraçoğlu is Professor at Ankara University. Amongst others, his work focuses on political and social theory, nationalism, migration racism, and inequality.

References

  1. Paxton, Robert O. 2004. The Anatomy of Fascism. Alfred A. Knopf.
  2. Toscano, Alberto. 2023. Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis. Verso.
  3. Bedirhanoğlu, Pınar, and Cenk Saracoglu. 2023. ‘Demokrasi Nereye?: Neoliberalizm Döneminde Demokrasi-Cumhuriyet Bağının Kopuşu’ (Quo Vadis Democracy: De-linking of Democracy and Republic in the Neoliberal Era). In Demokrasi: Kavram, Kurum, Süreç (Democracy: Concept, Institution, Process), edited by Menderes Çınar. İletişim Yayınları.
  4. Pettit, Philip. 2012. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
  5. Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2026. ‘Beyond the Freedom of Movement: Rethinking the Global Migration Regime through the Right to Homeland’. Globalizations, April 29, 1–22.
  6. Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2026. ‘Beyond the Freedom of Movement:…’

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F&L Blog – Authoritarian Desires

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Authoritarian desires

How Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism Brought Us to the Brink of Fascism

by Wendy Brown

04.06.2026

How did authoritarianism become desirable for ordinary people in formerly liberal democracies? In this blog article, Wendy Brown traces two governing rationalities that have been central in shaping popular tolerance for Trump’s attacks on democracy: neoliberalism and neoconservatism. While neoliberalism eroded democratic values by naturalizing markets and traditional morality, neoconservatism promoted a strong state, including militarism at home and abroad, and normalized regime change. Moreover, neoconservatism forged a distinct identity for middle- and working-class adherents, displacing class and upward mobility with religion, family, and nation. According to Brown, understanding these political subject formations is key to addressing the anti-democratic turn and articulating emancipatory forms of belonging.

The following article is an adaption of Wendy Brown’s keynote address at the Historical Materialism Conference 2025. It was edited by Maie Klingenberg.

The Puzzling Desire for Authoritarianism

We know that authoritarian politicians today anoint wounds, mobilize fears and resentments among working– and middle-class populations, while enabling oligarchic control of the levers of government. But how do we explain the popular tolerance, and even enthusiasm, for dismantling democracy? How do we explain the support for soldiers and tanks in cities, and masked ICE agents invading schools, workplaces and homes, tackling old people and grabbing children? For state takeovers of cultural institutions and universities dictating what is doable and sayable? For trampling the Constitution while amplifying the power of capital, lining the pockets of the already rich, and cutting what remains of social benefits after decades of neoliberal slash-and-burn? Why are so many accepting this conduct?

In the following, I identify what I deem some of the most important forces behind the rapid consolidation of authoritarianism in the US. My analysis concentrates on two different governing rationalities de-democratizing the state and the citizenry: neoliberalism and neoconservatism.

Far from identical or even commensurate, these two forms of reason together tilled the popular ground for an authoritarian state and yielded Project 2025, the playbook for much of what the Trump regime is doing. From dismantling the Department of Education to voter suppression, from mass firings of federal workers to undoing the basic institutions of liberal democracy via both nuanced legal maneuvers and bold power grabs – as well as renewed imperial domination in all parts of the globe.

"Project 2025 is the most thorough plan for state-animated transformation of the political, cultural, social, and economic life that any liberal democracy has so far known – and neoliberalism and neoconservatism are at its heart."

At 600 pages, Project 2025 is the most thorough plan for state-animated transformation of the political, cultural, social, and economic life that any liberal democracy has so far known – and neoliberalism and neoconservatism are at its heart. This claim will seem curious to many at first blush: neoliberalism is frequently declared to have suffered near-death blows from right-wing retorts to globalization – from ethnonationalism to tariff wars – and also from left-liberal efforts to revive the big state. At the same time, neoconservatism is conventionally regarded as history, left behind by the discredited Middle East wars, the rise of the Tea Party, and MAGA. Yet, the American present is profoundly shaped by the bastard legacies of both.

Neoliberalism: Markets and Morality as a Natural Order

At the level of economic policy, neoliberalism meant deregulation, privatization, regressive taxation, financialization, assaults on unions, and offshoring of jobs. Together, these exacerbated wealth inequality, stymied upward mobility, and throttled middle- and working-class existence, producing an economic populism that the entire right spotted and mobilized well before the center left did. At the level of political rationality, neoliberalism did something equally profound: it undermined the very idea of democracy – attacking its principles, its jurisprudence, and the idea of a social compact – even legislated justice.

Neoliberal reason naturalizes both markets and traditional morality, casting them as neither born from human minds or intentions nor as planned or engineered. Although markets may require state support, they are seen as emerging naturally and spontaneously. By contrast, democratic legislation is cast as emanating from an idea of “the good” imposed from above and thus intervening in these natural and spontaneous orders. Neoliberalism thus opposes active democratic practices, especially legislated ones, as it makes support for markets and traditional morality, along with national defense, the only legitimate domestic state practice.

With its privileging of capital accumulation, its dismemberment of society into individual units, its disintegration of the social compact, and its economization of politics, neoliberalism is an inherently anti-democratic force. By advancing the “equal right to inequality” and reducing freedom to the ability to buy, sell, and plunder, it has profoundly shaped the popular receptivity to authoritarian statism we see today.

Neoconservatism: Fighting the Redistributive, Anemic State

As neoconservatism is the lesser known of the two rationalities, I will explore it in more depth. Neoconservatism emerged in the 1970s, influenced by intellectuals such as Irving Kristol and Leo Strauss. Soon supported by secular cold warriors, Jewish and Christian religionists, and family moralists of all types, it had become mainstream in the Republican party by the 1990s. Neoconservatism is conventionally thought to have peaked in the early 2000s and then to have crashed after the second Bush administration, discredited by the quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq for which its leading figures such as Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney were responsible. Additionally, it was challenged by the Tea Party movement, with its principles of small government, fiscal austerity, and anti-regulatory libertarianism. However, we are not living with Tea Party politics today; MAGA is a descendent of neoconservatism even if MAGA leaders deny this. So we need to understand: how did neoconservative principles soak into the fabric of American political culture and life in general, and the Republican Party in particular?

"Capitalism [according to neoconservatives] has a downside: It frays the moral and cultural fabric of a people and discredits authority, producing individual licentiousness and indulgence, cultural decadence, liberation movements, and fractured families."

Neoconservatism responded to the upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s with the diagnosis that capitalism – for all its glories and achievements – has a downside: It frays the moral and cultural fabric of a people and discredits authority, producing individual licentiousness and indulgence, cultural decadence, liberation movements, and fractured families. Moreover, according to the neoconservatives, capitalism pushes the state in the wrong direction, promoting states that are redistributive and internally and externally passive and anemic.

So neoconservatism offers a political balancing practice. It endorsed strong states that would put this strength to use both at home and abroad, that would align with and empower corporations and replace “decadent” popular culture with a culture rooted in traditional values: religion, heteronormative families, and manliness. It further advocated transforming education, especially at the university level, and fostering – in schools and civic life more broadly – the values of patriotism, militarism and support for wars of regime change.

At the heart of the neoconservative project was the aim of linking state power and morality for both domestic and international purposes. This moral-political project not only departed significantly from the neoliberal rationality taking shape in the same period, but also from classic conservatism and its belief in limits, moderation, and the aristocratic virtues of rectitude, civility, education, and discipline.

Neoconservatism: The Making of a Post-Class Identity

"Neoconservatism took the Republican Party in a direction that was not conservative, but right-wing and authoritarian."

In abandoning these values, neoconservatism accomplished two ends. Firstly, whereas the Republican party had long been regarded as the home of the educated and wealthy, it now became incredibly attractive to working class men, especially amidst globalization and disinvestment in education. Secondly, neoconservatism was ready to battle with “its gloves off”, that is, without regard for liberal democratic norms or processes. Breaking with the old conservative attachment to a modest and small state, neoconservatives affirmed the values of authority and hierarchy, avowing the use of state power to shape the nation and the globe. It took the Republican Party in a direction that was not conservative, but right-wing and authoritarian, blasting past the party’s classic commitment to constitutional democracy, fiscal responsibility, unrestricted liberty, and isolationism in relation to foreign affairs.

