Muskism, Trumpism, Masculinism
Economic liberalism, right wing populism and
the new gender order
by Brigitte Aulenbacher & Birgitt Riegraf
21.05.2026
From “masculine energy” to “tradwives”— contemporary far-right political-economic movements are interwined with a new gender order which is not incidental, but core to understanding their rise, argue Brigitte Aulenbacher and Birgit Riegraf in this latest blog piece. With a focus on the USA, the authors compare the emergence of right-wing populism today, with roots in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crash, with the “countermovements” to economic liberalism witnessed by Karl Polanyi during the Great Depression. In contrast to their declared aims, both movements ultimately served to support liberal economic elites. The new era of “Muskism” and “Trumpism” carries on in this tradition, exemplified by the close relationship between governments and powerful tech elites. As a driving force of this development, the authors identify a new masculinism giving shape both to economic liberalism and the gender order.
The rise of contemporary right-wing populism: a Polanyian “countermovement”
Today’s populist far right has its roots in the early stages of neoliberal globalization. Karl Polanyi wrote his masterpiece The Great Transformation while witnessing the “movement” toward forced economic liberalism in the early 20th century and the emergence of „countermovements“ seeking protection from its destructive effects, such as the socialist, fascist-social and partisan movements, and the New Deal. While there are key differences between the stock market crash of 1929 and the neoliberal era’s financial crisis in 2008 (and their respective effects in terms of precarity, poverty, and social decline) there are historical parallels in that both marked important turning points which strengthened right-wing populism. Several developments point to the rise of the contemporary far right as such a Polanyian „countermovement“. Within Europe, Hans-Jürgen Bieling [1] identifies the crises of finance, poverty and forced migration in the face of wars as a historical „window of opportunity,“ which helped to promote right-wing parties and social movements, and their respective agendas and ideologies. Arlie Hochschild [2] came to a similar diagnosis with regard to the USA.
At the same time, these movements contain inherent contradictions: they are what Klaus Dörre terms “ambivalox” – a mix of ambivalence and paradox [3]. Many right-wing parties combine economic liberalism with the promise of social protection by transforming questions of social justice into questions of belonging: in terms of “Volk“ (nation), ethnicity, race and citizenship. As found by Atzmüller, Décieux and Ferschli [4], this is used to justify austerity policies. By promising social advancement instead of decline, right wing parties and social movements attract the votes of the working and middle classes. The flipside of this promise is that social concerns are turned into anti-democratic action as they seek to undo emancipatory progress in the politics of equality, diversity, and inclusion as well as the rights of women, migrants and LGBTQI+ communities. At its core, right-wing populism uses identity politics to address the native male working and middle classes – intermediated by emotions or “affective politics“ and the respective “affective narratives”, [5] while forcing economic liberalism and promoting the respective elites’ agenda.
Trumpism and Muskism: an elites’ Polanyian movement
A deeper understanding of the phenomenon underlying “Trumpism” (as explored by Faude & Heinkelmann-Wild [6]), or “Muskism” can be gleaned from the recent work of Quinn Slobodian and Ben Tarnoff with On Muskism. A Guide for the Perplexed [7]. In it, the authors diagnose a new era of economic liberalism characterised by the following shifts: authoritarian deglobalization replacing neoliberal globalization; a reconfiguration of the relationship between the economy and the state; new modes of production combined with the reorganization of work and everyday life; as well as a heightened emphasis on technological progress and the relationship between humans and technology.
We put forward that such new alliances between representatives of the most powerful parts of the private sector — such as the tech industry — and authoritarian political forces, constitute a new Polanyian “movement”, one which moves toward forced economic liberalism as soon as the latter enter government. And this development is also inextricably linked to gender relations that are deeply embedded within this process of transformation, be it in Hungary, Argentina, or the USA. Drawing upon the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” by Raewyn Connell [8], we now examine masculinism as a driving force in terms of both the scope and direction of societal transformation. For the purposes of brevity, we limit our analysis to the USA.
Trumpism, Muskism and Masculinism
If Trumpism or Muskism is characterized by an emphasis on national interests and a new form of technological and economic aggressiveness, this is — quite deliberately — intertwined with the propagation of a new “hegemonic masculinity” and the celebration of “emphasized femininity” (as per Raewyn Connell, enacted in ways that are compliant with, accommodating and subordinated to masculinism). We can hear this rearticulation, intensification, and reconfiguration of male dominance when Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg calls for more “masculine energy” in business and society — thereby joining other tech giants in promoting an ideal of hyper-individualized, market-driven masculinity. This is then cast in opposition to a “feminine” — or even “effeminate” — energy, which is portrayed both as the very cause of economic, technological, and political insecurities, while appearing powerless to counter them. By contrast, this new masculinity actively embraces all such uncertainties as trials by combat, tests of mettle, and opportunities for personal growth. This embodies precisely what Connell conceptualizes as “hegemonic masculinity” — a construct, the restoration of which attempts to reinstate a lost social order by firmly re-cementing the boundaries of both nation and gender roles. Movements such as that of the “Tradwives”, as investigated by Scott and Day [9], in turn serve as the counterpart designed to stabilize the male hegemonies championed by Trumpism and Muskism.
