All posts by IKPS

Habitation vs. Improvement

Debate on Brexit

The Conservative Party’s Impossible Brexit Politics
of ‘Habitation versus Improvement’

30th of April, 2020

Matthew Watson
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick

The Conservative Party has just managed to win a general election whilst breaking the first law of British electoral politics in being unsure of what it stands for economically.  For thirty years now, the commentariat has speculated whether ‘Europe’ would follow the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and tariff reform in 1903 in splitting the Conservative Parliamentary Party over free trade.  Boris Johnson has avoided such a split, but only by purging his party of parliamentary candidates who dissented from his vision of a Brexit Britain beyond the European single market and the EU’s customs union.  The Conservative Party might no longer know itself when viewed historically, but it has just proved that it knows how to construct an electorally successful populist appeal to a nationalist politics of habitation.

Therein manifests the irony of ministers whose impulse will forever be as Thatcherite free market improvers resolutely championing anti-Thatcherite anti-free market habitation as a means of using regulatory independence to protect the interests of a native in-group.  Johnson has successfully pulled the confidence trick that his Government is somehow to be seen as a habitation-oriented insurgent, as the antidote to the previous Conservative Government in whose ranks so many of its ministers also served.  However, his first Cabinet appointments to the three great offices of state were all confirmed small-state Thatcherites, with two helping to co-author the infamous Britannia Unchained, a 2012 book dreaming of a Britain in which state support of everyday life is completely eliminated.  During the Brexit referendum, Johnson himself argued alongside the most extreme free marketeers that the EU was a protectionist club that barred the way to the country fulfilling its laissez-faire destiny.  Still the utopia exists in Conservative Party rhetoric of a buccaneering Global Britain as laissez-faire role model, where a nineteenth-century imperial throwback UK wins everyone over to its vision of universal free trade whilst it also eagerly embraces significant commercial frictions with its nearest trading partners.

If the Conservative Party no longer knows what it want to be, then it is hardly surprising that the rest of us are little the wiser.  It is as if it is simultaneously planning for laissez faire and planning for planning.  There is no straightforward Polanyian explanation for how it is possible to be in both camps at once.  Yet that is what the Johnson Government’s chosen strategy for leaving the European Union implies.  The whole world is now the Brexiteers’ economic oyster, we are told, but only above the din of them also insisting that the country must become a closed cultural space to secure from the incursions of EU membership the independence of its constitution and the sovereignty of its decision-making powers.  Such a context is both clearly contradictory and also the new populist reality.  It denies the left any easy Polanyian positioning in response.  The Conservative Party has used Brexit as a habitation device to offer protection to communities whose currently unprotected status results directly from ten years of Conservative small-state policy.

Matthew Watson

Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
UK

Read the other essays on Brexit here: 

Chris Hann

Brexit in the Valley of the Crow

Ann Pettifor

Ann Pettifor

Brexit and its Consequences

Kevin Morgan

Post Pandemic Brexit

Bob Jessop & Ngai-Ling Sum

Brexit as a double movement?

Mikael Stigendal

Culture, Politics and the Economy:
From a happy to an awkward relationship

Brexit in The Valley of the Crow

Debate on Brexit

Brexit in the Valley of the crow

30th of April, 2020

Chris Hann
Director Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 

Students of economic anthropology are expected to be familiar with Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. But it is a long book, and some will only digest the comparative ethnographic materials in Chapter 4. For natives of Great Britain, however, the entire book is a gold mine. Polanyi derived his abstract theory of the “double movement” from the empirical details of British economic history. After leaving Red Vienna, his Christian socialism deepened during his years in England, when he lectured to workers rendered unemployed by the Great Depression. Polanyi was well aware that such workers could be mobilized for reactionary countermovements, including “jingoism” in the late nineteenth century, and Fascism in the twentieth. The “populist” mobilizations of the early twenty-first century would not surprise him at all. He would explain them with reference to renewed (neoliberal) marketization. It has become clear that major changes in the political landscape correlate closely with the loss of jobs in sectors such as mining and manufacturing (even if new jobs appear in other sectors, notably services). This pattern is common to West Virginia and postsocialist Brandenburg, to North-East France and Csepel island, Budapest. It is also manifest in Britain, where declining, deindustrialized regions voted strongly for Brexit in 2016 and then for Boris Johnson’s Conservatives in the General Election of 2019.

