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F&L Blog – The Hegemonic Project of the Right

November 12, 2026F&L Blogcountermovements, hegemony, Neoliberalism, polanyi, reactionary rightIKPS

The Hegemonic Project of the Right: Why the reactionary Right is more than a Polanyian countermovement

by Andreas Novy

12.11.2026

The reactionary Right has emerged as a powerful political movement promoting two forms of supremacist rule: disruptive capitalist governance and a traditionalist cultural order. This is why Andreas Novy critiques interpretations of Polanyi that understand contemporary reactionary movements solely as regressive “countermovements” seeking protection against immigration and a cosmopolitan liberal elite. Instead, he argues that we must recognize their aspiration to establish hegemony. An adequate response to this unruly alliance of neoliberals and traditionalists therefore requires an alternative hegemonic project of the political Left – one that ensures access to affordable foundational goods and services for all.

Contemporary actors of the reactionary Right, from Trump and Milei to Le Pen and Meloni, present themselves as ‘anti-establishment’, uniting diverse reactionary, supremacist, and fascist movements. While they cannot simply be equated with twentieth-century fascism, important parallels nevertheless exist. Both, historical fascist movements and the contemporary reactionary Right, profit from the failures of a liberal and globalized form of capitalism – then “laissez-faire” and now neoliberal – marked by austerity, unemployment and existential insecurity. And both appear as alternatives to this socioeconomic order – as anti-systemic “countermovements” against the cosmopolitan liberal mainstream, advancing a non-cosmopolitan form of capitalism instead.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “countermovement” – originally describing a response to the alienating and disruptive forces of globalized capitalism – has been increasingly employed to describe a range of political developments, including the resurgence of reactionary Right movements. In this article, I will discuss the political implications of (mis-)using the Polanyian concept of “countermovement” in understanding and combatting neoliberalism as well as the reactionary Right.

The Limits of Countermovements for Protection

In his 1944 book The Great Transformation Polanyi introduces the idea of the “double movement” – a central concept of his work. According to Polanyi, this double movement consists of, on the one hand, movements fostering capitalist improvements by expanding markets and, on the other, countermovements fostering habitation, meaning secure and familiar forms of life, by expanding social protection to alleviate the perils of globalized markets. Polanyi describes how the liberal laissez-faire regime became increasingly contested, especially once parliamentary democracy was implemented after World War I. While democratic governments aimed at introducing policies to foster social protection for its citizens, business fiercely opposed any regulations by democratic policymakers.

In the 1930s, democratic economic liberalism finally collapsed, giving rise to what Polanyi calls the “great transformation”. It was characterized by the takeover of anti-cosmopolitan and state-centered political movements that reclaimed control over the economy in different ways: fascism as a war economy in Germany and Italy, nation-state-centered authoritarian communism in Soviet Russia and the social-democratic New Deal in the US. After World War II, heavily discredited capital factions agreed on a class compromise resulting in welfare and developmental states. Readers of Polanyi have interpreted this development as a pendulum swing towards social protection, followed by another pendulum swing in the 1970/80s towards marketization, introduced by strengthened globalized capital factions.

In the following, I will contest this reading. The Polanyian double movement of marketization and social protection is not an eternal pendulum but constitutes a contradictory entanglement in capitalist development. Instead, I propose an understanding of Polanyi’s double movement as a back-and-forth between more and less liberalized forms of capitalism, leaving the underlying logic of capitalism – its property relations and supremacist structures – intact.

"Polanyi aspired to societal transformation, not only to protection in a disordered world."

This understanding is important, as in a capitalist order no reform is possible that only creates institutions of social protection without also transforming capitalist institutions such as markets and property. As Claus Thomasberger correctly points out, Polanyi opposed economic liberalism – namely its defense of private property rights and reliance on the market as the solution, as it weakens our capacity to meet the challenges of a complex society [1]. Thus, Polanyi aspired to societal transformation, not only to protection in a disordered world.

Therefore, countermovements that merely seek to foster protection in the neoliberal status quo can neither be the heroes of history nor the primary source of hope. Rather, they are societal pushes to implement forms of social protection by diverse actors, diverging means, and for diverse objectives [2]. Polanyi even uses the term “move” as a substitute for countermovement, when talking about the “purely practical and pragmatic nature of the ‘collectivist’ countermove” [3]. The “move” from laissez faire to more collectivist forms of politics, heavily contested already in the 19^th century, was pursued by heterogeneous actors. There were socialist actors like trade unions and the cooperative movement, but also conservative actors, such as Bismarck introducing social security, or reactionary ones, for example culturally reactionary farmers defending an entrepreneurial market ideology while implementing tariffs to limit globalization.

Despite this diversity of historical experiences, an enthusiastic but often reductionist focus on progressive countermovements for protection has inspired a generation of researchers and activists under neoliberal globalization [4]. These movements and related research are based on the conviction that our world is not for sale, that not everything can or should become a commodity, and that there must be limits to the expansionary and extractivist logic of capitalism. There are diverse examples of such grassroots-oriented countermovements that either organize resistance or prefigure a society beyond market fundamentalism, under the label of solidarity- or care economy, commoning, or other forms of cooperatively organizing livelihoods.

Such protectionist countermovements, historically as well as today, have been decisive in securing livelihoods, guaranteeing survival, and sustaining human dignity. However, they face limitations. Often arising as crisis responses, they tend to represent sectional or communitarian interests, for example communities opposing data centers, workers demanding higher wages, landless getting access to land, or households demanding price caps on housing and petrol. While often seeking to satisfy immediate existential needs, grassroots actors tend to lack strategic orientation regarding how to achieve broader societal transformations. They generally lack a hegemonic project. Following Polanyi’s insight that “no society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent” [5], it is imperative to move beyond strategies focused exclusively on civil society actors and to develop a counterhegemonic project that extends beyond countermovements.

The Hegemonic Project of the Reactionary Right

For Polanyi, conservative and reactionary movements were always more than mere countermovements against globalized, cosmopolitan capitalism. Instead, they offered solutions to the contradictions of the double movement, by reconciling economic growth and protection, technological progress and habitation. This was the case with Austrofascism, the manifestation of radical economic liberalism described in The Great Transformation which went hand in hand with political Catholicism, antisemitism, and anti-scientism. And it was the case with neoliberalism, which Stuart Hall already in the 1970s described as “authoritarian populism”, a unique alliance of the elites with the masses [6]. This “neo”-liberal alliance was necessary for the democratic implementation of the “old” economic-liberal recipe of austerity and privatization.

In the 21^st century, faced with the ongoing crisis of neoliberal globalization, not only the above-mentioned left-wing political movements were mobilized. Powerful conservative and reactionary actors too have emerged in opposition to the alleged “establishment” of a cosmopolitan liberal elite. They pursue fundamentally different objectives from those pursued by progressive actors – one need only consider the contemporary “protectionism” of the Make-America-Great-Again movement. Nevertheless, taking up Polanyi’s terminology, theorists have labeled both types as “populist” countermovements of protection.

"These hegemonic projects of the Right link a new wave of market expansion driven by AI, digital platforms, and cryptocurrencies to cultural movements for white supremacy, masculinism, and reactionary forms of religion."

This analysis is fallacious: contemporary reactionary Right-wing movements are not simply countermovements, seeking protection against migration and a cosmopolitan elite – even though they might claim to be. They are also movements for an aggressive form of marketization, centered on private property and profit. Combining elements of movement and countermovement they seek to establish hegemony based on two types of supremacy: disruptive capitalist governance, often by means of neoliberal policies, as in Argentina, and a traditionalist cultural and religious order. These hegemonic projects link a new wave of market expansion driven by AI, digital platforms, and cryptocurrencies to cultural movements for white supremacy, masculinism, and reactionary forms of religion. Combining “markets and morals”, to refer to Wendy Brown’s precise analysis [7], today’s reactionary Right has found a regressive way of reconciling the double movement’s strive for market expansion on one hand and protection on the other. This project has greater hegemonic potential than the laissez-faire liberalism of the 1920s and the progressive neoliberalism of the 2010s, i.e. the cosmopolitan but anti-egalitarian form of liberal globalism.

The good news is that historically and today, economic programs of the reactionary Right, such as the Heritage Foundation‘s Project 2025, appear coherent, while actual policymaking suffers from erratic leadership and a resultant authoritarian yet highly fragmented, governance – think of Trump and Milei’s policy disasters and Bolsonaro’s political cowardice. As a consequence, governments of the reactionary Right often abandon the pursuit of legitimacy through consensus. They either lose support, as in Hungary and the US, or replace hegemonic aspirations with ever more violent and repressive means to sustain their domination, as in Turkey and Argentina.

The Need for an Egalitarian Hegemonic Project

This hegemonic project of the reactionary Right, centered on the restoration of sociocultural and politico-economic hierarchies, cannot be overcome solely by grassroots initiatives, or so-called progressive countermovements, regardless of their laudable intentions. Social and political movements only become effective in interaction with the institutionalized political order of parties, interest groups, and the state, its laws, and public bureaucracies. This interaction is often conflictive, leading to confrontations and resistance to state institutions, for example the police or judiciary, but could also result in alliances with political parties and certain public institutions, ministries or public companies. A hegemonic project in the Gramscian sense, therefore, must not juxtapose civil society and the state but must seek to transform both.

Polanyi himself was never solely interested in social protection. His more ambitious concern was an egalitarian hegemonic project based on the equal freedom for all – a project for a new era of “the common people” as Isabella Weber highlights in her 2026 book [8]. Polanyi’s intention is expressed in the title of the posthumously published “The Common Man’s Master Plan”, an outline for an egalitarian post-war order that he wrote in parallel with The Great Transformation in the 1940s [9]. Since his involvement in the so-called Socialist Calculation Debate in the 1920s, Polanyi had tried to understand how “common people” could gain sufficient “overview” in an increasingly complex world.

Polanyi’s overriding aim was securing habitation for all, recognizing that this required democratic coordination to overcome the reliance on disruptive capitalist market forces. Therefore, his socialism was gradualist, liberal and democratic, based on trust in common people, their wisdom, and sense of responsibility. This implies that his socialist vision was also modest, acknowledging that existing capitalist institutions and traditionalist values lead to socio-cultural inertias and resistance to change. As supremacist political movements seek to exploit these conservative leanings among common people, egalitarian alternatives must offer an attractive and comprehensive response, in other words, a genuine hegemonic project.

"Polanyi's socialism was gradualist, liberal, and democratic, based on trust in common people, their wisdom, and sense of responsibility."

At its core, this egalitarian hegemonic project must provide access to foundational goods and services for all – to food, energy, housing, healthcare, and education. This cannot be achieved solely by grassroots and municipal actors, even while acknowledging the value of radical projects that create islands of habitation in a sea of capitalist exploitation. However, without embedding local alternatives in more favorable national policies and an international order conducive to peaceful cooperation, they risk failure. This was the fate of Polanyi’s “Red Vienna” and might again be the fate of other progressive municipalist projects, like Mamdani’s in New York.

The adequate response to the reactionary Right’s aspirations to dominate is an egalitarian hegemonic project that transforms and transcends the existing socioeconomic order. However, egalitarian projects aspiring to provide essential goods for all also need to take Polanyi’s insight into account that “no society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent”. A hegemonic project needs to impose limits on resource use, but also on the obstructive potential of opponents, including billionaires and the reactionary Right. Therefore, an alternative macroeconomic regime, including progressive taxation, credit steering, anti-trust regulation, and an industrial policy guided by the principle of sufficiency is needed. Today, growing numbers of (ecological) economists are calling for the democratic planning of investments and production, including the planning of global supply chains, communication technology, and AI. According to thinkers like Cédric Durand, democratic planning must combine top-down and bottom-up approaches to limit and regulate markets and private property [10].

Recent Brazilian and US elections offer reasons for hope as well as food for thought. They were victories over the reactionary Right and the election campaigns contained the incipient elements of hegemonic projects, particularly in the way they foregrounded the aspirations and needs of common people, and emphasized affordability, dignity, and the defence of public institutions. These elections showed that no progressive hegemonic project is possible without connecting to the common sense of working people – including its conservative traces – as well as to their everyday lives.