In its place, neoconservatism installed the precept of a big powerful state, including an anti-democratic judiciary, with current Supreme Court justices such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas shaped by neoconservatism’s philosopher-king Leo Strauss. Moreover, it aimed at repressing “decadent culture”, seeking to influence school curriculums, regulate hip hop, and outlaw porn. Neoconservatism also installed the principle of robust foreign policy – one that would reassert American empire, including devotion to Israel and active efforts at regime change to “spread American values around the world”.

In addition to legitimating authoritarian statism and imperialism, this project politicized family, religion, and education by tightly fusing them with Americanness and patriotism. Those who held traditional values were interpolated as true American patriots, tacitly and later explicitly demonizing the rest as un-American. Vilifying ordinary liberal democrats as radicals, terrorists, and dangers to the republic became a common strategy for right-wing leaders.

"Neoconservatism produced a distinctive identity for the working and middle class – an identity that was devoid of the concept of class."

Crucially, neoconservatives bound together family, religion, nation, and patriotism in a way that made economic precarity fall out of the picture. As unions were being destroyed, jobs outsourced, public education privatized, and upward mobility and access to cosmopolitanism removed, neoconservatism produced a distinctive identity for the working and middle class – an identity that was devoid of the concept of class. The promise of jobs and upward mobility – once a central part of post-war American capitalism – was now being replaced by God, family and country. Increasingly this bound working- and middle-class populations – those who brought Trump to power – to the authority and hierarchy of church, traditional family, and the neoconservative version of the state.

Neoconservatism: The Normalization of Regime Change

While few call themselves neoconservative anymore, we live with the legacy of three neoconservative decades. Three decades during which the neoconservative vision – a powerful state, traditional values at the heart of the nation, militarism abroad, and intensified policing in American cities – became normalized as mainstream conservative politics. Above all, neoconservatism legitimated regime change, which – while briefly discredited by Iraq and Afghanistan – was bound to come home, and is now being applied to the American republic.

Regime change for the United States is what the 900 pages of Project 2025 map and detail. That document specifies exactly what to do and how to do it, just as the Bremer orders – the 100 governing principles for Iraq after Saddam Hussein was toppled – provided details of regime change and the making of a new state, culture, and political economy for that country. In the case of Iraq, the design was for a relentlessly neoliberal order with a finesse of liberal constitutionalism. In the case of Project 2025, it is for a right-wing authoritarian order that transforms the liberal democratic state and its institutions, political economy, and culture.

At the Brink of Fascism: Possibilities of Turning Back

To conclude, over the past decades, with neoliberalism’s naturalization of markets and traditional morality, its economization of the principles of democracy, its tarring of democratic legislation as totalitarian social engineering, combined with neoconservatism’s affirmation of strong state power, hierarchy, authority, and binding of traditional values to patriotism, the ground was tilled for turning a population against its own class interests and in favor of an authoritarian state.

It is important to pay attention to political subject formations like these if we are to get our analysis and organizing right. Those who voted for Donald Trump and continue to support him are more than dethroned white workers manipulated by autocrats or bewitched by right wing media. We need to understand what these historical political formations legitimated and normalized, what they delegitimate, hystericize, and marginalize, and what desires, communities, and attachments they produce.

"Mamdani revived patria in its original Latin sense: not as loyalty to an abstract nation defined by flags or militarism, but as a lived attachment to the city – something collectively built, cared for, and protected."

Zohran Mamdani showed us how to address and begin to transform this formation by treating affordability and the right to the city as a non-radical value, even, we might say, a traditional one. To quote Zohran, “the people who work and raise families in New York City need to be able to live here.” Day after day during his campaign, he repeated his mission to make New York City a collective object of love and belonging – one that belongs to the people, not the billionaires. Mamdani revived patria in its original Latin sense: not as loyalty to an abstract nation defined by flags or militarism, but as a lived attachment to the city – something collectively built, cared for, and protected. He is especially brilliant at linking principles across the local to the global: New Yorker’s right to live in New York is no greater and no lesser than Palestinians right to live in Palestine. After several decades of driving toward fascism, his campaign showed us a way back from the brink.

Wendy Brown is a political theorist and Professor Emerita of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Brown holds an endowed professorship at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.

Further Readings

  • Brown, Wendy (2023): Nihilistic Times: Thinking with Max Weber. Harvard University Press.

  • Brown, Wendy (2019): In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. Columbia University Press.

  • Brown, Wendy (2015): Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Zone Books.

Photo Credit

Nando Ochando

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F&L Blog – Muskism, Trumpism, Masculinism

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Muskism, Trumpism, Masculinism

Economic liberalism, right wing populism and
the new gender order

by Brigitte Aulenbacher & Birgitt Riegraf

21.05.2026

From “masculine energy” to “tradwives”— contemporary far-right political-economic movements are interwined with a new gender order which is not incidental, but core to understanding their rise, argue Brigitte Aulenbacher and Birgit Riegraf in this latest blog piece. With a focus on the USA, the authors compare the emergence of right-wing populism today, with roots in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crash, with the “countermovements” to economic liberalism witnessed by Karl Polanyi during the Great Depression. In contrast to their declared aims, both movements ultimately served to support liberal economic elites. The new era of “Muskism” and “Trumpism” carries on in this tradition, exemplified by the close relationship between governments and powerful tech elites. As a driving force of this development, the authors identify a new masculinism giving shape both to economic liberalism and the gender order.

The rise of contemporary right-wing populism: a Polanyian “countermovement”

“The demand for a more traditional and aggressive form of masculinity functions as an economically and politically charged resource: as a promise of economic and technological growth in times of crisis, and as a promise of order and control in a seemingly chaotic world."

Today’s populist far right has its roots in the early stages of neoliberal globalization. Karl Polanyi wrote his masterpiece The Great Transformation while witnessing the “movement” toward forced economic liberalism in the early 20th century and the emergence of „countermovements“ seeking protection from its destructive effects, such as the socialist, fascist-social and partisan movements, and the New Deal. While there are key differences between the stock market crash of 1929 and the neoliberal era’s financial crisis in 2008 (and their respective effects in terms of precarity, poverty, and social decline) there are historical parallels in that both marked important turning points which strengthened right-wing populism. Several developments point to the rise of the contemporary far right as such a Polanyian „countermovement“. Within Europe, Hans-Jürgen Bieling [1] identifies the crises of finance, poverty and forced migration in the face of wars as a historical „window of opportunity,“ which helped to promote right-wing parties and social movements, and their respective agendas and ideologies. Arlie Hochschild [2] came to a similar diagnosis with regard to the USA. 

At the same time, these movements contain inherent contradictions: they are what Klaus Dörre terms “ambivalox” – a mix of ambivalence and paradox [3]. Many right-wing parties combine economic liberalism with the promise of social protection by transforming questions of social justice into questions of belonging: in terms of “Volk“ (nation), ethnicity, race and citizenship. As found by Atzmüller, Décieux and Ferschli [4], this is used to justify austerity policies. By promising social advancement instead of decline, right wing parties and social movements attract the votes of the working and middle classes. The flipside of this promise is that social concerns are turned into anti-democratic action as they seek to undo emancipatory progress in the politics of equality, diversity, and inclusion as well as the rights of women, migrants and LGBTQI+ communities. At its core, right-wing populism uses identity politics to address the native male working and middle classes –  intermediated by emotions or “affective politics“ and the respective “affective narratives”, [5] while forcing economic liberalism and promoting the respective elites’ agenda. 

Trumpism and Muskism: an elites’ Polanyian movement

A deeper understanding of the phenomenon underlying “Trumpism” (as explored by Faude & Heinkelmann-Wild [6]), or “Muskism” can be gleaned from the recent work of Quinn Slobodian and Ben Tarnoff with On Muskism. A Guide for the Perplexed [7]. In it, the authors diagnose a new era of economic liberalism characterised by the following shifts: authoritarian deglobalization replacing neoliberal globalization; a reconfiguration of the relationship between the economy and the state; new modes of production combined with the reorganization of work and everyday life; as well as a heightened emphasis on technological progress and the relationship between humans and technology.

We put forward that such new alliances between representatives of the most powerful parts of the private sector — such as the tech industry — and authoritarian political forces, constitute a new Polanyian “movement”, one which moves toward forced economic liberalism as soon as the latter enter government. And this development is also inextricably linked to gender relations that are deeply embedded within this process of transformation, be it in Hungary, Argentina, or the USA. Drawing upon the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” by Raewyn Connell [8], we now examine masculinism as a driving force in terms of both the scope and direction of societal transformation. For the purposes of brevity, we limit our analysis to the USA.