When a Labour government decided after the Second World War to establish new towns in various locations around the United Kingdom, the main aim was to mitigate the consequences of earlier capitalist dislocation. Cwmbrân was an industrial village at the eastern edge of the South Wales coalfield, a region that had boomed for the best part of a century down to the 1920s, before everything fell apart during the Depression. The name means “valley of the crow” in Welsh. All of the place names in the valley of the Afon Llwd are recognizably Welsh, though the language disappeared some 200 years ago in the early throes of industrialization. In addition to coal, iron and steel, and later tin plate, formed the basis of strong nonconformist working-class communities. They demonstrated their political consciousness in the Chartist riots of 1839. In the twentieth century, like the rest of South Wales, Cwmbrân was a stronghold of the Labour Party (the Communist Party candidate also polled respectably until the 1970s).

The new town created around Cwmbrân (the only new town in Wales) provided jobs for a generation of newcomers, who found affordable rented housing in streets such as Shakespeare Road and Keats Close. During my childhood, the prosperity and security of the “Keynesian” era were reflected in the construction of a vast new shopping complex on a green field site. Nowadays this town centre still attracts shoppers from far and wide, but like the housing stock it was privatized in the decade of Margaret Thatcher. One by one, the large factories that had guaranteed employment closed down (like most of the nonconformist chapels). Formerly an exemplar of how interventionist policies can create and sustain community, Cwmbrân has been profoundly affected by neoliberal deindustrialization.

People used to joke that you could nominate a donkey to represent this valley and, if it had the endorsement of the Labour Party, it would be elected. When Harold Wilson called an election in 1966, local support for Labour was 77%. But in the election of December 2019, the Labour candidate (a graduate of Oxford University called Nicholas Thomas-Symonds) polled below 42%. Had a candidate of the Brexit Party not divided the anti-EU vote, a Conservative might have been elected. The election manifesto of which Jeremy Corbyn was so proud did not earn him much credibility in the valley of the crow. Scurrilous reporting in newspapers like The Sun and the Daily Mail resonated better as an anti-establishment countermovement than Labour’s educated cosmopolitanism. As Samuel Strong has shown in his study of the neighbouring valley of Blainau Gwent, EU membership has done nothing to improve the poverty statistics; non-productive investments decorated with the EU flag are emblematic of the disconnect.[1] Blaenau Gwent used to be represented in Westminster by Neil Kinnock, the last Labour Party leader of working-class origin (who was trounced at the polls by Margaret Thatcher in 1987, when the lurch to neoliberalism was already in full swing).     

[1] Samuel Robert Strong: The Production of Poverty: Politics, Place and Social Abandonment in Blaenau Gwent, Wales. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cambridge University (2017).

Chris Hann

Director Max Planck Insitute for Social Anthropology
Halle, Germany

Read the other essays on Brexit here: 

Kevin Morgan

Post Pandemic Brexit

Ann Pettifor

Ann Pettifor

Brexit and its Consequences

Matthew Watson

The Conservative Party's Impossible Brexit Politics
of 'Habitation vs. Improvement'

Bob Jessop & Ngai-Ling Sum

Brexit as a double movement?

Mikael Stigendal

Culture, Politics and the Economy:
From a happy to an awkward relationship

Post Pandemic Brexit

Debate on Brexit

Post Pandemic Brexit

30th of April, 2020

Kevin Morgan
Professor of Governance and Development, School of Geography ans Planning, Cardiff University

Having dominated British politics ad nauseam for nearly 4 years, Brexit has suddenly disappeared from public life. The issues which brought it political success – first in the 2016 EU referendum and then in the 2019 General Election that propelled Boris Johnson into office – have also largely vanished from the public agenda, particularly the issue of immigration.