References

Thomasberger, Claus (2018). Freedom, Responsibility and the Recognition of the Reality of Society. In M. Brie & C. Thomasberger (Hrsg.), Karl Polanyi´s Vision of a Socialist Transformation (S. 52–66). Black Rose Books, p.64.
Alcock, Rowan (2026). Polanyi’s non-ideological countermovement: One step forward, two steps back. Globalizations, 1–18. Link
Polanyi, Karl (2001). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Beacon Press, p.153.
For a good overview of the potential of progressive countermovements, see Goodwin, Geoff (2022). Double Movements and Disembedded Economies: A Response to Richard Sandbrook. Development and Change, 53(3), 676–702. Link
Polanyi, Karl (2001). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Beacon Press, p.266.
Hall, Stuart (1979). The great moving right show. Marxism today, 23(1), 14–20.
Brown, Wendy (2019). In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. Columbia University Press.
Weber, Isabella M. (2026). Anti-fascist economics: In defence of affordability, dignity and democracy. Penguin.
Polanyi, Karl (2017). The Common Man´s Masterplan. In M. Brie (Hrsg.), Karl Polanyi in Dialogue. A Socialist Thinker of Our Times (S. 79–94). Black Rose Books.
Durand, Cédric (2026). The problem of knowledge in the Anthropocene. Globalizations, 1–20. Link

F&L Blog – A Black Critique of Fascism

October 30, 2026F&L Blogapartheid, Black thought, critical theory, fascism, liberal democracy, liberalism, racism, United States, Vanessa ThompsonIKPS

A Black Critique of Fascism: Lessons from Black Radical and Anti-Colonial Thinkers for the 21st Century

by Vanessa E. Thompson

30.10.2026

From genocidal colonial violence and the terror of racial apartheid and lynching regimes to mass incarceration and related methods of surplus containment, such as border regimes, these forms of rule have combined legal normality for some segments of society with systematic violence against racialized working-class and working-poor populations. Tracing the rich tradition of Black radical and anti-colonial critiques of fascism, Vanessa E. Thompson argues that we must not confine our analysis to European fascism of the early twentieth century. Moreover, Black radical and anti-colonial thinkers offer a perspective in which fascistization – that is, the transition toward more fascist forms of rule – is not regarded as the antithesis of liberal democracy but as embedded within liberal-democratic rationalities and projects. This perspective holds important lessons for renewing anti-fascist politics today: the task is not merely to combat the far right, but also to confront the social conditions and state dynamics in liberal democracies that drive fascistization.

This text first appeared in the German magazine LuXemburg. The Fascism & Liberalism Blog is honored to publish this shortened and translated version with the kind permission of Vanessa Thompson.

“Fascist governments do not permit revolutionary or progressive opposition groups to exist, no matter how peaceful or nonviolent they are. It doesn't matter whether the fascist government simply outlaws the groups, like in Nazi Germany, or mounts a counterintelligence campaign to destroy opposition groups, like in the U.S.” - Assata Shakur, 1987

In light of the second Trump administration’s designation of Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization in 2025, the statement by the late Black revolutionary Assata Shakur appears strikingly prescient. Importantly, it represents a critique of fascism that is not limited to drawing analogies with the historical European cases, but identifies elements of fascist rule across different spatial and temporal contexts. The Black radical and anti-colonial theorists who developed this tradition understand fascism primarily in relation to capitalist social relations, crisis and the imperialist drive for expansion, and to forms of extra-economic violence that shape the dynamics of capitalism. What can we learn from their analyses at a time when discussions of a new fascism are once again dominated by Eurocentrism?

Colonialism as a Prefiguration of Fascism

As early as the interwar years, Black Marxists and radical anti-colonial theorists argued that the fascism emerging in Europe was not a “new” phenomenon but had already been embedded in Europe’s colonial projects. Colonial techniques and forms of accumulation such as the legally protected exploitation of “unfree” labor and racial governance through violence and coercion were, in a sense, a prefiguration of fascism. From this perspective, the genocidal campaigns and methods of Belgian and German colonialism in present-day DR Congo (1885–1908) and Namibia (1904–1908) can be understood not only as precursors to the Nazi’s systematic mass murder, but as instances of what Alberto Toscano calls “fascism-before-fascism” [1].

At the time, Black and Third World Marxists such as George Padmore and C.L.R. James understood fascist rule as both a reaction to capitalist crisis and an expression of Western imperialism. Consequently, they saw “democratic” imperialism (as allegedly opposed to fascist imperialism) as incapable of truly combating fascism. Tellingly, the struggle of “democratic” (British and French) imperialism against European fascism left not only colonial rule intact but also the very conditions that had given rise to fascism in the first place.

“If the fascists win they will take the colonies back. If the ‘democracies’ win they will keep them. But whether ‘democracies’ win, or fascists win, the Africans remain slaves in their own country” - C.L.R. James, 1939

It was on these grounds that George Padmore, a Caribbean Marxist who organized dockworkers and sailors in Hamburg on behalf of the Comintern in the late 1920s and early 1930s, criticized the Comintern’s collaboration with the “democratic” imperialist powers – France, the United States, and Great Britain – in the fight against fascism. Rather than rejecting any popular front or cooperation between socialist and social democratic/centric forces per se, Padmore was obviously concerned about its political orientation. He was convinced that anti-fascist alliances would be ineffective if they left the root causes of fascism, including its colonial dimension, unaddressed. As Alberto Toscano also noted, in his 1936 book How Britain Rules Africa, Padmore argued that the racism of the settler colony was “the breeding-ground for the type of fascist mentality that is being let loose in Europe today” and that South Africa was “the world’s classic Fascist state” based on the “unity of race as against class” [2].

The Trinidadian historian C.L.R. James took a similar position, noting that after their victory in the First World War, Great Britain, France, and Belgium simply took over Germany’s colonies. His diagnosis in 1939 was equally bleak: “If the fascists win they will take the colonies back. If the ‘democracies’ win they will keep them. But whether ‘democracies’ win, or fascists win, the Africans remain slaves in their own country” [3]. With these arguments, Padmore and James anticipated Aimé Césaire’s better-known analysis in his Discourse on Colonialism (1950), in which he describes fascism as a “a formidable shock in return” of colonial violence that reverberated from the colonies back to the European metropolises (often translated, somewhat inaccurately, as “boomerang”). Césaire points out that as long as National Socialism was only being imposed on non-European peoples, Europeans could turn a blind eye to it, could excuse and legitimize it [4].

Racial Fascism in the Segregated United States

While the before-mentioned authors analyzed fascism from the perspective of the so-called periphery, Black radicals in the U.S. focused on the Western core. In his 1935 classic Black Reconstruction, the Marxist sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois emphasizes that fascist tendencies are deeply rooted in the structure of liberal democracies, also domestically [5]. He argues that following the Reconstruction – the rebuilding and reintegration of the U.S. South after 1865 – and the possibility of multi-racial class struggle and transformation, the capitalist class of plantation owners carried out a “counter-revolution of property”. Facing their defeat and the formal abolition of slavery, they shifted their strategy to integrating white workers into the political-ideological project of racist supremacy and the massive deployment of racist terror against Black and non-white workers. This included the introduction of new forms of forced labor such as the convict-leasing system and the Black Codes – a series of laws enacted in former Confederacy states explicitly designed to continue to limit the rights and freedoms of Black people to ensure their super-exploitation. A sophisticated legal apparatus enshrined racial segregation and prevented any form of social, economic, or political participation along racial lines. Additionally, parts of the executive state apparatus, particularly local and state law enforcement, often operated with considerable autonomy and in close collaboration with the Ku Klux Klan, terrorizing Black populations across the South.

According to Du Bois, all of these are characteristics of fascism: the daily racist terror of the lynching regime, forced labor on the plantations and regimes of super-exploitation, the systematic dehumanization and racist segregation in all areas of life, the denial of civil rights, and the normalization of an apartheid regime. In sum, U.S. society was characterized by the coexistence of the rule of law for some and unrestricted “arbitrariness” for others. Du Bois’ analysis of fascism is thus surprisingly similar to the concept of the “Dual State” in the analysis of National Socialism by the Jewish political scientist Ernst Fraenkel. Fraenkel’s description of how legal normality and a regime of arbitrariness and coercion coexisted in Nazi Germany is regarded as a seminal work in the study of fascism. However, as Alberto Toscano points out in his book Late Fascism, racial fascism went unnoticed “because it operated on the other side of the colour line” [6]. In fact, structural racism shapes what is perceived as fascism in the first place and which coercive relations are considered a “normal” part of state rule.

According to Toscano, Black radical, Marxist, and anti-colonial approaches show that fascism should not be understood statically as a shift from liberal to fascist regimes, but rather as an ideological and political process that “targets racialized and subaltern population groups in differentiated ways” [7]. They demonstrate that fascism is not a uniform phenomenon conforming to a particular “template”, such as German or Italian fascism. Instead, colonial and racialized capitalism and imperialism were always accompanied by fascist potentials, ideological elements, and practices that developed before the rise of fascism in Europe.

Black Radical Anti-Fascism in the Post-War and Neoliberal Era

"Fascistization can unfold within liberal democracies rather than standing in fundamental opposition to them."

Black radical analyses of fascism in the above-described tradition remained relevant in the postwar era, too. The Black Caribbean communist Claudia Jones, the prisoner and Black Guerrilla Family member George Jackson, as well as the Black feminist philosopher Angela Davis each describe processes of fascistization as a recombination and intensification of power relations intended to block a potential revolution by the exploited and disenfranchised in times of crisis.

Claudia Jones, who was deported to England during the McCarthy era, analyzed McCarthyism as a process of fascistization that involved large-scale repression against leftists, workers, and anti-imperialist organizations [8]. In doing so, Jones showed that fascistization can unfold within liberal democracies rather than standing in fundamental opposition to them.

Two decades later, amid the crushing of revolutionary movements and the onset of the neoliberal counter-revolution, George Jackson identified another fascist conjuncture in the United States. Writing from his cell at the notorious San Quentin State Prison (before being shot and killed while attempting to escape in 1971) Jackson described the relationship between prisons and fascistization. According to Jackson, the function and expansion of the prison system characterized the transition from the plantation society to the integration of Black workers into the wage labor regime. However, Jackson did not view the prison, including its political-economic function, as a continuation of slavery, which was geared towards the production of cotton, sugar, and coffee based on “unfree” labor. Rather, he viewed the prison as a state method for the suppression of revolutionary resistance and containment of the primarily racialized subproletariat and surplus populations. In the face of escalating crises, the expansion of the repressive state helps to forcibly assert class power [9].

"Against the backdrop of the capitalist polycrisis and intensifying competition for resources, these systems of warfare – including borders, prisons, and deportation regimes – present the model of 'accumulation through repression'."

In the following years, this form of crisis response and regulation would also become an essential element of the authoritarian-neoliberal politics of Thatcherism. In their 1978 book, Stuart Hall and his co-authors coined the term “policing the crisis” to describe the authoritarian, police-driven targeting of marginalized and migrant segments of the working class [10]. Hall understood these developments as a prerequisite for the emergence of new right-wing politics and ideology. In a similar vein, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, in her 2007 book Golden Gulag, described the neoliberal counter-revolution as a shift from military Keynesianism to “post-Keynesian militarism” [11] where instruments of crisis management – prisons, police, and borders – were massively expanded and strengthened – also in liberal-democratic states.

The culmination of this development is what contemporary sociologist William I. Robinson identifies as the rise of a “global police state,” increasingly facilitated by new technologies [12]. Beyond its function as a crisis response, Robinson also highlights its capacity to generate profits. Against the backdrop of the capitalist polycrisis and intensifying competition for resources, these systems of warfare – including borders, prisons, and deportation regimes – present the model of “accumulation through repression.” In his view, 21st-century fascism advances through an alliance between the faltering liberal-authoritarian “reformism from above” and right-wing authoritarian projects. Although ideologically not completely coherent, this new bloc cooperates effectively in expanding the regimes of warfare and carcerality.

Lessons from Black and Feminist Abolitionists for the 21st Century

"Black radical, anti-colonial and feminist abolitionist thinkers teach us that a simple restoration of welfare states – distinguishing between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor – does not bring processes of fascistization to an end. Rather than focusing solely on the role of far-right parties and movements, anti-fascist struggles today must also target the state mechanisms that drive fascistization."

