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F&L Blog – Is Fascism Returning?

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Is Fascism Returning?
Why the Historical Fascism Analogy Falls Short

by Stéfanie Prezioso

10.09.2026

The resurgence of the far-right has revived a familiar question: are we witnessing a return of fascism? According to historian Stéfanie Prezioso, the widespread use of the term ‘fascism’ as a template for understanding today’s far-right movements risks obscuring what is new about contemporary right-wing radicalisation. She argues that while today’s movements share important features with historical fascism, they operate under fundamentally different economic, political, and social conditions. Therefore, Prezioso calls for a more comprehensive analysis of the changing form of the far-right under the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism. 

Is there any point in reviving the concept of fascism? The central place that fascism occupies in the history and ‘mental territory’ of the 20th century explains why this concept is so frequently referenced, along with iterative nouns such as ‘recurrence’ and ‘return’. It is undoubtedly legitimate to want to place the current rise of the far-right within a broader historical context. However, it is precisely this ‘archaeological’ work (in the Foucauldian sense) that leads me to categorically reject the idea that we are reliving the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than focusing on historical analogies, I argue that we should concentrate on current movements and ask what is distinctive about today’s far-right – and, in particular, its relationship with contemporary capitalism. 

The Problem of Looking Backward

"[...] in my view, invoking fascism also amounts to a certain kind of laziness, as it spares us from analysing what is radically new about the current processes of right-wing radicalisation [...]"

In fact, the term ‘fascism’ poses numerous problems. Firstly, there is no consensus on its definition, despite – or perhaps because of – the hundreds of thousands of pages devoted to it. For historian Ian Kershaw, for example, attempting to define fascism is akin to trying to nail jelly to a wall.[i] Secondly, the term is marred by its numerous polemical or derogatory uses –  social fascism, Islamo-fascism, crypto-fascism, and so on – to the extent that, as historian Robert Paxton points out, “it stirs up more heat than light today”.[ii] Third, and more importantly in my view, invoking fascism also amounts to a certain kind of laziness, as it spares us from analysing what is radically new about the current processes of right-wing radicalisation among a significant section of bourgeois forces on a global scale. This does not mean that today’s far right poses fewer problems than the emergence of fascism after the First World War. Quite the opposite. It means that we need to better understand the specific conditions under which it is developing.

Those intellectuals, trade unionists, and politicians who attempted to understand the rise of fascism at the time – using the tools of the late nineteenth century – did not truly grasp what they were dealing with. Consider the antifascists, who — from 1919 to 1922 when Mussolini and his Blackshirts had not yet come to power in Italy and could still be stopped — remained fixated on the idea that fascism was either a reactionary movement similar to those they had previously encountered or a docile tool in the hands of the bourgeois state and big capital. Even worse, some Marxists such as Amadeo Bordiga[iii] claimed that there was no fundamental difference between fascism and parliamentary democracy. There was a profound misunderstanding of what was new about ‘this political animal’ at the time: a mass movement of civil society with a powerful paramilitary component (hundreds of thousands of men in uniforms), largely independent of traditional bourgeois forces, structured and organised for its own purposes and objectives. This relative autonomy in its march to power, however, did not ultimately prevent fascism from becoming a precious conveyors of the interests of the most aggressive sections of imperialist capital once it reached the state apparatus. 

"There was a profound misunderstanding of what was new about [fascism] [...] at the time: a mass movement of civil society with a powerful paramilitary component [...] largely independent of traditional bourgeois forces, structured and organised for its own purposes and objectives"

A similar risk arises today. Those who adorn the concept of fascism with a litany of prefixes — neo-, techno-, post-, para-, eco-, and so on — do not truly grasp what they are dealing with. The current proliferation of variations on the term merely masks the disorientation in the face of a situation that may recall the dark hours of the twentieth century but is nevertheless radically new. 