Trumpism, Muskism and Masculinism

"If Trumpism or Muskism is characterized by an emphasis on national interests and a new form of technological and economic aggressiveness, this is — quite deliberately — intertwined with the propagation of a new “hegemonic masculinity“ and the celebration of “emphasized femininity”

If Trumpism or Muskism is characterized by an emphasis on national interests and a new form of technological and economic aggressiveness, this is — quite deliberately — intertwined with the propagation of a new “hegemonic masculinity” and the celebration of “emphasized femininity” (as per Raewyn Connell,  enacted in ways that are compliant with, accommodating and subordinated to masculinism). We can hear this rearticulation, intensification, and reconfiguration of male dominance when Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg calls for more “masculine energy” in business and society — thereby joining other tech giants in promoting an ideal of hyper-individualized, market-driven masculinity. This is then cast in opposition to a “feminine” — or even “effeminate” — energy, which is portrayed both as the very cause of economic, technological, and political insecurities, while appearing powerless to counter them. By contrast, this new masculinity actively embraces all such uncertainties as trials by combat, tests of mettle, and opportunities for personal growth. This embodies precisely what Connell conceptualizes as “hegemonic masculinity” — a construct, the restoration of which attempts to reinstate a lost social order by firmly re-cementing the boundaries of both nation and gender roles. Movements such as that of the “Tradwives”, as investigated by Scott and Day [9], in turn serve as the counterpart designed to stabilize the male hegemonies championed by Trumpism and Muskism.

"the demand for a more traditional and aggressive form of masculinity functions as an economically and politically charged resource: as a promise of economic and technological growth in times of crisis, and as a promise of order and control in a seemingly chaotic world"

As such, contemporary economic and neoliberal political transformations are inextricably linked to the enforcement of an aggressive model of hegemonic masculinity in two distinct ways: on the one hand, by directly conflating the propagated ideal — characterized by entrepreneurial combativeness and risk-taking, authoritarian assertiveness, disruptive social and technological innovation, and fantasies of technological control — with the demand for the rehabilitation and resurgence of aggressive male conduct. On the other, tech elites and the far right not only propagate visions of boundless market utopias, but simultaneously mobilize anti-institutional sentiments — sentiments directed, for instance, against equality policies and democratic procedures in general, disparaging these as both the root cause of societal ills and an impediment to social progress. In both instances, the demand for a more traditional and aggressive form of masculinity functions as an economically and politically charged resource: as a promise of economic and technological growth in times of crisis, and as a promise of order and control in a seemingly chaotic world.

Hegemonic masculinity as central to understanding today’s new economic order

Figures such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump exemplify this dynamic. Their public self-presentation fuses the call for economic libertarianism with a performative reaffirmation of a supposedly lost male sovereignty — whether adopting the persona of the disruptive entrepreneur or that of the authoritarian decision- and deal-maker who pointedly distances himself from any behavior connoted as non-traditionally masculine or feminine. These performances, then, constitute something far more than mere matters of style; rather, they are an integral component of a hegemonic project in which economic deregulation and the hollowing out and capturing of the state are inextricably interwoven with the rearticulation, intensification, and reformation of hegemonic masculinity and traditional gender relations.

The on-going rise of techno-libertarian and right-wing populist ideologies — premised upon the restoration of hegemonic masculinity — is thus the expression of a deeper, underlying dynamic. It is akin what Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation described as economic liberalism’s  “utopia” of an economy and a society regulated by the market  — a process that, in this instance, is socially, culturally and politically shaped — and simultaneously intertwined — with a radicalized form of hegemonic masculinity that presents itself as a response to a perceived loss of control. It is therefore essential to take hegemonic masculinity seriously, not as a marginal phenomenon, but as a central foundation of contemporary processes of societal transformation.

Brigitte Aulenbacher

Brigitte Aulenbacher is Professor of Sociology at Johannes Kepler University Linz. She combines studies on science, domestic work, senior care and the digital transformation of work with the analysis of contemporary capitalism.

Birgitt Riegraf is Professor of General Sociology at the University of Paderborn. Her research focuses on the sociology of science and higher education, gender studies, critical analyses of the capitalist care economy, and questions of social inequality and intersectionality.

References

  1. Bieling, Hansjürgen (2017): Aufstieg des Rechtspopulismus im heutigen Europa – Umrisse einer gesellschaftstheoretischen Erklärung, in: WSI-Mitteilungen 70(8), S. 557¬–565. 
  2. Hochschild, Arlie (2016): Strangers in their own Land. Anger and Mourning on the American Right, New York/London. 
  3. Dörre, Klaus (2019): “Take Back Control!” Marx, Polanyi and Right-Wing Populist Revolt, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 44, pp. 225–243.
  4. Atzmüller, Roland/Décieux, Fabienne/Ferschli, Benjamin (eds.) (2023): Ambivalenzen in der Transformation von Sozialpolitik und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Soziale Arbeit, Care, Rechtspopulismus und Migration, Weinheim 
  5. Faude, Benjamin/Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim (2025): Destruction or renewal? Trumpism and the Future of Global Governance, in: Global Public Policy and Governance 5, pp. 305–315. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-025-00130-y 
  6. Sauer, Birgit (2026): Affektiver maskulinistischer Widerstand gegen Quotenimplementierung in Europa. Kämpfe um die (Un-)Sichtbarkeit von Frauen in der Politik, in: Feministische Studien 1/2026, S. 48-65; Bargetz, Brigitte/Eggers, Nina Elena (2023): Affektive Narrative: Theorie und Kritik politischer Vermittlungsweisen, in:  Politische Vierteljahresschrift 64, S. 221-246. 
  7. Slobodian, Quinn/Tarnoff, Ben (2026): Muskism. A Guide for the Perplexed, London. 
  8. Connell, Raewyn (1995): Masculinities. Oakland, California.
  9. Scott, Kate/Day, Linsey (2025). TikTok tradwives: femininity, reproduction, and social media, in: Gender and Education, pp. 1–18.

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F&L Blog – A Fascist “Solution”?

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A fascist "solution"? A Polanyian Reading of the Fascist Backlash

by Roland Atzmüller

30.04.2026

As commentators struggle to make sense of the rise of the far right and its entanglements with the neoliberal project, Roland Atzmüller turns to Karl Polanyi’s analysis of fascism and liberalism a century ago. In Polanyi’s view, fascism was a reaction to emancipatory social struggles that challenged the unchecked expansion of capitalist market society and demanded greater democratic control, universal equality, and individual freedoms. Fascism, in turn, came to the rescue of capitalism, ending the social and political blockages by reinstating inequality — especially along racial lines — as a principle of governance. According to Atzmüller, Polanyi’s analysis sharpens our understanding of both neoliberalism as a project to suppress or absorb egalitarian movements in the name of economic recovery, and contemporary processes of fascisation as efforts to reverse an alleged Western decline by attacking “wokism,” reasserting white supremacy, and defending the capitalist development model.

(Mis-)interpretations of the Far Right

Since the beginning of the second Trump administration and its attempt to remodel U.S. society and democracy along authoritarian lines, public and scholarly debates concerning the appropriate interpretation of the far right’s recent electoral successes and governing projects have intensified. The debates centre on whether these phenomena should still be understood as right-wing populism, or if they are better described as processes of fascisation (Faschisierung, to use the German term) in the light of their radicalization – or even a new fascism. These debates build on earlier controversies about how the hegemonic neoliberal governing projects of recent decades in many countries are related to the growing successes of (increasingly radicalized) right-wing parties and movements. 

Although originally, many right-wing populist parties were combining anti-migration sentiments with (authoritarian) neoliberal economic and social policy ideas, they developed increasingly encompassing and distinct programs and narratives for fundamental social change, particularly in the last one or two decades – albeit with considerable national variation. The emerging programmatic extensions of far-right parties have been particularly notable in certain sociopolitical fields such as welfare policy. Of course, these extensions remained closely aligned with ideologies which had been central to the (post-war) far right from the beginning, particularly concerning the rejection of immigration and a racist and even “völkisch” conception of the nation. However, since these programmatic expansions usually entailed assigning the state an important role in economic and social policy, certain public and social-scientific debates (for references see Atzmüller and Decieux, 2019) advanced the view that these actors should no longer be classified as right-wing, as their positions appeared closer to those of centre-left parties in these policy fields. This argument was linked to the fact that, in some countries, far-right reform policies hardly – or did not – reduce expenditure levels in certain policy areas, such as welfare.