In the past years we have witnessed massive state repression against Palestine solidarity protests, the multi-billion-dollar expansion of border regimes, and the increasingly stratified exploitation, containment and racist control of “surplus” populations. All these developments show that fascistization does not require fascists to be in power. Whether at the external borders of the EU, in prisons, or in impoverished and heavily policed neighborhoods, racialized working class and working poor people have long been subjected to forms of fascist violence.

For years, abolition feminists in Brazil, the U.S., and Europe have argued that the “policing of the crisis”, that is, the criminalization and containment of migration and poverty, must become the focal points of anti-fascist struggles – as exemplified by the widespread protests against border regimes and violence, of which the ICE raids are just one articulation. Abolition feminists also link struggles against carceral violence with struggles against privatization, the commodification of land and against all forms of warfare. Calls for the socialization of care work likewise advance a vision of the demilitarization and “de-incarceration” of society [13]. Together, these abolitionist struggles pave the way for new forms of anti-fascist internationalism.

Abolition feminists thus expand the scope of anti-fascist struggles not only by focusing on the social conditions and crises that give rise to fascistization in the first place, but also by promoting a materialist anti-fascist politics centered on workers – both in production and social reproduction – and the struggles of so-called “surplus” populations. In doing so, they overcome the severe limits of historical European anti-fascism and conventional labor struggles as well.

Crucially, Black radical, anti-colonial and feminist abolitionist thinkers teach us that a simple restoration of welfare states – distinguishing between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor – does not bring processes of fascistization to an end. Rather than focusing solely on the role of far-right parties and movements, anti-fascist struggles today must also target the state mechanisms that drive fascistization. This approach can offer a genuine alternative to the emerging late fascism: through abolition – that is, the internationalist dismantling of racist, gendered, and capitalist relations of production and imperialist violence, as well as the institutions that perpetuate them, in favor of an abolition democracy.

References

Toscano, Alberto. 2025. “The Changing Strategies of Counter-Revolution.” Communis, June 10, 2025.
George Padmore (1936) cited in Toscano, Alberto. 2023. Late Fascism. Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis, London: Verso, p.28.
James, C. L. R.. 1939. “Why Negroes Should Oppose the War.” Marxists Internet Archive.
Césaire, Aimé. 2000 (1955). Discourse on Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Du Bois, W. E. B. 1998. Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880. New York: Free Press.
Toscano, Alberto. 2023. Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis. London: Verso, p.29.
Toscano, Alberto. 2025. “Das Gefängnis als faschistisches Labor.” nd, June 9, 2025.
Jones, Claudia. 1949. “An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman.” Political Affairs, June 1949, 51–67. 
Rodney, Walter. 1971. “George Jackson: Black Revolutionary.” Maji Maji 5: 4–6.
Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 1978. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. 2007. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Robinson, William I. 2020. The Global Police State. London: Pluto Press.
e.g. Bhattacharya, Tithi. 2024. “Social Reproduction Theory as Diagnostic, Abolition as Politics: Reimagining Anticapitalism.” Labor 21(4): 117–129.

F&L Blog – Who Will Fight for Anti-Fascist Economics?

October 15, 2026F&L Bloganti-fascist economics, capitalism, social-ecological transformation, transformative cellsIKPS

Who will fight for Anti-Fascist Economics? The Role of Transformative Cells in the Face of a Regressive State

by Ulrich Brand

15.10.2026

Progressive proposals for improving the lives of the many often leave the question of how to transform power structures unaddressed. Similarly, recent proposals for an anti-fascist economics tend to portray the state as a benign actor driving progressive transformations. Challenging this view, Ulrich Brand argues that the state should instead be understood as a condensation of capitalist power relations. Based on this understanding, he proposes building power within and beyond the state through “transformative cells” – formal and informal networks within organizations that share the goal of advancing social-ecological transformations, be it in trade unions, schools, workplaces, government agencies, or other organizations. According to Brand, we must not underestimate the many ways in which transformative cells can strategically use their room for maneuver to shift power relations over the medium and long term.

Progressive political forces have good reason to view the future with little optimism given the rise in geopolitical tensions and armed conflicts, the enormous increase in power wielded by the super-rich, and the escalating ecological crisis. Nevertheless, many debates are underway and proposals are being put forward on how to strengthen emancipatory causes and, in turn, shift the balance of power.

There is thus no shortage of proposals and initiatives aimed at improving the lives of the many. Yet what is currently lacking is the political power to implement a progressive socio-ecological agenda. This raises several questions: How can the prevailing power and wealth structures be transformed? In what ways can concrete alternatives be developed on a small scale, as well as at a societal and even international level? And how can existing approaches be strengthened?

Weber’s Anti-Fascist Economics and the Problem of Power

This is where the currently important discussions around “anti-fascist economics” – shaped by Isabella Weber – come into play. Through measures such as combating inflation, imposing a tax on excess profits, implementing price controls, and expanding public goods, the aim is to curb powerful interests and improve the lives of the many. Sabine Nuss and Michael Heinrich, however, criticize these left-Keynesian proposals for not sufficiently distinguishing themselves from the bourgeois narrative of harmonious national communities of production and shared interests, united against competitors such as China [1]. Accordingly, the authors warn of the dangers of a politically progressive economic nationalism.

In my view, the proposals for an anti-fascist economics seem somewhat traditionalist; for example, they fail to recognize the significance of the escalating climate crisis. On the other hand, the state’s role as a regulator and protagonist of antifascist economics strikes me as portrayed in too positive a light. The idea of “the good state versus the problematic market” rests on a strong assumption. It is oversimplified, because the state not only drives the radicalization and brutalization of capitalism but also promotes reactionary – and even fascist – policies, as in the field of migration policy. The extent to which Weber addresses these arguments remains to be seen in her forthcoming book.

To avoid any misunderstanding, the state – or rather, the various state apparatuses at the international, supranational, national, regional, and local levels – possesses specific regulatory powers. Despite the current unfavorable balance of power, the state could potentially counter (fossil) capital through its financial and administrative resources, through legislation, and the recognition and support of progressive actors. Shifts in the balance of power and in constellations of interests in favor of progressive social and ecological causes could be advanced and consolidated through state institutions.

But “the state” does not do these things as an autonomously acting agent that solves problems or acts in the interest of the common good, such as good living conditions for all. Rather, the state and its policies are themselves an expression of social struggles and capitalist, imperial, patriarchal, and racialized structures. And the actors engaged in these struggles have highly unequal resources at their disposal. The owners of vast fortunes and the top management of corporations decide on investments – and thus on jobs; they influence public opinion, organize through their associations, and produce knowledge through their think tanks.

The State as the Condensation of Capitalist Power Relations

Fifty years ago, in his groundbreaking work State, Power, Socialism, the Marxist political theorist Nicos Poulantzas developed the argument that the “general function of the state” consists in securing the conditions for capitalist reproduction [2]. It is a highly conflict-ridden process, the outcome of which is by no means guaranteed. Thus, the power of (fossil) capital can be challenged, but not simply through state policies. It requires a much broader process of social mobilization and change, which might then lead to shifting state policies.

According to Poulantzas, one reason for this is that the ruling classes and class factions also wield power through certain state apparatuses – or, rather, that their power “condenses” within them. Some members of the current federal government in Germany are a direct and brazen expression of how fossil capital is able to place its own people at the helm of key state apparatuses, as can currently be observed in the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Conversely, according to Poulantzas, the ruled classes and their representatives – such as the trade unions – cannot count on similarly powerful state apparatuses. Even a Ministry of Social Affairs, while more open to the interests of the governed, remains closely tied to capitalist interests and logics.

Going beyond Poulantzas: The state, in its very structure, is a fossil-capitalist state – whether in its historically liberal “face” in the 19th and early 20th century, later in the form of a welfare state in both the West and the East, or, since the 1980s, in its neoliberal and, increasingly today, geo-economic orientation. The state is therefore structurally linked to the fossil-capitalist growth economy [3], from which it derives its resources and, not least, its legitimacy. This affects how progressive social and environmental concerns can be articulated within state apparatuses [4].

However, the Greek-French intellectual also pointed to “centers of opposition” within state apparatuses. These do indeed exist in many cases where individuals or groups within these apparatuses resist directives “from above” or “from outside” because, in their view, they are heading in the wrong direction: namely, toward promoting fossil fuels, slowing down the energy transition, pursuing anti-social or anti-immigration policies, or deepening inequalities between classes or genders.

Transformative Cells: Building Power Within and Beyond the State

"Conflicts over transformation play out not only within the state or at the societal level, but also within organizations."

Building on the previous reflections on the state and its capacity for governance, I want to outline a proposal for strengthening the capacity of progressive forces to act strategically. This is because conflicts over transformation play out not only within the state or at the societal level, but also within organizations. In our new book, Capitalism at the Limit: A Political Ecology of a World in Crisis, Markus Wissen and I refer to those groups and networks that seek to advance more ambitious social and ecological transformations as “transformative cells” [5], although this term is still tentative.

The underlying assumption is that the purposes and goals of various organizations – not only state apparatuses – are not set in stone but are contested. This means that most organizations are heterogeneous and contradictory. Many already have democratic internal structures and opportunities for participation, which can serve as entry points for progressive causes. This opens up room for maneuver within organizations that can be leveraged through smart strategies and tactics. Not all areas of an organization are always fully controllable “from above.” Individuals, groups, networks, or even departments possess knowledge, which can potentially be used to formulate and advance their own agendas. This offers opportunities to advance progressive social and environmental causes in workplaces, trade unions, government agencies, the media, schools, universities, associations, and other organizations.

“Transformative cells” is not a fixed term, but rather a designation for very diverse groups – both formal and informal networks within organizations – that specifically aim to strengthen the organization’s socio-ecological orientation. The term is intended to help committed actors become more self-aware and act with greater self-confidence. Transformative cells’ individual and collective capacity for action depends on a variety of factors, including their own knowledge and experience, networks within and outside the organization, motivation, as well as financial, time, and institutional resources. And certainly, it also requires some courage and the cultivation of a certain kind of rebellious subjectivity, both collective and individual, within the organization.

"Not all areas of an organization are always fully controllable “from above.” Individuals, groups, networks, or even departments possess knowledge, which can potentially be used to formulate and advance their own agendas."

Actors within transformative cells are connected by shared worldviews and a common understanding of their specific situation. In addition to trust, the ability to manage internal and external conflicts, and strategic and tactical acumen, a certain degree of internal cohesion is also essential. Openness and a willingness to learn are important, as is the ability not to be discouraged by setbacks – for example, when the response to the crisis of Germany’s automotive industry is a shift to military production rather than the production of sustainable public transportation. Good connections beyond the organization – that is, to progressive actors in other organizations – are also important to prevent being “swallowed up” by organizational rationalities, hierarchies, and priorities.

The specific goals and strategies for driving fundamental societal and ecological transformation are diverse and exploring them is a worthwhile endeavour. They include influencing organizational strategies and their implementation; fighting to secure a certain degree of autonomy, decision-making authority, and responsibility for the transformative unit (for example, in hiring or resource allocation); providing specific training for employees; democratizing the organization; and making fundamental and concrete alternatives imaginable. In this way, for example, those segments of the chemical industry that prioritize resource-efficient and environmentally friendly production could be strengthened, while curbing the expansion of unsustainable chemical practices.

Within organizations, transformative cells also have the potential to divide the opposition, at least partially delegitimize their agenda, and act as a “spanner in the works” for misguided projects. Motivation and self-confidence can likely be strengthened by the awareness of being part of a progressive movement. External networking with like-minded individuals, and, where appropriate, with the media certainly plays a role here. More broadly, keeping in mind the long-term goal of shifting societal power dynamics is central. To achieve this, it is important to have a “big-picture perspective” and an understanding of political and economic interconnections, as well as the intended and perhaps unintended consequences of one’s actions. Taking the political and power relations into account – such as austerity policies, the fears they generate, and the simultaneous concentration of wealth – makes it possible to formulate more appropriate strategies that are more likely to gain support.

"When widely entrenched and accepted discourses and worldviews begin to crumble [...] windows of opportunity open up that transformative cells must recognize, assess, and seize."