As Foucault wrote in the 1970s, “any analysis that seeks to produce a political effect by resurrecting old spectres is doomed to failure. It is precisely because we are unable to analyse something that we seek to resurrect the spectre of its return”[iv]. Instead of describing today’s extreme shift to the right by resorting to often superficial analogies, we should recognise the fundamental differences that separate us from the 1920s and 1930s. Above all, we must take into account the transformation of the capitalist economy, including globalised value chains and the dominance of the financial sector, the decline in the organisation of civil society — such as political parties, unions, and associations — and the strengthening of state apparatuses that escape democratic control, as discussed by Nicos Poulantzas.[v] 

Past and Present ‘Fascistisation’: Continuities and Decisive Differences

"As we are no longer at the beginning of this rising tide of new far-right movements, it is crucial that we strive to understand these movements' specific characteristics."

My research focus on the historical developments in Italy led me very early on to question the many static, term-for-term comparisons between the 1920s–1930s and the early 21st century, which uncritically relied on Robert Paxton’s (2004)  model.[vi] I also questioned the predictive and mobilising virtues of using such a ‘fire alarm’. Ongoing socioeconomic and political upheavals have moved us ever more clearly away from the interwar period. As we are no longer at the beginning of this rising tide of new far-right movements, it is crucial that we strive to understand these movements’ specific characteristics. 

Yet this does not mean that there are no continuities between historical fascism and today’s far right. Historical fascism itself was not without antecedents: it drew on reactionary, nationalist, and racist right-wing movements that had developed during the nineteenth century.  Hannah Arendt, for instance, demonstrated that these movements were situated within the context of imperialism and historians such as Stehrnell have also traced the ideological origins of fascism back to 19th-century Francevii. 

Today’s far-right movements undoubtedly share a common foundation with historical fascism and anti-democratic right-wing movements of the nineteenth century, including nationalism, racism, authoritarianism, a rejection of class conflict in favour of national and popular unity, the scapegoating of minorities (e.g. migrants, Muslims and Jews), machismo, and LGBTQI-phobia. Anyone who does not fit their conception of the nation, whether a minority or a political opponent, is stigmatised or criminalised, and this rejection is used as a tool for electoral mobilisation. This rejection of otherness is accompanied by an exclusionary, identity-based discourse that aims to legitimise authoritarian policies by claiming to defend a ‘threatened’ community. 

"Historical fascism was also economically statist and interventionist, whereas contemporary far-right movements aim to privatise the public sphere to open it up to private capital."

Such phenomena, I argue, emerge in contexts of prolonged economic, social, and moral crisis characterised by a loss of trust in traditional forms of political representation. However, such parallels have their limits: historical fascism emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, following the revolutionary wave of 1917–1920. At that time, the USSR embodied a horizon of hope for millions of workers — a situation without parallel today. Historical fascism was also economically statist and interventionist, whereas contemporary far-right movements aim to privatise the public sphere to open it up to private capital. This is precisely what Milei’s ‘chainsaw’ symbolises, in line with the Reaganite and Thatcherite rhetoric of the 1980s.[viii] Moreover, while far-right movements have always challenged democratic freedoms, historical fascism involved organized strong mass mobilisation, a feature lacking in today’s far-right movements, even if they are able to mobilise a large number of voters, as was more recently the case in Saxony-Anhalt. 

Historical fascism also relied on paramilitary formations, such as the Blackshirts and the SA. These were aimed at destroying the labour movement’s powerful organisations which had certainly suffered defeats but still retained considerable strength amid a profound crisis of capitalism. Such political formations no longer exist; currently, fascist splinter groups are marginal and loosely organised. 

In contrast, major far-right parties exert their influence through the electoral process. In his book Hyperpolitics, Anton Jäger identifies this as one of the main differences between historical fascism and the far-right today.[ix] He argues that, unlike in the interwar period, levels of politicisation in society are high, yet they are not organised along left- or right-wing lines. Alberto Toscano[x] thus describes a fascism largely stripped of its mass movement, which retains the ideal of national rebirth driven by a union of the ‘productive classes’ — a theme that has animated all far-right movements since the second half of the nineteenth century. Jäger’s and Toscano’s work therefore highlight that we should resist a simple equation between today’s far-right and historical fascism. The point is not to deny the continuities, but to understand why the same ideological elements can produce different political forms under different historical conditions. 