In the course of such debates, two things are often ignored. First, and this is particularly overlooked in journalistic contributions, the far right – beyond all social rhetoric – draws on long standing traditions of authoritarian statehood that do not have too much in common with the idea of a democratic, social, and inclusive state. Second, a perspective that mainly focuses on state expenditure levels – which is itself a sign of neoliberal hegemony in certain debates – tends to ignore the qualitative policy-changes implemented by far-right parties to foster authoritarian change.

Polanyi’s Interpretation of Fascism’s Rise

Karl Polanyi’s writings from the 1930s and 1940s on the role and consolidation of fascist regimes and their political and ideological “essence” offer considerations and insights that are of remarkable relevance for interpreting today’s rightward shift in many societies. Their significance stems from the fact that Polanyi engaged with these questions in particular during the period in which the democratic constitutional state was being displaced by a far-right movement and the establishment of a fascist regime. In his analyses from the 1930s onwards, Polanyi demonstrated how fascism sought to impose itself as an authoritarian and antidemocratic “solution” to social crisis dynamics and political deadlocks resulting from the contradictions and dynamics of the unbridled expansion of capitalist market society. Fascism, in Polanyi’s theoretical framework, constituted itself as the rescue of capitalism as a whole. Hence, Polanyi ascribed fascism a systemic role oriented towards society in its totality. For him, fascism was a reaction of certain social forces to progressive developments resulting from social struggles against the crisis-prone effects of unrestrained market expansion in the decades before.

Polanyi’s fundamental critique of fascist philosophers such as Othmar Spann or Ludwig Klages in the 1930s therefore does not simply constitute a scholastic refutal of their attempt to formulate a philosophical essence of fascism. Rather, their authoritarian and antidemocratic philosophical musings about concepts such as freedom or in/equality referred to a range of real social developments which became the target of fascist politics to rescue capitalism. These concerned first, the expansion of democratic structures; second, the extension of individual freedoms; and third, their grounding in ideas of universal equality.

"because the “liberal creed” was unwilling and unable to react to the outlined progressive countertendencies and to accept democratic control of the economy and society, a profound social crisis and political blockage emerged"

Thus, even if his formulations – particularly in The Great Transformation – were not entirely unambiguous, Polanyi did not simply conceptualize fascism as a “countermovement” similar to more progressive counterparts such as trade unions and working-class parties which aimed at securing the protection of society against the “liberal creed” and the consequences of market dynamics. Rather, because the “liberal creed” was unwilling and unable to react to the outlined progressive countertendencies and to accept democratic control of the economy and society, a profound social crisis and political blockage emerged. According to Polanyi, from a fascist viewpoint, the progressive countertendencies were responsible for the manifestations of crisis and political paralysis. The fascist “solution” was thus aimed at the abolition of democracy and individual freedom in order to subject individuals to violent re-education and, ultimately, to reimpose inequality – not least (but nationally varied) along ethnicized and racialized lines – as a mode of dominance. The attack on democracy and politics sought to absolutize the economy and to destroy all forms of democratic control and participation not only at the level of the state but also within the economy. In this way, as Polanyi wrote in 1933, economic dynamism was to be restored and society embodied in the economy.

Understanding the Neoliberal Project with Polanyi

"Polanyi’s approach can help to understand the political impetus of neoliberal governing projects which saw these developments as obstacles for economic recovery."

What, then, is today’s relevance of Polanyi’s reflections on fascism? In my view, the social countertendencies he identified as responses to the unrestrained imposition of market society resurfaced in the social struggles and movements of the post-war period – in particular in 1968 and the social reform projects of the 1970s. The expansion of individual freedoms sought to realize the “utopian promise” of social inclusion in the words of Jürgen Habermas, individual freedom, and recognition in the democratic welfare state. They became the basis of emancipatory aspirations “not only” of the (traditional) working class, but also of women, ethnic minorities and other “minority” or marginalized groups and extended to struggles around sexual self-determination and gender identities.

Polanyi’s approach can help to understand the political impetus of neoliberal governing projects which saw these developments as obstacles for economic recovery. From the outset, neoliberal projects curtailed codetermination rights and trade-union activities, targeted the dismantling of economic-democratic institutions and control mechanisms, and sought to remove the economy from political control as they regarded these developments as obstacles to overcoming economic crises. Furthermore, through welfare-state cutbacks and reorganization, neoliberal policies aimed at recommodifying labor power and intensifying social inequalities. In the name of individual freedom on global markets, the autonomy gains of subjects vis-à-vis market dynamics (as well as traditional family ties and other personal dependencies and subordinations) were to be rolled back.

"The alleged universalistic promise of economic individualism of so-called progressive neoliberalism ultimately collapsed – confronted with the reality of the market dynamics it promoted."

For neoliberal projects, allegedly focusing on individual freedom on markets, the expansion of minority rights could be legitimate only insofar as it proved its economic profitability. This points to the attempts of “progressive neoliberalism,” which since the 1990s sought to make market society more socially sustainable through inclusion and diversity and in particular equal opportunity to participate in markets. However, the alleged universalistic promise of economic individualism of so-called progressive neoliberalism ultimately collapsed – confronted with the reality of the market dynamics it promoted. Rather, these dynamics contributed to reproducing social inequalities and hierarchies along race, class, and gender, which deepened in numerous countries after the 2008 financial crisis. This reflects two fundamental conditions: first, that a democratic, diverse, and inclusive society cannot be achieved on unregulated, expanding markets; and second, that the basic structures of capitalist market societies were not challenged in neoliberal societies based on the Thatcherian claim that there is no alternative.

Contemporary Fascisation as “Solution” to Social Crises

In light of the failure of progressive neoliberalism, the new far right developed a comprehensive set of authoritarian “solutions” to social crises and political blockages, replacing market individualism through national and religious – i.e., Christian – homogeneity. As can be seen almost paradigmatically in the actions of the second Trump administration, this “new fascism” strives to gain extensive control over political structures in order to restrict political influence over economic domains and to reduce the significance of democratic processes or even destroy them. Social inequalities are deepened by cuts to social programs, the abolition of affirmative action, attacks on the public sector, and the like. The expansion of freedoms and opportunities for the inclusion and participation of all members of society – grounded in comprehensive concepts of equality and emancipation and the extension of anti-discrimination provisions won by social movements – has become a prime target of an increasingly authoritarian and fascistoid restructuring project that centres around the white, male-dominated, Christian nation.

The expansion of freedoms and opportunities for the inclusion and participation of all members of society [...] has become a prime target of an increasingly authoritarian and fascistoid restructuring project that centres around the white, male-dominated, Christian nation.

From this (Polanyian) perspective, the question arises whether the outlined policies also have a systemic dimension oriented towards the rescue of capitalism, as did their historic counterparts. Since fascist “solutions” never intended to save capitalism as such but rather a specific national social formation – and since crises are always also socially constructed – a systemic justification of imposing an authoritarian “solution” for western/northern capitalism is part of the self-understanding of the far right or the new fascism.

To begin with, there is the far-right claim – especially in the Global North – of a decline of western societies under the sway of so-called “woke” ideologies and an allegedly migration-induced “great replacement” attributed to certain global elites. This is said to undermine entrenched patriarchal, white, and class-specific “natural” hierarchies. In addition to these phantasmatic perspectives, the political positions of the contemporary far right or “new fascism” involve the preservation of the capitalist development model of permanent growth based on private enterprise and fossilism, combustion engines, and unrestrained meat consumption – against their projections of an allegedly looming ecological dictatorship. Amongst others, they aim to create the political and ideological conditions to secure access to (fossil) resources against global competitors such as China amid an escalating climate crisis – if necessary, by means of warfare. To implement these policies, they furthermore try to re-educate individuals by reasserting for example entrenched masculinist and racist hierarchies. Members of society are to acquire those subject dispositions that make them willing to accept – or even enact – the violent defense of borders against climate refugees, rather than merely “enduring some cruel images”, as Sebastian Kurz, former Austrian prime minister and now staffer to a representative of the fascistoid tech-oligarchy, once emphasized.

Only if – opposed to what Polanyi calls “freedom’s utter frustration” – the connections between individual freedom, universal notions of equality, and the extension of democracy can be restored in all their already attained complexity, can a new perspective on freedom in a global, complex society be opened.