For the possibilities for progressive action within an organization also depend on broader societal conditions – for example, when a crisis leaves those in power unable to lead, address societal problems, or offer anything to subaltern groups. This can also happen when widely entrenched and accepted discourses and worldviews begin to crumble – such as the notion that the rich deserve their wealth or that economic growth ultimately benefits everyone. This opens up windows of opportunity that transformative cells must recognize, assess, and seize. A sense of social renewal – a widely shared, emotionally resonant experience that one’s own actions “make a difference” – also fosters the capacity for emancipatory action.

Not everything can be planned out in advance by transformative cells; many highly contingent situations arise in the course of the process itself – such as a change in leadership, unforeseen allies, or a higher-level policy shift. This can also happen when strategies to steer the organization toward a more ambitious social and ecological transformation begin to yield initial successes. Conflicts that are successfully resolved can thus become the driving force behind socio-ecological transformation processes.

The concept of “transformative cells” is no magic bullet for progressive, anti-fascist action under conditions marked by regressive dynamics that point in an entirely different socio-political direction. However, it can help foster self-understandings critical of existing power structures and enable actors to pursue the urgently needed structural transformations.

References

Nuss, S. and Heinrich, M. (2024, 27. November) ‘Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik: Weg vom nationalen „Wir“’, nd. Link
Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, Power, Socialism. London: New Left Books.
Brand, U., Hausknost, D., Brad, A., Eyselein, G., Krams, M., Maneka, D., Pichler, M. and Schneider, E. (2025) ‘Structural limitations of the decarbonization state’, Nature Climate Change, 15(9), pp. 927–934. Link
For a closer examination, see the research approach to historical-materialist policy analysis in Brand, U., Krams, M., Lenikus, V. and Schneider, E. (2022) ‘Contours of historical-materialist policy analysis’, Critical Policy Studies, 16(3), pp. 279–296. Link
Brand, U. and Wissen, M. (2025) Capitalism at the Limit: A Political Ecology of a World in Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 158–163.

Webinar – Capitalism, Care, and Housing

October 7, 2026MediaIKPS

WEBINAR: Capitalism, Care and Housing

When? 10 November, 6-8 p.m. CET
Where? Online via zoom
Please register beforehand via the zoom link:

Care and housing are among the most pressing social and political issues of our time. While access to affordable housing and comprehensive care is increasingly set under pressure, current crises also raise fundamental questions about the values that should guide their organisation: Should care and housing be treated primarily as commodities, or as essential foundations of democratic life and social well-being?

In this online conversation, Joan C. Tronto, Attila Melegh, Brigitte Aulenbacher, and Andreas Novy will explore the interconnections between capitalism, care and housing from different disciplinary perspectives.

Drawing on the ethics of care and her concept of a caring democracy, Joan C. Tronto will reflect on the democratic and ethical dimensions of care and housing. Attila Melegh will offer a historical-sociological perspective on long waves of the societal organisation of care and housing, examining their economic, political and social provision as well as the role of mixed economies. Brigitte Aulenbacher will address contemporary care crisis, the significance of care for sustainable organisation, and the ways in which the structural carelessness of capitalism endangers decent care. Andreas Novy will contribute insights from socioeconomics and housing research, including approaches inspired by the foundational economy that explore pathways towards a socio- ecological transformation.

Together, the speakers will discuss how care and housing can be reorganised beyond narrow economic imperatives and how they may become central pillars of a more just, sustainable and democratic society.

The conversation will be moderated by Fabienne Décieux and Raphael Deindl.

SPEAKERS:

Brigitte Aulenbacher, Prof. (ret.), Institute of Sociology, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Attila Melegh, Prof., Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

Andreas Novy, assoc. Prof., Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations, WU Vienna University of Economics, Austria

Joan C. Tronto, Prof. (em), Political Science, University of Minnesota, US

MODERATION:

Fabienne Décieux, Department of Sociology in the research group Dynamics of Work, Care and Gender, University of Innsbruck, Austria

Raphael Deindl, Department of Sociology in the research group Dynamics of Work, Care and Gender, University of Innsbruck, Austria

An online conversation hosted by the International Karl Polanyi Society in cooperation with the Research group Dynamics of Work Care and Gender at the Department of Sociology, University of Innsbruck.

Andreas Novy – Isabella Webers Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik

October 7, 2026Antifascist EconomicsIKPS

Isabella Webers „Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik“ – Hayek und Polanyi im Widerstreit

Ein Kommentar von Andreas Novy

07.10.2026

Isabella Weber prägte den Begriff der „antifaschistischen Wirtschaftspolitik“, als sie 2024 auf X ihrer Frustration über den erneuten Wahlsieg Donald Trumps Ausdruck verlieh. Ihre These, dass die aktuelle neoliberale Wirtschaftspolitik reaktionären und faschistischen Bewegungen den Boden bereitet, hat seitdem für heftige Debatten gesorgt. In ihrem im Oktober 2026 erscheinenden Buch rahmt Weber nun ihr Argument als Kontroverse zwischen zwei großen Erzählungen, die von Friedrich Hayek und Karl Polanyi geprägt wurden. Im Buch wird Hayek ganze 92-mal und Polanyi ganze 126-mal erwähnt. Warum sind gerade diese beiden Ökonomen so bedeutsam für Webers Konzept der antifaschistischen Wirtschaftspolitik?

Hayeks und Polanyis Entwürfe einer anti-totalitären Wirtschaftspolitik

Um diese Frage zu beantworten und die großen Erzählungen der beiden Ökonomen verorten zu können, muss zunächst geklärt werden, was Karl Polanyi und Friedrich Hayek verbindet – und was sie unterscheidet. Beide wurden von ihrem Geburtsort Wien geprägt. Polanyi lebte im „Roten Wien“ der Zwischenkriegszeit, jenem beeindruckenden lokalen Reformprojekt, das erstmals für breite Bevölkerungsgruppen die Grundversorgung – in Isabella Webers Worten die „Essentials“ – sicherstellte, wesentlich gestützt durch ein ambitioniertes, öffentlich finanziertes Wohnbauprogramm. Das Rote Wien bot den Arbeitenden nicht nur soziale Sicherheit, sondern auch die Voraussetzungen für ein Leben in Würde. Für Hayek – geboren als Friedrich von Hayek – war der im Gefolge des Ersten Weltkriegs erfolgte Zusammenbruch des Habsburger Reichs hingegen eine Tragödie. Er und seine engsten Kollegen Fritz Machlup, Gottfried Haberler und Oskar Morgenstern sahen die neu gegründete liberale Demokratie mit ihrem rudimentären Sozialstaat als Ärgernis und blickten Zeit ihres Lebens nostalgisch auf das Empire zurück. Während Polanyis Vision einer egalitären und solidarischen Gesellschaft ihn zum Sympathisanten eines demokratischen und liberalen Sozialismus machte, wurde Hayek, mit seiner Nostalgie für das Empire und dessen große Freiheiten für die Besitzenden zum Gegner des Sozialismus – vor allem aber des demokratischen Wohlfahrtsstaats. 1944, gegen Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, veröffentlichten beide ihre Vorschläge für eine Wirtschaftsordnung nach dem Krieg. „The Road to Serfdom“ (Hayek, 1944) und „The Great Transformation“ (Polanyi, [1944] 2001) entwerfen beide eine Alternative zur totalitären Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus.

In der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit war Hayeks Wirtschaftsliberalismus noch höchst unpopulär, hatte dieser doch in den 1920ern zur Weltwirtschaftskrise geführt. Eine grundlegend andere Politik verfolgte Franklin D. Roosevelt, der, wie Weber in ihrem Buch detailliert zeigt, in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren zunächst innerhalb der Vereinigten Staaten und dann auch international eine explizit antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik umsetzte. Roosevelts Politik der Wirtschaftsplanung erwies sich als sehr erfolgreich: Die USA konnte während des Zweiten Weltkriegs sowohl Rüstungsproduktion als auch Massenkonsum steigern; eine machtvolle Demonstration der Leistungsfähigkeit einer geplanten Wirtschaft mit starkem öffentlichem Sektor und weiterhin eigenständigen Privatunternehmen. International ermöglichten die USA mit kreditfinanzierten Rüstungslieferungen den Sieg der Alliierten. Mit der Gründung der UNO und der Beschränkung globaler Finanzmärkte, sowie dem neuen Primat des Wohlfahrtskapitalismus inklusive Anti-Monopol Regelungen wurden auf internationaler und nationaler Ebene wichtige Lehren aus Wirtschaftskrise und Faschismus gezogen: „Nie wieder Faschismus“ hieß damals „Nie wieder Massenarbeitslosigkeit und soziale Verunsicherung“. Eine Wirtschaftspolitik der Vollbeschäftigung und der gesicherten Versorgung mit essenziellen Gütern und Dienstleistungen sollte garantieren, dass sich der faschistische Horror von Entmenschlichung und Gewalt niemals wiederholen würde.

Diese Prinzipien weisen Ähnlichkeiten zu Polanyis Erzählung von einer Gesellschaft auf, die allen Menschen die gleiche Freiheit ermöglicht. Doch nicht Karl Polanyi, sondern John Maynard Keynes wurde zur Leitfigur dieses nationalstaatlich regulierten Kapitalismus. Keynes, ein Pragmatiker, der wichtige Anleihen bei Abba Lerner und Michał Kalecki nahm, popularisierte, wie Weber anschaulich demonstriert, die Machbarkeit eines demokratischen »Mittelwegs« zwischen der Herrschaft der Märkte und zentraler Planung. In seinen verschiedenen Varianten prägte dieser Mittelweg nicht nur den Wohlfahrtskapitalismus des Globalen Nordens, sondern auch die Entwicklungsstrategien der entkolonisierten Staaten Afrikas, Asiens und Lateinamerikas. Politiker wie Willy Brandt (Deutschland), Bruno Kreisky (Österreich), Getúlio Vargas (Brasilien) und Jawaharlal Nehru (Indien), verfolgten eine Wirtschaftspolitik, die die Sicherung materieller Lebensgrundlagen sowie der Menschenwürde anstrebte. Bruno Kreiskys Spruch steht dafür beispielhaft: „Ein paar Milliarden mehr Schulden bereiten mir weniger schlaflose Nächte als hunderttausend Arbeitslose.”

Es dauerte bis in die 1970er Jahre, bis zum Ende streng regulierter Finanzmärkte und der damit verbundenen Krise keynesianischer Makroökonomie, dass Hayeks wirtschaftspolitische Vorstellungen Gehör fanden. Seine große Erzählung träumt von einer Gesellschaft, in der sich die Freiheit der Besitzenden bestmöglich entfaltet. Seine These lautete 1944, dass nur eine freie Marktwirtschaft vor den Gefahren des Faschismus schützt. Seiner Analyse zufolge gibt es zwei Formen der Wirtschaftspolitik, die beide im Totalitarismus enden: den Faschismus, den Hayek mit Nationalsozialismus gleichsetzt, und den Sozialismus. Hayek lehnte die zentrale Planwirtschaft und den Kommunismus ab, doch seine eigentlichen politischen Gegner waren all jene Demokrat:innen, die meinten, ein „Mittelweg“ sei möglich – allen voran Keynes. Hayek vertrat die These, dass schon der kleinste Eingriff in Märkte ein Wirtschaftssystem auf die Bahn des Totalitarismus lenke. Gerade wohlmeinende Demokrat:innen, die Totalitarismus eigentlich ablehnten, würden durch ihre Befürwortung staatlicher Eingriffe unbewusst zu Wegbereiter:innen des Totalitarismus. Hayek leugnet damit die Möglichkeit demokratischer Wirtschaftspolitik; Demokratie ist für ihn nur dort legitim, wo sie Märkte schützt – als „marktgerechte Demokratie“.

Niederlage des „sanften“ Hayek – Siegeszug des „harten“ Hayek?