Why Context Matters: Fascism in the Longue Durée

As Richard Saull et al. wrote in their introduction to a significant book on ‘The Longue Durée of the Far Right’, it is crucial to challenge the prevalent assumption that fascism represents the ‘supreme stage’ of the political spectrum.[xi] In reality, fascism acquired its particular form through a specific conjunction of crises: the crisis of the capitalist regulatory regime, the disintegration of the international order based on the treaties that ended the First World War, and the imminent threat of revolution. The political form that emerged from these conditions cannot be treated as a model that is simply transfarable to other contexts without caution. This way of viewing the far-right differs from interpretations that focus too exclusively on the realm of ideas and discourse. It is also a matter of understanding the far-right as a phenomenon rooted in concrete economic, social, and political dynamics. To understand its development, we therefore need to ask how contemporary capitalism produces insecurity and conflict, how states respond to these crises, how political representation is changing, and how different fractions of capital relate to the new right. 

Enzo Traverso’s term ‘post-fascism'[xii] is undoubtedly the term with which I disagree the least, precisely because the prefix “post” can be understood as signaling an incomplete transition. This allows us to consider both continuity and rupture. The breeding ground for many contemporary far-right movements was established in the 1920s and 1930s and is connected not only to Nazi-fascism but also to the experience of colonial rule by “democratic” states. Yet the distinctive characteristics of the twenty-first-century far-right are no less significant than those of the interwar period — hence the difficulty in describing this new ‘morbid phenomenon’, to borrow Gramsci’s term. 

Anti-Fascist Struggle in the Twenty-First Century

"In the 1920s and 1930s, there was at least a powerful, organised socialist and communist movement, as well as an aspiration to overthrow the capitalist order and a sense of purpose. Today, that horizon seems largely blocked. This requires us to examine not whether fascism is simply “returning,” but how the far right is being transformed by the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism."

The anticipatory nature of the term ‘fascism’ risks misleading current struggles against the far-right. While history can help shed light on the present, it can in no way predict the future, provided we do not view it as eternal repetition. Understanding how Italian fascism and German National Socialism triumphed does not necessarily mean that we will be better equipped to confront the rise of new authoritarian — or even totalitarian — regimes. We do not know in advance the forms that their development will take. The term ‘fascism’, thus, traps us in the past. We must stop isolating fascism from “the longue durée” of the far-right, which has its roots in the nineteenth century and continues to this day. The detached use of the term ‘fascism’ obscures precisely this connection to the long-term history of the far right. By constantly presenting fascism as the ultimate stage of the far right, we contribute to turning it into a static archetype divorced from the history of capitalism — a ‘parentheses’, as the liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce argued. [xiii] 

I believe we could be facing even more dramatic situations. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was at least a powerful, organised socialist and communist movement, as well as an aspiration to overthrow the capitalist order and a sense of purpose. Today, that horizon seems largely blocked. This requires us to examine not whether fascism is simply “returning,” but how the far right is being transformed by the conditions of twenty-first-century capitalism. In other words, it compels us to examine the fundamental antagonism between democracy and capitalism, particularly in its imperialist phase, to examine how economic and social crises reshape political representation and to conduct an in-depth analysis of the history of the right and its most radical factions during times of crisis.  

Stefanie Prezioso

Stefanié Prezioso is a Marxist historian, and Associate Professor of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Lausanne.

References

  1. Ian Kershaw, To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949, Penguin Books, 2016, p. 246 
  2. Elisabeth Zerofsky, “Is it Fascism ? A Leading Historian Changes His Mind”, The New York Times, Oct. 23, 2024. 
  3. Amadeo Bordiga, “I rapporti delle forze sociali e politiche in Italia (II)”, Rassegna Comunista, Oct. 31, 1922, n. 30-31, p. 1461 
  4. Michel Foucault, “La sécurité et l’État”, Tribune socialiste, Nov. 24-30 novembre 1977, in Dits et écrits, t. 3, Paris, Gallimard, 1993, p. 387. 
  5. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London, Verso, 2000 (first English edition 1980). 
  6. Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, New York, Alfred A. Kopf, 2004. 
  7. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarisnim. Expanded Edition, New York, Library of America, 2025 (first edition 1948); Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left. Fascist Ideology in France, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986. 
  8. See Quinn Slobodian, Hayek’s bastard. The Neoliberal Roots of the Populist Right, London, Allen Lane, 2025
  9. Anton Jägger, Hyperpolitics. Extreme Politicization Without Political Consequences, London Verso, 2026. 
  10. Alberto Toscano, Late Fascism. Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis, London, Verso, 2023. 
  11. Richard Saull et al., “The longue durée of the far-right : an introduction”, in Id. (eds), The Longue Durée of the Far Right. An international historical sociology, New York, London, Routledge, 2015. 
  12. Enzo Traverso. 2017. Les nouveaux visages du fascisme. Éditions Textuel 
  13. Benedetto Croce, “Discorso inaugurale al Congresso di  Bari il 28 gennaio 1944 “, in Gli Atti del Congresso di Bari. Prima libera assemblea dell’Italia e dell’Europa liberata, 1944. 