Although the UK is still scheduled to quit the EU at the end of this year, COVID-19 has totally displaced Brexit in the public mind. So much so that the most important political question in the UK right now – apart from when the societal lockdown will be lifted – is what kind of legacy will the pandemic bequeath.

Will it be a return to neoliberal “normality”, the hallmarks of which were austerity, outsourcing public sector activity and shrinking the state, or will it be a tipping point for society to view and value things anew and embed the new habits of solidarity acquired during the crisis?

Past experience suggests that the powers-that-be will strive to return to some form of “normality” as soon as possible, which is precisely what happened after the 2008 financial crisis. Many things need to come together to prevent a return to neoliberal “normality”.

Let’s mention two of these things: (a) the Conservative government needs to be exposed for its astonishingly inept handling of the pandemic and (b) progressive forces need a compelling vision to show that another world is possible and the alliances, in civil society and among political parties, to enact that vision.

Even before the pandemic struck, the Johnson government was forced to adopt some very unusual policies for a Conservative government. It was forced to nationalise some railways and it felt compelled to adopt a new regional policy to support the former Labour areas in the north and midlands. Its COVID-19 rescue plan shocked its supporters, such was the scale of state financial support.

Launching the rescue package, the new Chancellor famously said that “this is not a time for ideology”; but what he meant was not a time for neoliberal ideology. The Johnson government was seen to be adopting the language of the left – by calling for social solidarity and extolling the need for an agile public sector, a sector that had been eviscerated by a decade of Tory austerity. While these things are necessary, they may be outweighed in the public mind by the inept handling of the pandemic, the most poignant sign of which is that health workers have to work without enough protective equipment.

Turning to the progressive forces, the key questions are do they have a compelling vision and do they have the necessary alliances for change? A core part of the vision now exists in the form of the Foundational Economy, arguably the most important spatial development strategy to have emerged in the UK in the past fifty years. In contrast to traditional spatial policies like Foreign Direct Investment, which are zero sum games between places, the Foundational Economy concept signals a positive sum game in the sense that foundational flourishing in one place does not preclude other places from also flourishing (see https://foundationaleconomy.com for details).

Post-pandemic Britain may look and feel very different to the political environment which spawned Brexit. Social solidarity, civic activism and key workers – many of them based in the Foundational sectors of health, social care and food provisioning – are the qualities helping the country to cope with the ravages of the pandemic. One hopes that progressive forces can ensure that these qualities and habits are part of the enduring legacy of the pandemic and not the ephemera of the crisis.  

Kevin Morgan
Professor of Governance and Development
School of Geography and Planning
Cardiff University
MorganKJ@cardiff.ac.uk

Read the other essays on Brexit here: 

Chris Hann

Brexit in the Valley of the Crow

Ann Pettifor

Ann Pettifor

Brexit and its Consequences

Matthew Watson

The Conservative Party's Impossible Brexit Politics
of 'Habitation vs. Improvement'

Bob Jessop & Ngai-Ling Sum

Brexit as a double movement?

Mikael Stigendal

Culture, Politics and the Economy:
From a happy to an awkward relationship

Polanyi in Brazil

Polanyi all over the World

The importance of Polanyi for the world peripheries:
Brazil and Latinamerica

In this first part of our series 'Polanyi all over the world', Patricia Villen and Bruno de Conti talk about the importance of Polanyi's work in Brazil and Latin America. Patricia Villen works as a researcher in sociology, Bruno de Conti is professor at the institute of economics, both at University of Campinas in Brazil. 'Polanyi all over the world' is a column initiated by the IKPS which aims at strengthening our ties with other Polanyi-related institutes, communities and organizations around the globe.