In den 1980ern wurde Hayek zum Idol neoliberaler Politik, verehrt von Margaret Thatcher und Ronald Reagan. Im Gefolge der Demontage keynesianischer Politik verbreitete sich eine rechtsliberale Vision, die den Sozialstaat abbaute und wirtschaftliche Freiheiten erweiterte. In Erweiterung von Webers Argument, nenne ich diese sich in den folgenden Jahren breit machende Version des Neoliberalismus die Vision des “sanften” Hayek. Sie basiert auf der Idee einer “marktgerechten Demokratie”, das heißt einer neoliberalen Wirtschaftspolitik, die die Institutionen der liberalen Demokratie nicht offen attackiert, sondern bloß ihren Wirkungsbereich einschränkt. Diese Vision fand in den folgenden Jahrzehnten breite Unterstützung: Christdemokrat:innen und Sozialdemokrat:innen, unterstützt von Liberalen und Grünen, gingen gleichermaßen davon aus, dass Markt und Menschenrechte, Kapitalismus und Demokratie einander benötigen und gemeinsam zu einer harmonischen, liberalen Gesellschaftsordnung führen würden. Eine wirtschaftsliberale Politik der Privatisierung und Austerität – also eine Politik sozialstaatlicher Opfer – sei daher nicht nur wirtschaftlich sinnvoll, sondern auch in liberalen Demokratien alternativlos, um Freiheitsrechte und langfristige Prosperität zu sichern.

Kritiker:innen dieser Wirtschaftspolitik galten als Populist:innen. Demnach sei die demokratische Mitte sowohl von rechts als auch von links bedroht: Marine Le Pen, Jörg Haider und heute die AfD auf der einen Seite – Salvador Allende in Chile, Syriza in Griechenland und Bernie Sanders in den USA auf der anderen. Beide gefährden, dieser Sichtweise folgend, die Marktwirtschaft und damit die Freiheit – auch wenn sie demokratische Unterstützung finden. Die Vertreter:innen einer „marktgerechten Demokratie“ meinten, ihre Wirtschaftspolitik schütze vor den totalitären Extremen des Staatsinterventionismus. Dabei ignorierten sie die Einsicht, dass der Antifaschismus seine Legitimation nur aus einer Wirtschaftspolitik der Grundsicherung und Vollbeschäftigung beziehen kann.

Aus diesem Grund befinden sich Politiker:innen der Mitte, die sich auf diese gemäßigte Version der Hayek’schen Erzählung stützen, heute allerorten in der Defensive. In den vergangenen Krisen – von der Finanzkrise 2008 über die Covid-19-Pandemie bis zur Leistbarkeitskrise der letzten Jahre – haben sie ihr moralisches Kapital zusehends aufgezehrt. Immer mehr Menschen fragen sich: Welchen Zweck hat die Verteidigung einer „marktgerechten Demokratie“, wenn diese einzig zu einer Politik des Sozialabbaus führt? Wozu braucht es die Demokrat:innen der Mitte, wenn sie die steigenden Lebenshaltungskosten und die Zuspitzung der Klimakrise als alternativlos darstellen? Warum sollte man sich politisch engagieren, wenn sich Regierungen aller Couleurs weigern, in entfesselte Märkte und konzentriertes Konzerneigentum einzugreifen? Wenn also eine Wirtschaftspolitik der Mitte die Existenzgrundlage der Menschen zerstört und dies als Kollateralschaden einer freien Gesellschaft verharmlost, sind Aufstand und Protest unvermeidbar. Fehlt in so einer Demokratie die sozialstaatliche Alternative, gewinnt die reaktionäre Rechte an Boden.

Die Vision des “sanften” Hayek ist heute stark diskreditiert, wie sich am fehlenden Zuspruch für gemäßigte Neoliberale wie Merz und Macron zeigt. Gleichzeitig entlarvt sich der vorgebliche Antifaschismus vieler Neoliberaler als das, was er immer war: Eine Illusion, manchmal sogar eine bewusste Lüge. Nicht nur ist es illusorisch anzunehmen, dass eine “marktgerechte Demokratie” antidemokratischen Tendenzen effektiv entgegenwirken könne; vielmehr gab es stets auch die Vision des “harten” Hayek, der Bündnisse mit Faschist:innen im Notfall akzeptierte, um Kapitalinteressen zu sichern. Dieser „harte“ Hayek verfolgt die sozialdarwinistische Vision einer Gesellschaftsordnung, in der das Recht des Stärkeren und Erfolgreichen herrscht und Empathie als Schwäche gilt.

Ein genauer Blick auf Hayeks Schaffen begründet die Zweifel an dessen antifaschistischer Gesinnung: Nicht nur verteidigte er den chilenischen Diktator Augusto Pinochet sowie die Eigentumsordnung des südafrikanischen Apartheid-Regimes (von der Elon Musk, ein Anhänger Hayeks, heute profitiert). Mit zunehmendem Alter zeigte sich hinter seiner Ablehnung des Sozialismus auch immer deutlicher seine Abneigung gegenüber der Demokratie: Demokratische Herrschaft, die wirtschaftliche Freiheiten einschränkt, sei nichts mehr als Mehrheitsdiktatur (Hayek, 1978). Heute wird Hayek daher nicht nur in der politischen Mitte von Parteien wie FDP und NEOS hochgehalten, sondern vor allem auch von AfD und FPÖ, Musk und Milei. Hayek Institute propagieren weltweit einen sozialdarwinistischen Neoliberalismus: Rechtsliberale verbünden sich mit der reaktionären Rechten. Damals wie heute denunzieren Neoliberale, die die Vision des “harten” Hayek teilen, jede Politik des Mittelwegs als extremistisch und vertuschen die eigene anti-egalitäre Ideologie.

Angesichts des Scheiterns der Mitte stehen wir heute vor Herausforderungen, die in vielerlei Hinsicht den Herausforderungen der 1930er Jahre gleichen. Ich stimme daher Isabella Weber zu, wenn sie eine mutige Politik für Leistbarkeit, Würde und Demokratie fordert – gegen die Vertiefung sozialer Hierarchien entlang der Linien von Klasse, Geschlecht und Herkunft.

Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik und die Wiederentdeckung Polanyis

Im 20. Jahrhundert galt John Maynard Keynes als der Gegenspieler des “sanften” Hayek, während Karl Polanyi in wirtschaftspolitischen Debatten marginalisiert blieb. Dies liegt nicht nur daran, dass Polanyi keine ausgefeilten wirtschaftspolitischen Empfehlungen lieferte, sondern auch an seinem Fokus auf die politischen, gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Implikationen von Wirtschaftspolitik. Wie Isabella Weber in ihrem aktuellen Buch hervorhebt, beschäftigte Polanyi in den 1940er Jahren vor allem die Suche nach einer antifaschistischen Politik, in der die “gewöhnlichen Leute” im Zentrum stehen (Polanyi, [n.d.] 2017). Er verband damit die Vision eines guten Lebens für alle innerhalb planetarer Grenzen – einer Gesellschaft, in der die Grundversorgung und Menschenwürde gesichert und der Alltag lebenswert ist. Dieser Vision haben sich auch die Vertreter:innen der Alltagsökonomie (Foundational Economy) verschrieben, die seit rund einem Jahrzehnt dafür eintreten, die Bedeutung materieller und sozialer Infrastrukturen stärker ins Zentrum wirtschaftspolitischer Debatten zu rücken (Foundational Economy Collective, 2019).

Isabella Weber gelingt es mit ihrer packenden Analyse, den Beitrag Polanyis zu einer „Vision der demokratischen Organisation der essenziellen Güter … [und] eines durch öffentliche Investitionen ermöglichten guten Lebens“ (2026, S. 75) erneut einem breiteren Publikum zugänglich zu machen. Sie erinnert an Polanyis brillante moralische Kritik an einem wirtschaftsliberalen Status Quo, der Ungleichheit verschärft und die Würde vieler Menschen mit Füßen tritt. Damit findet sich Isabella Weber im Wiener Diskurs in bester Gesellschaft: Die International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS) sieht seit ihrer Gründung 2018 ihre Aufgabe darin, eine Alternative zu „den Austrians“, der Österreichischen Schule der Nationalökonomie, zu entwickeln – eine „neue Wiener Schule der Wirtschaftswissenschaften“ (Novy, 2019). Zudem entstand 2023 das „Kompetenzzentrum Alltagsökonomie“, inspiriert von einem Verständnis von Wirtschaften als die Bereitstellung von Lebensgrundlagen (Getzner et al., 2024). Diese Bemühungen um eine Neudefinition der Wirtschaftswissenschaften decken sich mit Isabella Webers Verständnis von antifaschistischer Wirtschaftspolitik als Essential Economics, einer Ökonomik essenzieller Güter – von Gesundheit und Bildung bis Wohnen und Energie.

Eine Wirtschaftspolitik, die die Essentials sichert und die gleiche Freiheit aller anstrebt, ist antifaschistisch, ohne ein Allheilmittel versprechen zu können. Webers Vision ist zutiefst antidogmatisch: Weder „glaubt“ sie an Märkte noch an das Versprechen einer umfassenden zentralen Planung. In pluralistischen Gesellschaften mit widerstreitenden Interessen ist ein Mittelweg aus Marktwirtschaft und Planung die vielversprechendste Chance auf eine demokratische Wirtschaftspolitik. Weber hält außerdem daran fest, dass eine Wirtschaft für „gewöhnliche Leute“ nicht nur möglich, sondern auch notwendig ist. Denn die Verteidigung der liberalen Demokratie wird angesichts der aktuellen Konzentration von Vermögen und Macht nur mit einer umfassenden sozioökonomischen Demokratisierung gelingen, das heißt mit der Gewährleistung guter Lebensbedingungen durch öffentlich bereitgestellte Infrastrukturen.

Bei der Umsetzung dieser großen Erzählung von einer Gesellschaft der Freien und Gleichen bedarf eine antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik vieler Perspektiven, allen voran des Wissens einer interdisziplinär arbeitenden Wirtschaftswissenschaft, von John Maynard Keynes, Karl Polanyi, Joan Robinson, Michal Kalecki bis zu Tom Krebs und Clara Mattei. Und sie vertraut auf die Fähigkeit der Menschen, demokratisch die Weichen für ein gutes Leben festlegen zu können. Das ist antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik: Wirtschaften im Dienste aller Menschen.

Literatur

Foundational Economy Collective. (2019). Die Ökonomie des Alltagslebens—Für eine neue Infrastrukturpolitik. Suhrcamp.
Getzner, M., Damjanovic, D., Dowling, E., Müller, H. L., Plank, L., Strickner, A., Damböck, C., Evers, P., Kalhorn, A. F., & Pöchhacker, T. (2024). Daseinsvorsorge 2023. Gute Grundversorgung für alle innerhalb planetarer Grenzen (Nr. 209; Informationen zur Umweltpolitik).
Hayek, F. A. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Routledge.
Hayek, F. A. (1978). The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press.
Novy, A. (2019). Welche Freiheit für wen? Friedrich Hayek und Karl Polanyi. In B. Aulenbacher, M. Marterbauer, A. Novy, & A. Thurnher (Hrsg.), Karl Polanyi—Wiederentdeckung eines Jahrhundertdenkers (S. 122–128). Falter Verlagsgesellschaft.
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Beacon Press. (Original erschienen 1944).
Polanyi, K. (2017). The Common Man´s Masterplan. In M. Brie (Hrsg.), Karl Polanyi in Dialogue. A Socialist Thinker of Our Times (S. 79–94). Black Rose Books. (Original undatiert als Manuskript im Polanyi Archiv).
Weber, I. (2026). Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik. Suhrkamp.

EVENTS:

Wiener Vorlesung – Isabella Weber – Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik

September 21, 2026MediaIKPS

Wiener Vorlesung: Isabella Weber über Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik

Im Rahmen der Wiener Vorlesungen und in Kooperation mit der IKPS wird Isabella Weber ihr Buch Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik vorstellen.

Datum: Freitag, 9. Oktober 2026, 19.00 Uhr
Ort: Wiener Rathaus, Festsaal
Anmeldung erforderlich.