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F&L Blog – Against The Republic

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Against the Republic:

Fascism, Capitalist Crisis, and the Assault on Popular Sovereignty

by Pınar Bedirhanoğlu & Cenk Saraçoğlu

19.06.2026

What are the roots of today’s global fascist turn and where is it leading us? In this article, Pınar Bedirhanoğlu and Cenk Saraçoğlu argue that fascism is not a fixed regime type, but a counter-revolutionary political process triggered by deep capitalist crises. Moving beyond rigid historical checklists, the authors show how fascism systematically assaults “republican political rationality” – the institutional and ideological frameworks that allow ordinary people to act as active political subjects. They trace the current wave of global fascistization back to the backlash against popular uprisings following the 2007–08 financial crisis, itself a crisis of neoliberal capitalism. While contemporary movements differ in their rhetoric, their shared objective is to atomize societies and eliminate democratic restraints on capital accumulation. Addressing today’s fascist turn means recognizing it as a broader assault on popular empowerment and our ability to shape our collective future.

Understanding Today’s Fascist Turn Within the Historical Development of Capitalism

The renewed urgency with which fascism is discussed today is not merely an intellectual exercise. It reflects a widely shared intuition that what is unfolding across the world today cannot be understood by terms such as “democratic backsliding”, “competitive authoritarianism”, or “right-wing populism”. These conceptual debates often get stuck in a methodological dead end, evaluating fascism only by the degree with which it corresponds to past instances, such as interwar Germany and Italy.

This article differs from common approaches that use a checklist of features to decide whether the “fascist minimum”, in Robert Paxton’s words [1], is met. Instead, we draw on a historical materialist framework by investigating the question of what fascism means within the historical development of capitalism: what structural function it serves, what it targets, and why it recurs. Alberto Toscano’s 2023 book Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis [2] offers a decisive methodological starting point. Building on W.E.B. Du Bois’s characterization of late 19th century post-Reconstruction period in the US as a “counter-revolution of property” led by white supremacy, Toscano argues that fascism must be approached not as a fixed regime type or a coherent ideological formation, but as a historically fluid process intimately tied to the dynamics of capitalist crises. In this respect, “late fascism”, like “late capitalism” varies in form and content according to its conjuncture. According to Toscano, its genealogy can be traced back to racial capitalism and extends well beyond the interwar European cases that have dominated theoretical reflections.

We take up Toscano’s argument and seek to extend it in a specific direction: if fascism is a counter-revolutionary process whose form and content change with historical circumstances, then we need a clearer answer to a basic question: what exactly is it a revolution against?  

Fascism as a Counter-Revolution Against “Republican Political Rationality"

"[Today's fascist counter-revolution] does not merely suppress specific gains but works to eliminate the very conditions under which such gains become possible."

We argue that fascism consistently targets two interrelated terrains. The first consists of the ideological and political gains won through socialist and progressive struggles. The second is the ideological and institutional ground which enables working and lower social classes to be active political subjects in the first place. It is this second terrain – what we term republican political rationality – that gives today’s fascist counter-revolution its characteristic depth and reach. It does not merely suppress specific gains but works to eliminate the very conditions under which such gains become possible.