Roland Atzmüller is Associate Professor at the Institute of Sociology at Johannes Kepler University in Linz, Austria, focusing on (critical) theories of capitalist societies, welfare states and social policies with an emphasis on labour market policies.

Further Readings

  • Atzmüller, Roland; Décieux, Fabienne (2019): “Freedom’s utter frustration…”: Neoliberal social-policy reforms and the shift to the far-right through Polanyi’s theory of fascism. In: Roland Atzmüller, Brigitte Aulenbacher, Ulrich Brand, Fabienne Décieux, Karin Fischer und Birgit Sauer (Hg.): Capitalism in transformation. Movements and countermovements in the 21st century. Cheltenham, UK u.a.: Edward Elgar Publishing, S. 135–151.

  • Dale, Gareth; Desan, Mathieu (2019): Fascism. In: Gareth Dale, Christopher Holmes und Maria Markantonatou (Hg.): Karl Polanyi’s political and economic thought. A critical guide, S. 151–170.

  • Polanyi, Karl (2018): The essence of fascism. In: Karl Polanyi (Hg.): Economy and society. Selected writings. Edited by Michele Cangiani and Claus Thomasberger. Cambridge/Medford: Polity, S. 81–107.

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Vortrag und Buchvorstellung von Lucí Cavallero: Feministische Kämpfe in Argentinien unter Milei

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LUCi cavallero - Femi­nis­ti­sche Kämpfe gegen den Auto­ri­ta­ris­mus der finan­zi­el­len Frei­heit. Argentinien unter Milei.

April 29th, 2026

6. MaI LINZ WISSENSTURM

In diesem Vortrag wird Luci Cavallero ihr jüngstes Buch „Contra el autoritarismo de la libertad financiera“ (tinta limón, 2025, mit Verónica Gago) vorstellen, in dem sie analysiert, wie im Namen der Freiheit die Finanzmärkte das Leben der Mehrheit regieren. Sie zeigt, dass der Begriff der Freiheit im zeitgenössischen Finanzkapitalismus eine zentrale Rolle spielt – angetrieben von den neuen Rechten und gelenkt von Konzernen, die Reichtum in algorithmischen und extraktiven Formen konzentrieren.

Ausgehend von ihren jüngsten Forschungen im argentinischen und lateinamerikanischen Kontext wird Cavallero die Verflechtungen von Neoliberalismus, Autoritarismus und Antifeminismus untersuchen, die in der sogenannten „finanziellen Freiheit“ ihr Fetischkonzept, ihre großspurige, aber zugleich perverse Hülle finden – angesichts der beschleunigten Verarmung und sozialen Grausamkeit. Abschließend wird sie die Kämpfe der argentinischen transfeministischen Bewegung gegen den Vormarsch der extremen Rechten beleuchten sowie deren Widerstand zur Verteidigung anderer Formen von Leben, Gemeinschaft und Freiheit.

 

Der Vortrag wird auf Spanisch gehalten und vor Ort auf Deutsch übersetzt.

Übersetzung: Fatima El Kosht, das kollektiv

Moderation: Johanna Neuhauser, JKU Linz

 

Luci Cavallero ist Soziologin und Forscherin an der Universität Buenos Aires. Ihre Forschung konzentriert sich u.a. auf Schulden und Geschlecht. Sie ist Aktivistin bei Ni Una Menos, einer feministischen Bewegung, die sich gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt einsetzt. Sie hat zusammen mit Veronica Gago „A Feminist Reading of Debt“ (2021) und „Der Haushalt als Versuchslabor Feministische Kämpfe um Mieten, Haus- und Heimarbeit“ (2023) veröffentlicht. 

 

VHS Linz in Kooperation mit der Abteilung für Gesellschaftstheorie und Sozialanalysen (Johannes Kepler Universität Linz), das kollektiv (kritische bildungs-, beratungs- und kulturarbeit von und für migrant*innen) und dem Center Interdisziplinäre Geschlechterforschung Innsbruck (CGI) der Universität Innsbruck sowie dem Institut für Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung (IFG), dem Institut für die Gesamtanalyse der Wirtschaft (ICAE), dem Arbeitsbereich Globale Soziologie und Entwicklungsforschung (alle Johannes Kepler Universität Linz), dem Institut für angewandte Entwicklungspolitik (IAE), der International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS) und maiz (autonomes zentrum von & für migrantinnen). 

 

Luchas feministas en Argentina bajo Milei

 

En esta conferencia, Luci Cavallero presentará su último libro, “Contra el autoritarismo de la libertad financiera” (tinta limón, 2025, con Verónica Gago) en el que analiza cómo, en nombre de la libertad, las finanzas gobiernan la vida de las mayorías. La autora muestra que el concepto de libertad desempeña un papel central en el capitalismo financiero contemporáneo, impulsado por las ultraderechas y dirigido por corporaciones que concentran la riqueza en su forma algorítmica y extractiva.

 

A partir de sus últimas investigaciones en el contexto argentino y latinoamericano, Cavallero examinará las interrelaciones entre el neoliberalismo, el autoritarismo y el antifeminismo, que encuentran en la llamada “libertad financiera” su concepto-fetiche, ropaje grandilocuente y a la vez perverso frente a la velocidad del empobrecimiento y la crueldad social. Por último, analizará las luchas del movimiento transfeminista argentino contra el avance de la ultraderecha, así como su resistencia en defensa de otras formas de vida, comunidad y libertad.

 

La conferencia se impartirá en español y se traducirá al alemán in situ.

Traducción: Fatima El Kosht, das kollektiv

Moderación: Johanna Neuhauser, JKU Linz

 

Luci Cavallero es socióloga e investigadora en la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Su investigación se centra, entre otras cosas, en la deuda y el género. Es activista de Ni Una Menos, un movimiento feminista que lucha contra la violencia de género. Publicó junto a Verónica Gago “A Feminist Reading of Debt” (2021) y “Der Haushalt als Versuchslabor Feministische Kämpfe um Mieten, Haus- und Heimarbeit” (2023).

den Auto­ri­ta­ris­mus der finan­zi­el­len Frei­heit. Argentinien unter Milei. 

Luci Cavallero (Buenos Aires), Forscherin und Aktivistin bei Ni Una Menos, stellt ihr jüngstes Buch „Contra el autoritarismo de la libertad financiera“ (2025, mit Verónica Gago) vor. In dem Buch untersuchen die Autorinnen die Verflechtungen von Neoliberalismus, Autoritarismus und Antifeminismus, die in der sogenannten „finanziellen Freiheit“ ihr Fetischkonzept finden. 

Luci Cavallero kommt im Mai 2026 nach Österreich und wird drei Vorträge halten: 

Innsbruck: 5. Mai, 18:00 Uhr, am Center Interdisziplinäre Geschlechterforschung Innsbruck

Linz: 6. Mai, 19:00 Uhr, am  Wissensturm, Volkshochschule Linz und Abteilung für Gesellschaftstheorie und Sozialanalysen, JKU Linz

Wien: 7. Mai, 18:30 Uhr, an dem IPW,  Universität Wien, Arbeitsbereich Geschlecht und Politik in Kooperation mit dem Arbeitsbereich internationale Politik und der Forschungsgruppe Lateinamerika

Wir freuen uns auf viele interessierte Zuhörer*innen in Innsbruck, Linz und Wien!

ES WIRD UM ANMELDUNG bei der VHS Linz gebeten!
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Road to serfdom or great transformation? Lessons for today from competing Viennese schools

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Road to serfdom or great transformation?
Lessons for today from competing Viennese schools

April 28th, 2026

A dialogue between Richard Cockett and Andreas Novy,
moderated by Valentina Ausserladscheider 

We cordially invite you to join us for an evening event at WU Executive Academy’s Foyer on May 11th, 2026 at 6pm 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the cosmopolitan city of Vienna was a global hub of intellectual cross-pollination, influencing everything from psychology to art to advertising. This is the premise of historian and Economist journalist Richard Cockett’s pathbreaking book, Vienna: How the City of Ideas Created the Modern World.
Arguably one of Vienna’s most enduring legacies has been the “Austrian School” of economics. Developed by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, its liberal values of personal and economic freedom would prove influential in major economies in the latter part of the 20th century. Yet, the Austrian School developed its ideas in direct tension with the radical social welfare model of 1920s Red Vienna. While Hayek and Mises saw such state intervention as the first step on the “Road to Serfdom,” to Karl Polanyi – the “other” Viennese economist – it encompassed his vision of a “mixed economy”, where democratic freedoms are upheld, and markets serve social needs. 
As today’s liberal world order faces increasing threats – often from self-described liberals – the panel will discuss the relevance of the competing Viennese schools in navigating an uncertain future.
 