Begrüßung: Veronica Kaup-Hasler, Stadträtin für Kultur und Wissenschaft
Vortrag: Isabella M. Weber, Ökonomin und Professorin für Volkswirtschaftslehre, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Anschließendes Gespräch und Publikumsfragen: Isabella M. Weber und Natascha Strobl, Politikwissenschaftlerin und Autorin
Moderation: Judith Belfkih, Journalistin, Essayistin und Medienexpertin

Kurz nachdem die erneute Wahl von Donald Trump zum US-Präsidenten feststand, fragte Isabella M. Weber auf X: »Können wir jetzt endlich eine ernsthafte Diskussion über eine antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik führen?« Die Demokraten hätten die Auswirkungen der dramatisch gestiegenen Lebenshaltungskosten verkannt und so Trump mit seiner Ressentiment-Politik das Feld überlassen. Ihr Tweet ging viral und setzte eine weltweite Debatte in Gang. Wenn wir den weiteren Aufstieg der extremen Rechten verhindern wollen, so Weber, brauchen wir eine Wirtschaftspolitik, bei der die Bedürfnisse und die Würde der Menschen im Mittelpunkt stehen.

Isabella M. Weber, geboren 1987 in Nürnberg, ist Professorin für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der University of Massachusetts Amherst. Sie wurde mit zahlreichen Preisen ausgezeichnet, u.a. mit dem Wissenschaftspreis der Keynes-Gesellschaft. Ihr neues Buch Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik erscheint im Oktober 2026 im Suhrkamp Verlag.
Natascha Strobl, geboren 1985 in Wien, ist Politikwissenschaftlerin und Autorin. Sie schreibt unter anderem für die Frankfurter Rundschau und die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Ihr Buch Radikalisierter Konservatismus. Eine Analyse war ein Bestseller und wurde 2021 mit dem Bruno-Kreisky-Preis für das Politische Buch (Anerkennungspreis) ausgezeichnet.

Es wird einen Livestream geben.

Veranstaltungsbeschreibung übernommen von Wiener Vorlesungen. Fotocredit: © Heike Steinweg_SV

F&L Blog – Is Fascism Returning?

September 10, 2026F&L Blogfar-right, fascism, fascistization, Germany, history, Italy, labour, Mussolini, Nazi Germany, TrumpIKPS

Is Fascism Returning?
Why the Historical Fascism Analogy Falls Short

by Stéfanie Prezioso

10.09.2026

The resurgence of the far-right has revived a familiar question: are we witnessing a return of fascism? According to historian Stéfanie Prezioso, the widespread use of the term ‘fascism’ as a template for understanding today’s far-right movements risks obscuring what is new about contemporary right-wing radicalisation. She argues that while today’s movements share important features with historical fascism, they operate under fundamentally different economic, political, and social conditions. Therefore, Prezioso calls for a more comprehensive analysis of the changing form of the far-right under the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism.

Is there any point in reviving the concept of fascism? The central place that fascism occupies in the history and ‘mental territory’ of the 20th century explains why this concept is so frequently referenced, along with iterative nouns such as ‘recurrence’ and ‘return’. It is undoubtedly legitimate to want to place the current rise of the far-right within a broader historical context. However, it is precisely this ‘archaeological’ work (in the Foucauldian sense) that leads me to categorically reject the idea that we are reliving the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than focusing on historical analogies, I argue that we should concentrate on current movements and ask what is distinctive about today’s far-right – and, in particular, its relationship with contemporary capitalism.

The Problem of Looking Backward

"[...] in my view, invoking fascism also amounts to a certain kind of laziness, as it spares us from analysing what is radically new about the current processes of right-wing radicalisation [...]"

In fact, the term ‘fascism’ poses numerous problems. Firstly, there is no consensus on its definition, despite – or perhaps because of – the hundreds of thousands of pages devoted to it. For historian Ian Kershaw, for example, attempting to define fascism is akin to trying to nail jelly to a wall.[i] Secondly, the term is marred by its numerous polemical or derogatory uses – social fascism, Islamo-fascism, crypto-fascism, and so on – to the extent that, as historian Robert Paxton points out, “it stirs up more heat than light today”.[ii] Third, and more importantly in my view, invoking fascism also amounts to a certain kind of laziness, as it spares us from analysing what is radically new about the current processes of right-wing radicalisation among a significant section of bourgeois forces on a global scale. This does not mean that today’s far right poses fewer problems than the emergence of fascism after the First World War. Quite the opposite. It means that we need to better understand the specific conditions under which it is developing.

Those intellectuals, trade unionists, and politicians who attempted to understand the rise of fascism at the time – using the tools of the late nineteenth century – did not truly grasp what they were dealing with. Consider the antifascists, who — from 1919 to 1922 when Mussolini and his Blackshirts had not yet come to power in Italy and could still be stopped — remained fixated on the idea that fascism was either a reactionary movement similar to those they had previously encountered or a docile tool in the hands of the bourgeois state and big capital. Even worse, some Marxists such as Amadeo Bordiga[iii] claimed that there was no fundamental difference between fascism and parliamentary democracy. There was a profound misunderstanding of what was new about ‘this political animal’ at the time: a mass movement of civil society with a powerful paramilitary component (hundreds of thousands of men in uniforms), largely independent of traditional bourgeois forces, structured and organised for its own purposes and objectives. This relative autonomy in its march to power, however, did not ultimately prevent fascism from becoming a precious conveyors of the interests of the most aggressive sections of imperialist capital once it reached the state apparatus.

"There was a profound misunderstanding of what was new about [fascism] [...] at the time: a mass movement of civil society with a powerful paramilitary component [...] largely independent of traditional bourgeois forces, structured and organised for its own purposes and objectives"

A similar risk arises today. Those who adorn the concept of fascism with a litany of prefixes — neo-, techno-, post-, para-, eco-, and so on — do not truly grasp what they are dealing with. The current proliferation of variations on the term merely masks the disorientation in the face of a situation that may recall the dark hours of the twentieth century but is nevertheless radically new.

As Foucault wrote in the 1970s, “any analysis that seeks to produce a political effect by resurrecting old spectres is doomed to failure. It is precisely because we are unable to analyse something that we seek to resurrect the spectre of its return”[iv]. Instead of describing today’s extreme shift to the right by resorting to often superficial analogies, we should recognise the fundamental differences that separate us from the 1920s and 1930s. Above all, we must take into account the transformation of the capitalist economy, including globalised value chains and the dominance of the financial sector, the decline in the organisation of civil society — such as political parties, unions, and associations — and the strengthening of state apparatuses that escape democratic control, as discussed by Nicos Poulantzas.[v]

Past and Present ‘Fascistisation’: Continuities and Decisive Differences

"As we are no longer at the beginning of this rising tide of new far-right movements, it is crucial that we strive to understand these movements' specific characteristics."

My research focus on the historical developments in Italy led me very early on to question the many static, term-for-term comparisons between the 1920s–1930s and the early 21st century, which uncritically relied on Robert Paxton’s (2004) model.[vi] I also questioned the predictive and mobilising virtues of using such a ‘fire alarm’. Ongoing socioeconomic and political upheavals have moved us ever more clearly away from the interwar period. As we are no longer at the beginning of this rising tide of new far-right movements, it is crucial that we strive to understand these movements’ specific characteristics.

Yet this does not mean that there are no continuities between historical fascism and today’s far right. Historical fascism itself was not without antecedents: it drew on reactionary, nationalist, and racist right-wing movements that had developed during the nineteenth century. Hannah Arendt, for instance, demonstrated that these movements were situated within the context of imperialism and historians such as Stehrnell have also traced the ideological origins of fascism back to 19th-century Francevii.

Today’s far-right movements undoubtedly share a common foundation with historical fascism and anti-democratic right-wing movements of the nineteenth century, including nationalism, racism, authoritarianism, a rejection of class conflict in favour of national and popular unity, the scapegoating of minorities (e.g. migrants, Muslims and Jews), machismo, and LGBTQI-phobia. Anyone who does not fit their conception of the nation, whether a minority or a political opponent, is stigmatised or criminalised, and this rejection is used as a tool for electoral mobilisation. This rejection of otherness is accompanied by an exclusionary, identity-based discourse that aims to legitimise authoritarian policies by claiming to defend a ‘threatened’ community.

"Historical fascism was also economically statist and interventionist, whereas contemporary far-right movements aim to privatise the public sphere to open it up to private capital."

Such phenomena, I argue, emerge in contexts of prolonged economic, social, and moral crisis characterised by a loss of trust in traditional forms of political representation. However, such parallels have their limits: historical fascism emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, following the revolutionary wave of 1917–1920. At that time, the USSR embodied a horizon of hope for millions of workers — a situation without parallel today. Historical fascism was also economically statist and interventionist, whereas contemporary far-right movements aim to privatise the public sphere to open it up to private capital. This is precisely what Milei’s ‘chainsaw’ symbolises, in line with the Reaganite and Thatcherite rhetoric of the 1980s.[viii] Moreover, while far-right movements have always challenged democratic freedoms, historical fascism involved organized strong mass mobilisation, a feature lacking in today’s far-right movements, even if they are able to mobilise a large number of voters, as was more recently the case in Saxony-Anhalt.

Historical fascism also relied on paramilitary formations, such as the Blackshirts and the SA. These were aimed at destroying the labour movement’s powerful organisations which had certainly suffered defeats but still retained considerable strength amid a profound crisis of capitalism. Such political formations no longer exist; currently, fascist splinter groups are marginal and loosely organised.

In contrast, major far-right parties exert their influence through the electoral process. In his book Hyperpolitics, Anton Jäger identifies this as one of the main differences between historical fascism and the far-right today.[ix] He argues that, unlike in the interwar period, levels of politicisation in society are high, yet they are not organised along left- or right-wing lines. Alberto Toscano[x] thus describes a fascism largely stripped of its mass movement, which retains the ideal of national rebirth driven by a union of the ‘productive classes’ — a theme that has animated all far-right movements since the second half of the nineteenth century. Jäger’s and Toscano’s work therefore highlight that we should resist a simple equation between today’s far-right and historical fascism. The point is not to deny the continuities, but to understand why the same ideological elements can produce different political forms under different historical conditions.

Why Context Matters: Fascism in the Longue Durée

As Richard Saull et al. wrote in their introduction to a significant book on ‘The Longue Durée of the Far Right’, it is crucial to challenge the prevalent assumption that fascism represents the ‘supreme stage’ of the political spectrum.[xi] In reality, fascism acquired its particular form through a specific conjunction of crises: the crisis of the capitalist regulatory regime, the disintegration of the international order based on the treaties that ended the First World War, and the imminent threat of revolution. The political form that emerged from these conditions cannot be treated as a model that is simply transfarable to other contexts without caution. This way of viewing the far-right differs from interpretations that focus too exclusively on the realm of ideas and discourse. It is also a matter of understanding the far-right as a phenomenon rooted in concrete economic, social, and political dynamics. To understand its development, we therefore need to ask how contemporary capitalism produces insecurity and conflict, how states respond to these crises, how political representation is changing, and how different fractions of capital relate to the new right.

Enzo Traverso’s term ‘post-fascism'[xii] is undoubtedly the term with which I disagree the least, precisely because the prefix “post” can be understood as signaling an incomplete transition. This allows us to consider both continuity and rupture. The breeding ground for many contemporary far-right movements was established in the 1920s and 1930s and is connected not only to Nazi-fascism but also to the experience of colonial rule by “democratic” states. Yet the distinctive characteristics of the twenty-first-century far-right are no less significant than those of the interwar period — hence the difficulty in describing this new ‘morbid phenomenon’, to borrow Gramsci’s term.

Anti-Fascist Struggle in the Twenty-First Century

"In the 1920s and 1930s, there was at least a powerful, organised socialist and communist movement, as well as an aspiration to overthrow the capitalist order and a sense of purpose. Today, that horizon seems largely blocked. This requires us to examine not whether fascism is simply “returning,” but how the far right is being transformed by the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism."

The anticipatory nature of the term ‘fascism’ risks misleading current struggles against the far-right. While history can help shed light on the present, it can in no way predict the future, provided we do not view it as eternal repetition. Understanding how Italian fascism and German National Socialism triumphed does not necessarily mean that we will be better equipped to confront the rise of new authoritarian — or even totalitarian — regimes. We do not know in advance the forms that their development will take. The term ‘fascism’, thus, traps us in the past. We must stop isolating fascism from “the longue durée” of the far-right, which has its roots in the nineteenth century and continues to this day. The detached use of the term ‘fascism’ obscures precisely this connection to the long-term history of the far right. By constantly presenting fascism as the ultimate stage of the far right, we contribute to turning it into a static archetype divorced from the history of capitalism — a ‘parentheses’, as the liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce argued. [xiii]

I believe we could be facing even more dramatic situations. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was at least a powerful, organised socialist and communist movement, as well as an aspiration to overthrow the capitalist order and a sense of purpose. Today, that horizon seems largely blocked. This requires us to examine not whether fascism is simply “returning,” but how the far right is being transformed by the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism. In other words, it compels us to examine the fundamental antagonism between democracy and capitalism, particularly in its imperialist phase, to examine how economic and social crises reshape political representation and to conduct an in-depth analysis of the history of the right and its most radical factions during times of crisis. 