The concept of republican political rationality has its roots in the French Revolution, or more precisely, the long revolutionary conjuncture of the late eighteenth century. It was during this era that popular forces — the sans-culottes, the urban laboring poor, the peasantry, the colonized subjects of the Haitian Revolution — first entered onto the political stage. For the first time, the question of who rules and on what terms could no longer be settled among elites without responding to the cries and claims of the laboring majority. Thus, what the new, republican state form registered, however imperfectly and however much against the intentions of dominant classes, was this irreversible entry of the popular classes into politics.[3]

The political rationality – i.e. the logic or set of ideas – of the republican societal order and state structure builds on a specific conception of freedom, freedom as non-domination, as long emphasized by Philip Pettit.[4] Here, freedom is understood not only as the absence of interference but as the absence of subjection to arbitrary power. As such, we can define the republican political rationality as encompassing following principles:

  1. Popular sovereignty: the legitimacy of political authority derives from and must remain accountable to the people as a collective subject, not via divine mandate, dynastic right, or the will of a particular privileged group.
  2. Active citizenship: the political community is made up not of passive subjects but active participants – people who deliberate about and take responsibility for the common affairs of their polity and play an active role in designing the constitution and laws that organize social and political life.
  3. The priority of the public: the common good, the res publica, takes precedence over private interest; the state is accountable to the general will rather than to particular interests.

These principles do not constitute a coherent or tension-free doctrine but are better understood as the normative residue of social struggles. While capital forces the state to maintain the conditions for its accumulation, such as the protection of property and the “policing” of class conflict, the republican political form introduces into this equation a set of principles – such as popular sovereignty, active citizenship, non-domination – that are structurally in tension with the impositions of capital. This tension is what makes the republican state both a mechanism of bourgeois class rule and a terrain of popular struggle. This has significant implications for how we read both the historical instances of fascism and its contemporary forms.

How Neoliberalism Created the Conditions for Contemporary Fascism

In the interwar period, the fascist assault was directed simultaneously against the organized working-class movement – its parties, unions, and revolutionary organizations – and against the liberal-democratic institutional and ideological framework within which that movement had won its basis. The neoliberal era since the 1970-80s has been characterized by a systematic hollowing out of the gains achieved by social and working-class movements in inter- and post-war eras.[5] The financialization of social relations has atomized the working class and made collective political action increasingly difficult; the subordination of public policy to the demands of financial markets has reduced popular sovereignty; the technocratization of government has removed key decisions from the domain of democratic deliberation; and the dismantling of welfare institutions has eroded the material conditions of active citizenship.

"The neoliberal erosion of republican political rationality is not yet fascism. It does, however, create the conditions for fascism."

The result is a procedural democracy stripped of its republican substance, reduced to the empty form of periodic elections that reproduce the management of accumulation by different political figures but do not alter its fundamental logic. This neoliberal erosion of republican political rationality is not yet fascism. It does, however, create the conditions for fascism. It produces the generalized political disorientation, the erosion of trust in democratic institutions, and the atomized social landscape on which a fascist counter-revolution can operate.

The Significance of the 2007-08 Crisis and Its Aftermath

The 2008 financial crisis was not merely an economic event. It was the explosive moment at which the accumulated contradictions of neoliberal capitalism could no longer be contained. The rapid delegitimization of existing political institutions and ideological frameworks, the material impoverishment of broad sections of the working class and middle strata, and the sudden visibility of the structural violence of capital produced what Antonio Gramsci would have called an organic crisis. The 2008 financial crisis was not merely a crisis of the economic realm but of the entire social formation, in which the old forms of hegemony could no longer be upheld. The result was a wave of popular political mobilization unprecedented in the post-Cold War era: the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Occupy Wall Street, Turkey’s Gezi Park uprising, the Indignados movement in Spain that eventually crystallized as Podemos, the student movements in Brazil… to name only a few. 

"The 2008 financial crisis was not merely a crisis of the economic realm but of the entire social formation, in which the old forms of hegemony could no longer be upheld."

These varied movements shared a common political grammar that is highly significant for our argument: not particular to a specific sector or identity group, but what can be recognized – in retrospect – as cries of republican political claims. Popular masses reclaimed the political institutions that had been captured by private and oligarchic interests. They reacted to the hollowing out of popular sovereignty by financial, technocratic and coercive strategies, which were systematically destroying the conditions of active citizenship and people’s capacity to participate meaningfully in shaping the collective conditions of life.