Venue: Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 1, Foyer of Executive Academy
Time: May 11th 2026, 6 pm
Organized by  IKPS and ISSET (WU)
 
SPEAKERS:
Richard Cockett, historian & economist
Andreas Novy, WU Vienna and International Karl Polanyi Society
MODERATION:
Valentina Ausserladscheider, University of Vienna
You can watch the event below!

F&L Blog – No Nationalism Without Exclusion

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No Nationalism without Exclusion: On the Left’s Return to the Nation-State

by Valentina Ausserladscheider

09.04.2026

Does the nation-state offer democratic protection in an age of crisis – or does it reproduce the exclusions that helped generate those crises in the first place? In this article, economic sociologist Valentina Ausserladscheider examines why moments of economic and political dislocation repeatedly revive demands for national sovereignty – even on the left. While many contemporary left accounts portray the nation-state as the last viable site of social protection and democratic control, she argues that this move risks recoding rather than questioning the national form of the state itself. Drawing on debates in political theory, sociology, and critical political economy, the article argues that nationalism is never a neutral instrument: defining a political community always entails drawing boundaries of belonging and exclusion. At stake, then, is not only the resurgence of the far right, but a broader political convergence around nationalist frameworks of protection – but according to Ausserladscheider, there is also a democratic politics that can move beyond them.

Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation remains indispensable because it diagnosed how the collapse of liberal market society generated a widespread desire for protection. Historically, however, this demand did not produce an emancipatory response. Instead, the search for protection gave rise to nationalist spatial-political regimes. Most catastrophically through fascism and National Socialism, these regimes restored political control within bordered nation-state containers. The crucial lesson is that the crisis of liberal globalization did not simply produce “more state,” but a turn to national sovereignty through exclusion as the dominant horizon of response. That lesson matters today as the ascent of the far right openly couples social protection to chauvinism and nationalist exclusion. More surprisingly, even sections of the left increasingly flirt with the idea that democratic protection, welfare, and planning can only be recovered within nationally bounded forms. What this underestimates is that nationalism is never a neutral instrument. Once protection is framed nationally, exclusion is no longer a side effect but part and parcel of the political logic itself – an issue this blog post seeks to examine.

The Deceptive Appeal of the Nation-State

In the wake of recent developments such as increasing financial instability, ecological breakdown, geopolitical fragmentation, inflation, and the exhaustion of neoliberal globalization, a range of left and heterodox-economic accounts have renewed the case for the nation-state as the primary site of democratic agency, economic regulation, and social protection. These accounts locate both the crises and our inability to address them in the disembedding effects of globalized neoliberalism. Costas Lapavitsas, Professor of Economics at SOAS, for example, has made “the left case against the EU,” casting it as a neoliberal citadel from which nation-states must be defended through popular and national sovereignty. Another instance is Wolfgang Streeck, former Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, who – after his famous critiques of the EU´s austerity and neoliberal policy – moved toward controversial arguments about borders and immigration control as a last defense of the European welfare state. Streeck also became politically active in his support for Sahra Wagenknecht and her left-conservative, migration-critical party BSW. From this perspective, the sovereign nation-state has re-emerged as the last credible site from which market power might be restrained, political accountability restored, and planning capacities reconstituted.

This argument has real force. Transnational markets have escaped democratic control, while supranational institutions have insulated economic governance from popular contestation. The appeal of the nation-state lies not only in its familiarity, but in its concentration of fiscal, legal, territorial, and administrative power. The left return to the nation-state is therefore not simply nostalgic, but a response to a genuine institutional problem. In these accounts, the state is seen as the most capable institutions for constraining capital, organizing redistribution, and sustaining democratic solidarity – an argument that deserves serious engagement. Indeed, democratic institutions require a demos, which historically been organized within bounded political communities. Abstract cosmopolitanism, however, has thus far offered little concrete institutional approaches for redistribution, decarbonization, or decommodification.

"The nation-state is not a neutral scale of governance. It is a historically sedimented form of political belonging organized through the distinction between members and non-members."

The pitfall of this argument, however, is that it leaves the conventional understanding of the state as the nation-state intact, without adequate scrutiny. Since these approaches do not question the national framing of the state, the problem concerns not only institutional power but also the bounded and exclusionary community that such power is assumed to represent, a logic intrinsic to nationalism. Nationalism is not merely representative of a national political community; it is also a way of drawing boundaries around political membership. In that sense, there is no nationalism without exclusion. The nation-state is thus not a neutral scale of governance. It is a historically sedimented form of political belonging organized through the distinction between members and non-members. Even in its civic or universalist variants, nationalism presupposes a bounded community in whose name decisions are taken and distributive claims justified. Therefore, the nation-state remains exclusionary.

No Nationalism Without Exclusion

Among the many accounts demonstrating that nationalism is inherently exclusionary, Meghan Tinsley´s critique of patriotism is exemplary: while patriotism has been represented as a supposed counterweight to ethnocultural nationalism, Tinsley argues that patriotism itself hardens racialized distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Thomas Jeffrey Miley likewise stresses that “nation” is bound to the legitimation of “states” – a nexus that has shown strong affinities with racism and fascism. Bhambra and Holmwood, in turn, show that the liberal welfare state cannot be understood apart from European colonial exploitation. These boundaries are not incidental; they are constitutive. To define a people is always also to define those who do not belong.

Exclusion, then, is not a deviation from nationalism but one of its basic operations. Its forms vary – juridical, racial, cultural, territorial, colonial, administrative – but it is always present. Nationalism establishes a principle of priority for those recognized as members of the nation, structuring the distribution of rights, protections, and vulnerabilities. The outsider – migrant, refugee, minority, internal stranger, geopolitical rival – is therefore central, not secondary, to national politics.

"Fascism does not emerge mechanically from nationalism, but nationalism supplies symbolic and institutional resources that fascist and reactionary movements can radicalize."

This is where the historical record matters. A critique of the left’s renewed attachment to the nation-state does not require the crude claim that all nationalism is fascist, or that every defense of sovereignty culminates in authoritarianism. The stronger claim is that nationalism has repeatedly furnished the grammar through which crises of liberal order are translated into projects of closure, hierarchy, and restoration. Fascism does not emerge mechanically from nationalism, but nationalism supplies symbolic and institutional resources that fascist and reactionary movements can radicalize.

Because of this, the left cannot assume that it can mobilize the desire for protection in national terms without reproducing the terrain on which the far right possesses decisive advantages. This may be the central error of left-national or sovereigntist currents: they treat nationalism as if it were a progressive idiom detachable from its exclusionary history. Indeed, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas warn against the hype around supposedly “new” issues such as immigration and cultural grievance when these often eclipse enduring economic concerns; reclaiming the discussion on inequality would be a more promising strategy for the left than entering a contest over national belonging. 

Going Beyond the Dichotomy

"The problem with the left’s renewed attachment to nation-state sovereignty is not that state institutions are unimportant, but that state-centred strategies alone are inadequate to crises whose causes and dynamics exceed national borders."

None of this implies a defense of globalized neoliberalism, nor does it deny the importance of state institutions in any plausible project of transformation. The historical lesson is that nationalism is not an empty vessel waiting to be filled with progressive content. It is a mode of political belonging constituted through exclusion. The answer to current crises cannot be a left politics that re-legitimates the nation as the privileged horizon of protection. Solutions cannot be limited to either national or inter-, transnational. Global challenges such as climate change demand political solutions beyond this dichotomy – both within and beyond the state.

The problem with the left’s renewed attachment to nation-state sovereignty is not that state institutions are unimportant, but that state-centred strategies alone are inadequate to crises whose causes and dynamics exceed national borders. This does not mean we can ignore the familiar critiques of transnational governance – its democratic deficits, technocratic insulation, and subordination to market imperatives. The democratic failures of transnational governance are real as Robert Dahl so convincingly explained decades ago. But the answer to those failures cannot be a retreat into the nation-state as the final horizon of politics. The crises that define the present exceed that horizon and necessitates responses on all levels. With Jürgen Habermas’s death, we have also lost one of the most important thinkers who insisted that democracy need not end at the borders of the nation-state. The question, then, is not whether we can afford to think beyond the state, but whether we can afford not to.