References

Ian Kershaw, To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949, Penguin Books, 2016, p. 246
Elisabeth Zerofsky, “Is it Fascism ? A Leading Historian Changes His Mind”, The New York Times, Oct. 23, 2024.
Amadeo Bordiga, “I rapporti delle forze sociali e politiche in Italia (II)”, Rassegna Comunista, Oct. 31, 1922, n. 30-31, p. 1461
Michel Foucault, “La sécurité et l’État”, Tribune socialiste, Nov. 24-30 novembre 1977, in Dits et écrits, t. 3, Paris, Gallimard, 1993, p. 387.
Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London, Verso, 2000 (first English edition 1980).
Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, New York, Alfred A. Kopf, 2004.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarisnim. Expanded Edition, New York, Library of America, 2025 (first edition 1948); Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left. Fascist Ideology in France, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986.
See Quinn Slobodian, Hayek’s bastard. The Neoliberal Roots of the Populist Right, London, Allen Lane, 2025
Anton Jägger, Hyperpolitics. Extreme Politicization Without Political Consequences, London Verso, 2026.
Alberto Toscano, Late Fascism. Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis, London, Verso, 2023.
Richard Saull et al., “The longue durée of the far-right : an introduction”, in Id. (eds), The Longue Durée of the Far Right. An international historical sociology, New York, London, Routledge, 2015.
Enzo Traverso. 2017. Les nouveaux visages du fascisme. Éditions Textuel
Benedetto Croce, “Discorso inaugurale al Congresso di Bari il 28 gennaio 1944 “, in Gli Atti del Congresso di Bari. Prima libera assemblea dell’Italia e dell’Europa liberata, 1944.

F&L Blog – The International Division of Finance

July 30, 2026F&L Blogcapitalism, financialization, global south, NeoliberalismIKPS

The International Division of Finance: a structural threat to democracy in the global periphery

by Bruno De Conti

30.07.2026

Drawing on Karl Polanyi’s insights, Bruno De Conti argues that contemporary financialisation undermines democracy, particularly in the global periphery. Analogous to the international division of labour, which relegates peripheral countries to the production and export of low-value-added goods, De Conti identifies an International Division of Finance. By strengthening the political power of global financial actors at the expense of governments’ policy autonomy, this division creates conditions in which far-right and authoritarian forces can thrive. Reclaiming democratic control over global finance is therefore essential if governments are to restore their ability to pursue the economic and social programmes for which they were elected.

The Transformation of Finance in the 20th Century

"Historically, finance has evolved alongside capitalism itself, while its manifestations differ markedly between the core and the periphery of the global economy."

Finance lies at the heart of capitalism. Financial markets and instruments have enabled large-scale investment, technological innovation, and the spread of consumption patterns that have underpinned unprecedented economic growth. At the same time, finance has generated chronic instability and recurrent crises with profound socioeconomic consequences. Although finance is intrinsic to capitalism, its forms, functions, and effects vary across time and space. Historically, it has evolved alongside capitalism itself, while its manifestations differ markedly between of the global economy.

To understand how finance shapes today’s global economy and processes of fascistization, it is necessary to briefly examine the historical evolution of finance over the course of the last century. At the turn of the twentieth century, the international financial system was organised around the gold standard. According to Karl Polanyi, the latter constituted one of the four institutional pillars of the nineteenth-century liberal order, providing the monetary discipline that sustained an integrated world economy. Britain occupied the system’s commanding position, and the Bank of England acted as its chef d’orchestre.

The Great Depression and two world wars exposed the fragility of this order. In response, policymakers sought to redesign the international monetary and financial system to promote peace and revive international trade. Despite opposition from financial interests centred on Wall Street, in 1944, the Bretton Woods Agreement established a framework that restricted international capital mobility and reduced exchange-rate volatility. This system proved short-lived. By the 1960s, the emergence of the Euromarkets (with US dollar deposits in London) marked the beginning of a new phase of financial deregulation.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971/73 paved the way for what is now widely known as financialisation, understood here as a regime of accumulation in which finance assumes a dominant role. While finance has always been central to capitalism, advances in information and communication technologies (ICT), together with deliberate political decisions to deregulate domestic and cross-border finance, profoundly transformed its scale and influence in the neoliberal era. New financial instruments proliferated, speculative activity expanded, the financial sector grew faster than the productive economy, and financial operations became increasingly important within non-financial corporations. Internationally, these changes were accompanied by an extraordinary expansion of cross-border financial flows and a deepening of financial integration across most of the world economy. The 2008 financial crisis showed the extent to which the world population is vulnerable to the volatilities of global financial markets, yet it did not lead to structural transformations or stronger regulation.

How Financialisation Undermines Democracy

Given the centrality of finance to contemporary capitalism, a vast literature has examined the socioeconomic consequences of financialisation. Some studies associate it with lower levels of productive investment, while others analyse its effects on individual behaviour, education, and even professional football. Lionel Messi’s transfer to Inter Miami, for example, increased the value of the club’s shares, from which he himself benefited as a shareholder.

This essay takes a different approach, arguing that one of the most harmful consequences of deregulated finance is its erosion of fundamental democratic principles. Financial actors frequently seek to depoliticise finance and financial institutions by portraying economic decisions as purely technical rather than political. Yet claims of technical neutrality invariably serve particular interests. This logic is perhaps most clearly reflected in debates over central bank independence. The argument that monetary authorities should be insulated from political influence in order to ensure price stability and financial credibility serves to remove a key public institution from democratic control. Given the pivotal role central banks play in contemporary economies – and the far-reaching consequences of their decisions, from inequality to the green transition – it is difficult to justify preventing elected governments from using monetary policy to pursue the development projects for which they were democratically elected.

"Governments may therefore find themselves unable to implement the programmes on which they were elected for fear of a downgrade [by credit rating agencies] that could trigger capital flight, currency depreciation and inflation."

A similar logic underpins the widespread belief that senior positions in central banks and finance ministries should be occupied by supposedly apolitical experts. In practice, many of these officials come directly from private financial institutions through the well-known “revolving door” between the public and private sectors. Their policy preferences inevitably reflect both a particular theoretical outlook and the interests of the financial sector, often privileging speculation and financial returns over broader social objectives.

Financialisation has also elevated credit rating agencies (CRAs) to a central position in global finance. Three agencies – not by chance, all headquartered in New York or London – dominate this market, assessing not only corporate debt but also the sovereign debt of national governments. Although their evaluations are presented as objective technical assessments, they are based on specific assumptions about what constitute “sound” economic policies. Governments may therefore find themselves unable to implement the programmes on which they were elected for fear of a downgrade that could trigger capital flight, currency depreciation and inflation. As my colleagues and I argued in a 2022 paper [1], CRAs have effectively become policymakers, exercising significant influence over national economic policy without any democratic accountability. This constitutes a profound contradiction of democratic governance.

The International Division of Finance

Although the previous arguments apply broadly, they must be qualified by the unequal position that countries occupy in the global economy. The classical distinction between a core and a periphery in the world economy remains highly relevant and has been reinforced by financialisation. Drawing an analogy with the international division of labour, my colleagues at the University of Campinas and I propose the concept of an International Division of Finance [2]. It alludes to the configuration in which core countries issue liquid, low-yield assets and low-cost liabilities, whereas peripheral countries offer less liquid assets with higher returns.

Just like the international division of labour, this hierarchy is neither accidental nor the result of underdeveloped financial markets in peripheral economies. Rather, it reflects the structural role these countries play in the global financial system by offering international investors opportunities for higher (and often quick) returns, for example through public bonds with high interest rates. Yet investors’ appetite for such assets fluctuates with changing perceptions of global risk. Peripheral economies are therefore repeatedly exposed to waves of capital inflows and sudden reversals over which they have only limited control. The International Division of Finance thus reproduces and deepens their dependency on the core while increasing their vulnerability to external shocks.

"Peripheral economies are therefore repeatedly exposed to waves of capital inflows and sudden reversals over which they have only limited control."

This structural dependency significantly constrains policy autonomy in the periphery, reinforcing the antidemocratic character of financialisation. Brazil provides a telling example. Dilma Rousseff was re-elected president in 2014 on a platform of stronger social policies. However, amid a deep political crisis and growing concerns about the possible loss of Brazil’s investment-grade status, she appointed a highly orthodox finance minister who implemented a stringent fiscal adjustment programme. Many voters perceived this shift as a betrayal of the electoral mandate, contributing to the president’s declining popularity and paving the way for the parliamentary coup d’état that removed her from office in 2016. The subsequent political crisis paved the way for the far-right government led by Jair Bolsonaro.

This sequence of events illustrates two broader dynamics. First, governments (especially in the periphery) are often compelled to conform to the imperatives of global finance rather than the preferences expressed by their electorates. Second, when democratic mandates cannot be translated into public policy due to externally imposed fiscal constraints, trust in democratic institutions erodes, creating fertile ground for authoritarian and far-right political forces.

Moving Forward: Subjecting Finance to Democratic Control

"In the contemporary era, finance is one of the principal mechanisms through which neoliberalism undermines democracy and creates favourable conditions for the far right."

Inspired by Polanyi, many contributions to this blog have highlighted the historical relationship between (neo)liberalism and the rise of the far right. This relationship is not automatic, but reflects a recurring historical pattern in which the social dislocations produced by (neo)liberalism generate countermovements that may strengthen authoritarian and fascist forces. In the contemporary era, finance is one of the principal mechanisms through which neoliberalism undermines democracy and creates favourable conditions for the far right.

The growing power of liberalised finance has produced the paradox in which governments often prioritise the demands of financial markets over the well-being of their populations. This was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when CRAs continued to press governments in the periphery to reduce public spending despite the massive deaths resulting from an unprecedented public health emergency.

There are no simple solutions to these challenges. Yet one conclusion is clear: finance must be repoliticised, especially in the global periphery. If liberalised finance threatens democratic sovereignty, the response must be to restore democratic control over finance. At the national level, this requires measures such as capital controls and other forms of financial regulation. Internationally, this requires renewed efforts to reform the international monetary and financial system so that it serves democratic development rather than the imperatives of global finance. Unless we fundamentally transform the financial system now, we should be prepared to use the next financial crisis for expanding democratic policy space.

References

De Conti, Bruno, Pietro Borsari, and Manuel Martínez. 2022. “Credit rating agencies as policymakers: the different stances in regard to core and peripheral countries during the pandemic.” Texto para Discussão. Unicamp. IE, Campinas, n. 438. Link
Oliveira, Édivo de Almeida, and Bruno De Conti. 2025. “The International Division of Finance: Reassessing the Peripheral Condition in a Financialised Capitalism.” New Political Economy30 (2): 163–77. doi:10.1080/13563467.2024.2405522.; Lima, Humberto. 2013. Dependência Econômica sob a Hegemonia do Capital Financeiro. University of Campinas: PhD thesis. Link

Call for Papers – Democracy Under Pressure Conference

July 15, 2026MediaIKPS

CALL FOR PAPERS: DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE CONFERENCE

We are pleased to share the Call for Papers for the interdisciplinary conference Democracy Under Pressure: Conditions of the Authoritarian Turn Yesterday and Today, to be held at WU Vienna on 24-26 May 2027.

The conference brings together scholars from law and socioeconomics to examine the current rise of authoritarian tendencies around the world and to explore which socioeconomic, legal, and institutional responses could strengthen democratic resilience. The conference addresses these challenges in dialogue with four pivotal thinkers – Friedrich Hayek, Karl Polanyi, Hans Kelsen, and Carl Schmitt – whose influential yet antagonistic accounts of the proper economic and constitutional order remain highly relevant for contemporary debate. Confirmed keynote speakers are Katharina Pistor(Columbia University) and Quinn Slobodian (Boston University).