The counter-revolutionary response did not take long to respond, however. The violent repression and/or “hijacking” of the Arab Spring, the crushing of the Gezi movement, the defeat of Syriza’s opposition to EU-imposed austerity policies, the systematic containment of Occupy and the Indignados: these were the opening moves of what has become a globally converging, if not centrally organized, counter-revolutionary assault.

The Fascistization of Post-2008 Societies Around the World

"What followed was [...] a more far-reaching attempt to eliminate the very political, social, and ideological terrains from which popular challenges might re-emerge. This is what substantiates the use of the term 'fascistization'."

What followed was not limited to the reassertion of neoliberal policy, but a more far-reaching attempt to eliminate the very political, social, and ideological terrains from which popular challenges might re-emerge. This is what substantiates the use of the term fascistization, not because all its contemporary manifestations replicate the organizational or ideological forms of interwar fascism, but because the counter-revolutionary logic at work shares the same structural target: the conditions that enable everyone to be active political subjects.

This fascistization process has taken different forms in different national contexts. Trumpism and the MAGA movement combine the mobilization of racial and nativist resentment with a systematic assault on the institutional and legal constraints on executive power. In India, Modi’s BJP has deployed Hindu nationalist ideology to reconfigure the political community along exclusionary ethnic-religious lines, dismantling the constitutional protections that had, however imperfectly, sustained a plural political field. In Turkey, the AKP has combined right-wing populist mobilization with a subversive assault on the republican institutional and ideological framework of the state. In Brazil, Bolsonarismo represented not merely a right-wing government but an attempt to reorganize the terms of political conflict around the elimination of the social and political gains of the PT era.

In Europe, the picture is more complex, but its fundamental logic is the same. The electoral rise of far-right parties across almost all European countries represents something more than the predictable shift toward the right. These forces systematically undermine the democratic norms that structure political contestation – from equal citizenship regardless of origin, to the principle that political authority is accountable to the entire population rather than to an ethnically defined community. Crucially, we argue that these forces remain part of the fascistization process even when they are not in power. Their role is to reshape the political horizon by normalizing authoritarian and exclusionary ideas, weakening the republican foundations of popular political agency, and redirecting the energies unleashed by organic crises into nationalist channels rather than true emancipatory alternatives.

Fascistization vs. Our Common Future

What all these diverse manifestations of fascistization share is a goal of eliminating the republican political rationality. The particular institutional targets and ideological codes, and the specific combination of repression and mass mobilization through which consent is organized all vary in each national context. But the structural logic is the same: to annihilate the conditions of popular political subjectivity and to depoliticize, atomize, and reintegrate the popular classes under forms of identification and mobilization that preclude true collective agency. [6]

In this way, fascistizsation secures the conditions for the continued extraction and accumulation of capital, unhindered by social or political forces. Discussions on the extent to which contemporary forms align with historical examples overlook fascism’s broader purpose of dismantling our collective capacity to shape our common world – and risks distracting from the urgent need to form collective responses.

Pınar Bedirhanoğlu is Professor at Middle East Technical University, at the Department of International Relations. Her work focuses on global political economy, neoliberalism, financialization, and corruption.

Cenk Saraçoğlu is Professor at Ankara University. Amongst others, his work focuses on political and social theory, nationalism, migration racism, and inequality.

References

  1. Paxton, Robert O. 2004. The Anatomy of Fascism. Alfred A. Knopf.
  2. Toscano, Alberto. 2023. Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis. Verso.
  3. Bedirhanoğlu, Pınar, and Cenk Saracoglu. 2023. ‘Demokrasi Nereye?: Neoliberalizm Döneminde Demokrasi-Cumhuriyet Bağının Kopuşu’ (Quo Vadis Democracy: De-linking of Democracy and Republic in the Neoliberal Era). In Demokrasi: Kavram, Kurum, Süreç (Democracy: Concept, Institution, Process), edited by Menderes Çınar. İletişim Yayınları.
  4. Pettit, Philip. 2012. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
  5. Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2026. ‘Beyond the Freedom of Movement: Rethinking the Global Migration Regime through the Right to Homeland’. Globalizations, April 29, 1–22.
  6. Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2026. ‘Beyond the Freedom of Movement:…’

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