Valentina Ausserladscheider is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology at the University of Vienna. Her research focuses, among other topics, on the relationship between neoliberalism and right-wing populism.

Further Readings

  • Ausserladscheider, Valentina. (2024). Far-right populism and the making of the exclusionary neoliberal state. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Ausserladscheider, Valentina. (2024) Constructing a neoliberal exclusionary state: the role of far-right populism in economic policy change in post-war Austria. Comparative European Politics 22, 128–152.

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F&L Blog – Beyond Net Zero

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Beyond Net Zero: Towards a Climate Politics that Can Defeat the Far Right

by Christopher Shaw

26.03.2026

Christopher Shaw holds Research Associate roles at both the University of Sussex’s School of Global Studies and the Working Class Climate Alliance, and is a leading voice in climate communications in the UK. Below, he argues that the UK’s liberal, technocratic net zero climate politics has reached its limits. By ignoring both the political roots of the climate crisis, and the voices of the working class, net zero has allowed itself to be instrumentalized by the far-right. Drawing on recent political developments, Shaw outlines what a climate politics, rooted in social justice and grassroots democracy, could look like, in the fight not just for heat pumps or electric cars—but a world that feels like home.

The UK’s net zero policy: preserving liberalism versus preserving life

As the centrist waters recede back down the beach of history, climate policies are left stranded and exposed on the shore, flapping about like so many dying fish. Who will fight for net zero now? Not the European Union it seems, which is busy shredding many of its flagship climate policies, whilst the long standing net zero consensus in the UK is now coming apart. Even climate researchers supportive of net zero remain divided over the ability of net zero to deliver emission cuts quickly and fairly. To cap it all, campaigners have seen twenty years of efforts to get people to adopt the low carbon behaviours needed to deliver net zero come to naught. The rapid and ongoing collapse of the net zero policy architecture leaves climate campaigners with two choices. The first is to double down on net zero, turning increasingly to geo-engineering and technological innovation as the primary tools used to fix the climate. This limits the need to involve people or politics. The only choice the public needs to make is whether to install an air source or ground source heat pump. The second option is to recognise that the climate fight is, and always has been, political. Campaigners are choosing the first option, a strategy destined to fail further and faster than ever before. Rather than trying to lift climate policy out of the democratic sphere, we need narratives that present climate change as a product of the same politics that have delivered austerity, inequality and war. Fixing climate change means fixing the political conditions that are generating these crises. If this is not a fight the existing liberal climate movement wants to take on, we will need a new climate movement, one that does not prioritise the preservation of liberalism over the preservation of life.

The myth of the good liberal citizen

"Support for net zero has also come to stand as a marker of whether or not you are a good liberal citizen."

There is more anger, resentment and fear abroad today than liberal politics can assimilate – liberal politics and the current public mood are as oil and water. Liberal climate policy remains wedded to the hope that the evidence-based application of intellect and reason will dissipate both greenhouse gases and public anger. Through calculation and rational deliberation we can fashion a painless technocratic and reformist path to the net zero land beyond history. Liberals look to an eternal tomorrow of ‘self-regulating citizens conducting resource-efficient and sustainable lives’, enjoying outdoor yoga, cycling to the repair cafe. The mainstream climate movement is blind to the true function of net zero; it is an idea created by the allies of capital as an instrument of control, handed over to the middle class liberal climate movement to then sell to the working class as their only hope of a decent life. Support for net zero has also come to stand as a marker of whether or not you are a good liberal citizen. It doesn’t matter if you enabled the bombing of 2 million Gazans or got rich from an exploitative finance system. If you are on board with net zero then you are part of the liberal climate family. As a consequence, your voice is more deserving of attention and obedience than a poor person of poor means who is critical of net zero. If you want to identify as a progressive then you have to support net zero. If you don’t support net zero you are a fascist.

Towards a climate politics that can defeat the far right

"The UK Green Party recently overturned a huge Labour majority without once mentioning climate change in their leaflets"

There is much excellent theoretical and practical work to draw on when thinking about what sort of climate politics can defeat the far right. Efforts to articulate and promote a Green New Deal offer vital insights for how to combine climate policy with an anti-austerity, anti-imperialist agenda. Community engagement projects across Europe have identified important knowledge about barriers and opportunities for combining climate action with social justice campaigns. These ideas will remain on the margins all the while climate organizations continue drawing from the same privileged strata of society, or insist any subaltern actors must adopt middle class values and norms before being allowed into the circle. The political shift we are seeing as parties of the left and far right gain momentum is an opportunity for the climate movement to jump to the left and engage in the battle for humanity’s future.

The UK Green Party recently overturned a huge Labour majority without once mentioning climate change in their leaflets, focusing instead on poverty and the destruction of public services. This reflects a deep public rift with the liberal climate agenda. It points toward the path we need to take — further and faster, in the opposite direction to that mapped out by net zero narratives: away from global and towards the local, away from work and towards play, prioritise the human over the machine, democracy over technocracy, the substantive over the abstract, equality over difference, the social over the individual. It is only from these foundations that we can undermine the allure of far-right politics, whilst building a climate strategy from the bottom up.

For a world that feels like home

"Such technologies may be a part of living in a carbon-constrained world, but the first task is to recreate the social world, to make a world people feel at home in, feel rooted in, have control over."

The failure of the liberal climate movement is in part a failure to understand human nature. Liberalism, and the climate policies it has birthed, wrongly assume there is a space above and beyond the human heart. We cannot escape our own subjectivity. Right-wing politicians would rather see the world destroyed than compromise their political beliefs. This is also true for liberalism. This is also true for climate campaigners. This is also true for you and me. I joined the climate fight because it seemed to me the best reason for the ecosocialist future I already wanted. I am not going to fight for a decarbonised capitalist future of ground source heat pumps, a modernised electricity grid, or more EV charging points, even if I thought such things would preserve a liveable future for my children. Such technologies may be a part of living in a carbon-constrained world, but the first task is to recreate the social world, to make a world people feel at home in, feel rooted in, have control over. There seems nothing so thrilling as this prospect. Whilst liberalism makes a fetish of free will and individual autonomy, the vast majority can see that the decisions about our future have already been made for us by experts and leaders. Net zero promised to let the targets be humanity’s guide and leave the politics behind. But actually what we need is maximum politics in climate policy, a genuine grassroots democracy, a mechanism for embracing and channeling public anger towards a world that feels like home, not an innovation hub.

Christopher Shaw holds Research Associate roles at both the University of Sussex's School of Global Studies and the Working Class Climate Alliance, and is a leading voice in climate communications in the UK.

Further Readings

  • Bernstein, Steven. F. (2001). The compromise of liberal environmentalism. Columbia University Press.
  • Crary, Jonathan. (2022). Scorched earth: Beyond the digital age to a post-capitalist world. Verso books.
  • Moyn, Samuel. (2023). Liberalism against itself: Cold War intellectuals and the making of our times. Yale University Press.
  • Rose, Matthew. (2021). A world after liberalism: Philosophers of the radical right. Yale University Press.
  • Shaw, Christopher. (2023). Liberalism and the challenge of climate change. Routledge.

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TWO Webinars in preparation for the “Democracy under Pressure” 2027 Conference

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JOIN us for TWO WEBINARs to prepare the 2027 conference

March 26th, 2026

We, the International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS), the Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET) and the Institute for Law and Governance cordially invite you to join our webinars in preparation for the 2027 conference “Democracy under Pressure.” After the discussion of texts by Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt and their understanding of freedom and democracy, of the state and markets and of fascism and liberalism in our Reading Circle, the webinars will further engage in discussions about alternatives to the current radicalization of neoliberal thought.

The webinars will take place via Zoom on the following dates,  starting at from 6pm (CET).

  • Mon, May 18, 2026, 6pm:
    “Global Finance and Fascism: Yesterday and Today” – Webinar with Ann Pettifor and Bruno De Conti

    The second webinar will discuss learnings from the great transformation following the Great Depression after 1929 for better understanding and combatting the emerging far-right reactionary movements today. The focus of the exchange will be on identifying differences and similarities of the respective manifestations of economic liberalism and reactionary political-cultural movements and parties in both moments, including the joint attack on democratic and egalitarian institutions by economic liberals and cultural reactionaries. 