We welcome the submission of individual abstracts as well as proposals for complete panels from scholars in law, socioeconomics, political economy, constitutional theory, political science, economic sociology, history and related research fields — at all career stages, and from all regions, including the Global South.

Deadline for Abstract Submission: 15 October 2026

You can find the full Call for Papers including conference themes and submission guidelines on the conference website:

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the conference team via democracy2027@wu.ac.at

The conference is organized as a collaboration between the Institute for Law and Governance, the Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET), and the International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS).

DETAILS

Date:
May 24th-26th, 2027

Keynote Speakers:
Katharina Pistor (Columbia Law)
Quinn Slobodian (Boston University)

Organised by:

Institute for Law and Governance
Institute for Spatial and Social-Ecological Transformations (ISSET)
International Karl Polanyi Society (IKPS)
(WU Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Check out our preparatory work & events:

As preparation for the conference we have held Reading Cicles and two webinars and we also reccommend our FASCISM & LIBERALISM blog, which you can find here:

F&L Blog – In Search of Protection

July 9, 2026F&L Blogann pettifor, fascism, finance, fl-blog, karlpolanyi, liberalism, Markets, securityIKPS

In Search of Protection: Why Global Financial Markets Fuel the Far Right

by Ann Pettifor

09.07.2026

Why are so many people willing to trade democracy for authoritarian promises of protection? According to political economist Ann Pettifor, humans share a need for social, economic, and ecological security. This need, however, has been undermined by globalised markets in money, energy, food and housing as well as the US dollar standard. The consequent existential precarity is a primary reason why far-right leaders with their promises of protection and strength appeal to a growing number of people. Thus, Pettifor calls for a financial order that again subordinates global financial markets to public control.

Human Insecurity and the Need for Protection

Human beings have a fundamental need for security. In their book “Human Givens”, Joe Griffen and Ivan Tyrrell outline a radical new framework for the practice of psychiatry, psychotherapy and counselling based on the idea that humans, like all living organisms, share innate needs. These inbuilt patterns are nature’s genetic endowment. According to Griffen and Tyrell, we seek to fulfill these emotional needs not only for our well-being, but ultimately for our survival. Fortunately, our needs are only one half of the story, write Griffen and Tyrrell. Nature has also provided us with a wealth of resources to help us get those needs met.

According to the authors, one of our most important needs is security – or safe territory. An environment which enables us to lead our lives without experiencing undue fear and anxiety, and that ensures we develop fully. Our need to feel secure is closely connected, the authors explain, to our innate need for control and autonomy.

"the world has once again become profoundly insecure. Societies turn to authoritarian strongmen and women for protection from the globalised markets of our era"

Griffin and Tyrell’s insights allow us to acknowledge that when economic, social and ecological life becomes increasingly precarious, people do not simply demand more freedom – they demand protection. However – just as “in the early thirties, with an awe-inspiring vehemence”[1] – the world has once again become profoundly insecure. Societies turn to authoritarian strongmen and women for protection from the globalised markets of our era – markets in money, energy, food, and housing that, while enriching the already wealthy, have stripped millions of incomes, secure work, the right to a decent home, and affordable food. These insecurities have led many societies to turn away from what passed as democratic politics and towards far-right leaders promising protection. Donald Trump, for example, appealed to workers in the American Rust Belt by promising to protect jobs and incomes through walls against Mexico and China.

Thus, I argue, global financial markets are one of the key reasons why authoritarian leaders have become attractive again across the world. It is not inequality alone that drives the far right, but the widespread experience of insecurity generated by an international financial order that has subordinated democratic politics to global markets.

The recent turn away from democracy and towards authoritarianism has been remarkably rapid in historical terms and has spread across an extraordinary range of countries—from the United States under Trump, to India under Modi, Russia under Putin, China under Xi Jinping and Brazil under Bolsonaro, with many more countries like Indonesia, Ethiopia and Vietnam following similar trajectories. As the ‘Tyranny Tracker’ illustrates, authoritarian rule is no longer confined to a handful of countries but has become a defining feature of today’s political landscape. Of all 179 countries covered by the tracker, only 74 are classified as democracies, 25 as hybrid authoritarian regimes, and 80 as fully authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarianism and Its International Roots: From the Gold Standard to the Dollar Standard

“[the] bird’s-eye view of the quarter-century, 1914-39, shows clearly that change was sudden and world-wide, including in range, countries of the most various social and political complexion. Only a cause external to them all could have had such an effect" - Karl Polanyi 1940 [1]

What explains the remarkably simultaneous rise of authoritarian politics across countries with very different political traditions? As Karl Polanyi argued of the 1930s, “only a cause external to them all could have had such an effect.” The external cause of this era’s rise in authoritarianism worldwide, I argue, is the insecurity generated by the globalised financial system and the US Dollar Standard – a system that in many respects mirrors the gold standard of the 1930s. Polanyi described the “fount and matrix” of that earlier international order as the self-regulating market, built around markets in the fictitious commodities of labour, land and money. Much the same can be said of today’s financial order.

To paraphrase Polanyi, since President Nixon dismantled the Bretton Woods international financial architecture in 1971, little has been allowed to impede the expansion of private global markets in money, labour, energy, food and housing [2]. Prices, supply and demand have increasingly been left to market forces, while governments have retreated from regulating markets in the public interest. Neither price, nor supply, nor demand were fixed or regulated: only such policies and measures were introduced which helped to ensure the self-regulation of the market. The result has been an international economic order in which global markets have become the only organizing power in the economic sphere.

"[...] globalised markets increasingly disturbed and ruined our daily lives and livelihoods by way of financial, political and ecological volatility, leading periodically to catastrophic crises and causing growing insecurity"

Reflecting on the collapse of the Gold Standard and the rise of fascism, Polanyi concluded in a 1940 lecture that “neither liberal capitalism nor representative democracy could function satisfactorily under such conditions” [3]. His insight remains strikingly relevant today.

The willing surrender of the world’s parliaments and congresses to government by private, globalised markets in the neoliberal era, increasingly hollowed out political power and bred cynicism and disillusion with so-called democratic politics. The governance of globalised markets was not only deliberately detached from democratic, regulatory oversight, globalised markets increasingly disturbed and ruined our daily lives and livelihoods by way of financial, political and ecological volatility, leading periodically to catastrophic crises and causing growing insecurity.

The Neoliberal Age: Financial Crises and Wars

What ensued from these neoliberal market policies was a non-stopping wave of financial crises: The sovereign debt crises of low-income countries began at the fringes of the global economy in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. With the following dotcom crisis of the 2000s – which was caused by the widespread euphoria over the internet and new telecommunication technologies – financial crises shifted to the Western core.

Since the start of the twenty-first century, as awareness grew of the threat posed by ecological breakdown, societies have endured recurring global crises and growing precarity: The world lurched from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09, to the 2009-10 European debt crisis, to the collapse of the repo market, i.e. shadow banking, on 17 September 2019 which led to massive central bank bailouts. The wave of crises continued from the COVID-induced stock market crash in February 2020, to the shadow banking crash in March 2020, to the 2021-2024 global cost-of-living crisis.

In reference to the 1930s, Karl Polanyi argued that the economic system has led to a social and economic “transformation of planetary range […] topped by wars of an entirely new type in which a score of states have crashed, and the contours of new empires are emerging out of a sea of blood”. [4] Today, similar dynamics can be seen in Russia’s long war against Ukraine, the ongoing devastation in Gaza following the Hamas attack on Israel, and the subsequent immiseration and deliberate genocide of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza. The disastrous 2026 war against Iran, led by Israel and the United States led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, driving energy prices sharply upward and intensifying both the cost-of-living crisis and global ecological pressures.

Toward a Global Financial Order for Security

"we must once again draw on our own personal resources to build the international coordination and cooperation needed to restore humanity’s and the ecosystem’s profound need for stability, security and autonomy."

Taken together, these developments provide stark evidence that the contemporary US dollar-based financial order has become a destabilising force in global politics and material life. Looking at the multiple wars, rising costs and ensuing resource shortages there can be no clearer evidence that today’s US dollar standard of globalised financial markets threatens to physically destroy human society and to transform the ecosystem into a wilderness.

Yet this is not an inevitable condition. An international financial order that subordinated finance to democratic priorities has existed before. We did this as a world community, at Bretton Woods in 1944, when the world’s leading economists gathered to design an international financial system that rejected the globalisation of the 1930s, and built a system that subordinated global markets to the interests of states. These states worked inter-nationally to create what is known in all economic textbooks as ‘the golden age’. An age when governments exercised power over cross-border capital flows; used central bank powers to manage the creation of credit, and regulation to intervene in the conduct of markets in money, labour and land. It was an era in which humanity experienced relative peace, security and stability, thanks to the subordination of global markets to democratic regulation in the interests of society.

Society’s only hope today is to draw on nature’s wealth of resources to restore some sense of security and stability to both humanity and the ecosystem. The ability to mobilise those resources requires wise leadership, solidarity and community and the political power needed to, once again, subordinate global markets to the interests of society and the biosphere.In other words, we must once again draw on our own personal resources to build the international coordination and cooperation needed to restore humanity’s and the ecosystem’s profound need for stability, security and autonomy.

References

Karl Polanyi, 1940. Lecture 1: The Passing of 19th Century Civilization
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 1957, p.72
Karl Polanyi, 1940. Lecture Four: Is America an Exception?
Karl Polanyi, 1940. Lecture Four: Is America an Exception?, p. 4.

The Hegemonic Project of the Right: Why the reactionary Right is more than a Polanyian countermovement

by Andreas Novy

12.11.2026

The Limits of Countermovements for Protection

The Hegemonic Project of the Reactionary Right

The Need for an Egalitarian Hegemonic Project

References

A Black Critique of Fascism: Lessons from Black Radical and Anti-Colonial Thinkers for the 21st Century

by Vanessa E. Thompson

30.10.2026

Colonialism as a Prefiguration of Fascism

Racial Fascism in the Segregated United States

Black Radical Anti-Fascism in the Post-War and Neoliberal Era

Lessons from Black and Feminist Abolitionists for the 21st Century

References

Further Reading

Who will fight for Anti-Fascist Economics? The Role of Transformative Cells in the Face of a Regressive State

by Ulrich Brand

15.10.2026

Weber’s Anti-Fascist Economics and the Problem of Power

The State as the Condensation of Capitalist Power Relations

Transformative Cells: Building Power Within and Beyond the State

References

WEBINAR: Capitalism, Care and Housing

Isabella Webers „Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik“ – Hayek und Polanyi im Widerstreit

Ein Kommentar von Andreas Novy

Hayeks und Polanyis Entwürfe einer anti-totalitären Wirtschaftspolitik

Niederlage des „sanften“ Hayek – Siegeszug des „harten“ Hayek?

Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik und die Wiederentdeckung Polanyis

Literatur

Wiener Vorlesung: Isabella Weber über Antifaschistische Wirtschaftspolitik

Is Fascism Returning? Why the Historical Fascism Analogy Falls Short

by Stéfanie Prezioso

10.09.2026

The Problem of Looking Backward

Past and Present ‘Fascistisation’: Continuities and Decisive Differences

Why Context Matters: Fascism in the Longue Durée

Anti-Fascist Struggle in the Twenty-First Century

References

The International Division of Finance: a structural threat to democracy in the global periphery

by Bruno De Conti

30.07.2026

The Transformation of Finance in the 20th Century

How Financialisation Undermines Democracy

The International Division of Finance

Moving Forward: Subjecting Finance to Democratic Control

References

CALL FOR PAPERS: DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE CONFERENCE

DETAILS

Quinn Slobodian

Katharina Pistor

Organised by:

Check out our preparatory work & events:

In Search of Protection: Why Global Financial Markets Fuel the Far Right

by Ann Pettifor

09.07.2026

Human Insecurity and the Need for Protection

Authoritarianism and Its International Roots: From the Gold Standard to the Dollar Standard

The Neoliberal Age: Financial Crises and Wars

Toward a Global Financial Order for Security

References

Further Reading

Is Fascism Returning?
Why the Historical Fascism Analogy Falls Short