As such, contemporary economic and neoliberal political transformations are inextricably linked to the enforcement of an aggressive model of hegemonic masculinity in two distinct ways: on the one hand, by directly conflating the propagated ideal — characterized by entrepreneurial combativeness and risk-taking, authoritarian assertiveness, disruptive social and technological innovation, and fantasies of technological control — with the demand for the rehabilitation and resurgence of aggressive male conduct. On the other, tech elites and the far right not only propagate visions of boundless market utopias, but simultaneously mobilize anti-institutional sentiments — sentiments directed, for instance, against equality policies and democratic procedures in general, disparaging these as both the root cause of societal ills and an impediment to social progress. In both instances, the demand for a more traditional and aggressive form of masculinity functions as an economically and politically charged resource: as a promise of economic and technological growth in times of crisis, and as a promise of order and control in a seemingly chaotic world.
Hegemonic masculinity as central to understanding today’s new economic order
Figures such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump exemplify this dynamic. Their public self-presentation fuses the call for economic libertarianism with a performative reaffirmation of a supposedly lost male sovereignty — whether adopting the persona of the disruptive entrepreneur or that of the authoritarian decision- and deal-maker who pointedly distances himself from any behavior connoted as non-traditionally masculine or feminine. These performances, then, constitute something far more than mere matters of style; rather, they are an integral component of a hegemonic project in which economic deregulation and the hollowing out and capturing of the state are inextricably interwoven with the rearticulation, intensification, and reformation of hegemonic masculinity and traditional gender relations.
The on-going rise of techno-libertarian and right-wing populist ideologies — premised upon the restoration of hegemonic masculinity — is thus the expression of a deeper, underlying dynamic. It is akin what Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation described as economic liberalism’s “utopia” of an economy and a society regulated by the market — a process that, in this instance, is socially, culturally and politically shaped — and simultaneously intertwined — with a radicalized form of hegemonic masculinity that presents itself as a response to a perceived loss of control. It is therefore essential to take hegemonic masculinity seriously, not as a marginal phenomenon, but as a central foundation of contemporary processes of societal transformation.
Brigitte Aulenbacher is Professor of Sociology at Johannes Kepler University Linz. She combines studies on science, domestic work, senior care and the digital transformation of work with the analysis of contemporary capitalism.
Birgitt Riegraf is Professor of General Sociology at the University of Paderborn. Her research focuses on the sociology of science and higher education, gender studies, critical analyses of the capitalist care economy, and questions of social inequality and intersectionality.
References
- Bieling, Hansjürgen (2017): Aufstieg des Rechtspopulismus im heutigen Europa – Umrisse einer gesellschaftstheoretischen Erklärung, in: WSI-Mitteilungen 70(8), S. 557¬–565.
- Hochschild, Arlie (2016): Strangers in their own Land. Anger and Mourning on the American Right, New York/London.
- Dörre, Klaus (2019): “Take Back Control!” Marx, Polanyi and Right-Wing Populist Revolt, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 44, pp. 225–243.
- Atzmüller, Roland/Décieux, Fabienne/Ferschli, Benjamin (eds.) (2023): Ambivalenzen in der Transformation von Sozialpolitik und Wohlfahrtsstaat. Soziale Arbeit, Care, Rechtspopulismus und Migration, Weinheim
- Faude, Benjamin/Heinkelmann-Wild, Tim (2025): Destruction or renewal? Trumpism and the Future of Global Governance, in: Global Public Policy and Governance 5, pp. 305–315. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-025-00130-y
- Sauer, Birgit (2026): Affektiver maskulinistischer Widerstand gegen Quotenimplementierung in Europa. Kämpfe um die (Un-)Sichtbarkeit von Frauen in der Politik, in: Feministische Studien 1/2026, S. 48-65; Bargetz, Brigitte/Eggers, Nina Elena (2023): Affektive Narrative: Theorie und Kritik politischer Vermittlungsweisen, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 64, S. 221-246.
- Slobodian, Quinn/Tarnoff, Ben (2026): Muskism. A Guide for the Perplexed, London.
- Connell, Raewyn (1995): Masculinities. Oakland, California.
- Scott, Kate/Day, Linsey (2025). TikTok tradwives: femininity, reproduction, and social media, in: Gender and Education, pp. 1–18.