    The webinar will start discussing the political consequences of the demise of the gold standard in the 1930s and the resultant increased national policy space – for fascism as well as reformism. Of special interest are similarities and differences in the center and on the periphery of the world economy. The webinar will continue by discussing the implications for the current conjuncture: What are the prospects for global finance given the current crisis of neoliberal globalization? How does the ongoing dominance of global financial markets in the 2020s contribute to the proliferation of far-right movements and what would be the prospects for progressive politics of a recurrence of disintegrating global financial markets? 

    Ann Pettifor is a political economist, author and public speaker. Her work focusses on the global financial system, sovereign debt restructuring, and international finance.

    Bruno De Conti is Associate Professor at the University of Campinas, Brazil. His work focusses on the International Monetary System, the Chinese Economy, and BRICS.

    Andreas Novy, Associate Professor and head of the ISSET Institute at WU Vienna and president of the International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS), will moderate the discussion with Ann Pettifor and Bruno De Conti.

     

  • Mon, April 13, 2026, 6pm:
    “The Law of Capitalism and How to Transform It”
     The first webinar  will present and discuss Katharina Pistor’s new book “The Law of Capitalism and How to Transform It” and its implications for understanding and overcoming the erosion of democratic institutions across the globe.
    In her book, Katharina Pistor argues that capitalism is not just an economic system; it is a deeply entrenched legal order that enables private wealth accumulation and shields it from democratic oversight. She demonstrates how legal codes privilege capital and corrode social cohesion by favouring certain assets, markets, and property relations, with far-reaching implications for democracy and the climate crisis. This places law at the centre of any response to these converging challenges.
    The webinar will explore if and how legal and economic structures need to be transformed to counteract these challenges. What roles can lawyers, economists, legislators, and civil society play in reshaping the legal foundations of capitalism? And, how feasible is such a transformation in the current political conjuncture

    Katharina Pistor is Edwin B. Parker Professor of Comparative Law at Columbia University. She is a leading scholar and writer on corporate governance, money and finance, property rights, and comparative law and legal institutions.

    Anne Sanders holds the Chair of Civil Law, Corporate Law, Family Business Law and Judicial Research at Bielefeld University. Her research focuses, among other things, on legal issues of sustainable entrepreneurship and the concept of steward ownership.

    Verena Madner, Head of the Institute for Law and Governance at WU, will moderate the discussion with Katharina Pistor and Anne Sanders.

The webinars are being held in preparation for the conference on “Democracy Under Pressure: Conditions of the Authoritarian Turn Yesterday and Today” which will take place 24 to 26 May 2027 in Vienna, organized by the Institute for Law and Governance, the Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET), and the International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS). Please find the save the date for the conference here. 

We are looking forward to your participation and to an exciting exchange!

Andreas Novy, Verena Madner and Stefan Mayr

REPLAYS:

WEBINAR DETAILS:

2nd WEBINAR
“Global Finance and Fascism: Yesterday and Today”

Date:
May 18th, 6PM (CET) via Zoom

Participants:
Ann Pettifor,
Bruno De Conti, 
(University of Campinas, Brazil)

Moderation:
Andreas Novy

1st WEBINAR
“The Law of Capitalism and How to Transform It”

Date:
April 13th, 6PM (CET) via Zoom

Participants:
Katharina Pistor, speaker,
(Columbia Law, USA)
Anne Sanders, discussant,
(Bielefeld University, Germany)

Moderation:
Verena Madner

Organised by:

Institute for Law and Governance (WU Vienna)
Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (WU Vienna: ISSET)
International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS)

FURTHER READINGS:

New IKPS blog by the IKPS on 
Fascism and Liberalism: Yesterday and Today 

i.e.:
Markets and Morals: The Reactionary Right’s Ideological Core by Andreas Novy

2027 CONFERENCE:

https://www.karlpolanyisociety.com/2026/03/24/2027-conference-democracy-under-pressure/Join us in May 2027 for the Conference “DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE” in Vienna 
Read more here!

SPEAKERS

Anne Sanders

Ann Pettifor

Bruno De Conti

Katharina Pistor

2027 CONFERENCE: DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE

Media

SAVE THE DATE: CONFERENCE (2027)

The Institute for Law and Governance, the Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET) and the International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS) at WU Vienna University of Economics and Business cordially invite you to the interdisciplinary conference on:

Democracy Under Pressure: Conditions of the Authoritarian Turn Yesterday and Today

Date:
May 24th-26th, 2027

The 2020s have witnessed a troubling erosion of democratic institutions across the globe. In the US, MAGA questions electoral legitimacy and undermines state administrations and fundamental rights. In general, “illiberal democracies” and “electoral autocracies” challenge constitutional courts and related checks and balances. Consequently, contemporary societies in established democracies face multiple threats to democratic resilience, including the return of fascism.

This interdisciplinary conference addresses this urgent challenge through a specific lens: It seeks to explore how intellectual debates from a past period of democratic crisis—the 1920s and 1930s—can provide insights into current dilemmas.

While history does not repeat itself, it is often said to rhyme. The conference will connect historical debates on markets, law, and authority to analyses of contemporary challenges to liberal democracies posed, inter alia, by digital surveillance, gendered anti-feminism, inequality, climate crisis, and imperialism. To shed light on today’s authoritarian turn, we will explore competing diagnoses from four pivotal thinkers— Friedrich von Hayek (“state interventionism leads to fascism”), Karl Polanyi (“fascism defends capitalism while sacrificing democracy”), Hans Kelsen (“democracy is based on pluralist compromise”), and Carl Schmitt (“sovereignty means the power to decide on the state of exception”).

Vienna—a city whose history embodies both the promise and fragility of democratic experimentation—offers the ideal setting for this urgent conversation.

The Department of Socioeconomics at WU, our academic home base, is an interdisciplinary faculty, uniting economists, social scientists, and legal scholars—a unique institution in the German-speaking context.

“While history does not repeat itself, it is often said to rhyme.”

Core Questions

Rather than contemplating ready-made answers, the conference will investigate burning issues related to contested democracies past and present: Are economic liberalism and political authoritarianism related and if so, how do they intersect? What can the 1920s-30s teach us about socioeconomic causes of constitutional fragility and political collapse? How do current technological and politico-economic developments impact contemporary forms of authoritarianism? And how can we move from “what went wrong then” to “what and how to transform today?”.

Methodological Approach

The conference employs three complementary methods.

  • Textual Reconstruction: Close reading of primary sources to understand each thinker’s arguments in their strongest form, avoiding caricature while identifying genuine tensions and contradictions by connecting texts to their context.
  • Comparative Historical Analysis: Examining case studies of democratic resilience and collapse in the interwar period (Austria 1933-34, Germany 1930-33) and contemporary cases (Hungary, Poland, Spain’s Catalan crisis, US, Brazil for example) to identify patterns and divergences.
  • Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue: Structured panels pairing legal scholars with economists, and historians with political theorists, to explore how different disciplinary perspectives illuminate—or obscure—connections between economic processes and political-legal outcomes.

Format

Three days of keynotes, cross-disciplinary panels, and round table discussions to examine the intersections of socioeconomics and law. Sessions will be organized around substantive problems rather than individual thinkers, ensuring genuine dialogue across perspectives.

Our call is aimed at scholars from various disciplines, including economics, economic sociology, law and political economy, constitutional theory, political science, and history.

Expected Outcomes

The conference seeks to foster scholarly networks capable of sustained interdisciplinary engagement with democracy’s present crisis. Rather than providing predetermined conclusions, it seeks to clarify what historic debates can—and cannot—teach us about contemporary challenges to democratic institutions and socioeconomic development. It aims to achieve a better understanding of the underlying politico-economic and socio-cultural conditions of the current authoritarian turn, thereby contributing to a new research programme at the intersection of socioeconomics and law.

Full call and registration details coming soon.

DETAILS

Date:
May 24th-26th, 2027

Facilitation:
Institute for Law and Governance
Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET)
International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS)
(WU Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Keynote Speakers:
Katharina Pistor (Columbia Law)
Quinn Slobodian (Boston University)

Quinn Slobodian

Katharina Pistor

Organised by:

Institute for Law and Governance
Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET)
International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS)
(WU Vienna University of Economics and Business)

More info coming soon:

Watch this space for more info.

Check out our preparatory work & events:

As preparation for the conference we have held Reading Cicles and two webinars and we also recommend reading our and many other authors’ work on our FASCISM & LIBERALISM blog, which you can find here:

SPEAKERS

Quinn Slobodian

Katharina Pistor