25th of March, 2020

Bruno de Conti and Patricia Villen

“My work is devoted to serve to Asia, to Africa, to the new people”
– Karl Polanyi, letter to Bé de Waard, Jan. 6th 1958

In inaugurating the new column “Polanyi all over the world”, it is pertinent to discuss the importance of Polanyi´s thoughts not only for Europe and the USA, but also for the periphery of our capitalist world economy. Being based in Brazil, our aim will be to examine the relevance of the Polanyian discussions for our country and Latin America in general, particularly in this moment of humanitarian crises.

Polanyi’s core contribution to a deep understanding of capitalism lies in his critical analysis of economic liberalism and its contradictions. This is a key-element for studies on Latin America, because these contradictions are much stronger in peripheral countries, resulting in tragic consequences for its population. For instance: Economic liberalism forces countries, that mainly (or exclusively) rely on the export of natural resources, to maintain the same marginal role in the international division of labour forever. In countries, which had a colonial past or a past including a slave-system, economic liberalism deepens the inequalities in the labour market and in society; in countries with peripheral currencies, economic liberalism stimulates speculation and thereby intensifies the volatility of capital flows, exchange and interest rate.

In spite of all that, economic liberalism has been violently imposed in Latin America. Not surprisingly, the region has suffered several financial crises in recent decades, there has been a re-primarization of the production structure and the labour market has become increasingly precarious. Nevertheless, the countries of the capitalist centre and the multilateral institutions, represented by the dominant classes at the local level, are calling for a further deepening of liberal reforms. As denounced by Polanyi, the argument is monotonous, claiming that the process has yet been insufficient and there is still room for further liberal reforms. Consequently, the reaction in many Latin American countries has historically been within the frame of liberalism, and in the last decades neoliberalism. 

During the so-called “pink tide”, in the first fifteen years of the 21st century, some governments have tried to stop or at least refrain the pace of the reforms. Yet, even if most of these governments were far from radical – some even being neoliberal in some aspects –, they evoked brutal reactions from the local dominant classes and external forces (notably the USA), which resulted in a series of coups d’états all over the region (Honduras, 2009; Paraguay, 2012; Brazil, 2016; Bolivia, 2019) and strong pressures over Venezuela, including an economic boycott which is very harmful for the population, and a permanent threat of a real war.

After all, in most parts of the region the mantra of a “neoliberalism with steroids” remains. In Brazil, this neoliberalism currently manifests itself in the form of a military and pseudo-nationalist government. Bolsonaro carries out reforms (eg. of the pension system, the labour market and the public sector) that have devastating consequences for the rights and living conditions of the working class. Hit by the economic challenges imposed by COVID-19, the reaction of the Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes (a former member of the “Chicago school”, who has worked for Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile) was the most foreseeable: “We have to accelerate the liberal reforms”. With an attitude of hideous opportunism, it does not even occur to him to face reality. He wants to take advantage of the fear and vulnerability of the population to impose new reforms without any dialogue. As a consequence, the worst is yet to come: Not due to Coronavirus, but due to the neoliberal virus that contaminated Latin America and the world years ago. The harsh reality is that precarious worker will have a terrible year in which they will run the risk of getting into desperate situations or even having to starve.

Nevertheless, as brilliantly stated by Polanyi, this move towards economic liberalism has a limit, namely the destruction of nature and human life. In this context of a global pandemic, diverse governments all over the world are realizing that strong interventions are needed, both for health and economic reasons. In Brazil, the belated action of Bolsonaro and Guedes in dealing with Corona has led to massive recurring “social distancing” demonstrations of unsatisfaction, in which people are hitting pans from their windows or balconies in a predetermined time. Let’s hope that these movements will last and get stronger, combatting Bolsonaro’s government and its neoliberal furor. Associatively, let’s keep up the struggle for a new economy, an alternative to the (neo)liberal utopia which is said to be the only solution for all problems – most of all in the peripheral countries. In the words of Polanyi, let’s search for “a way of life that consciously embraces the cause of the survival of the human being”.

Bruno de Conti

Professor at the Institute of Economics
University of Campinas
Brazil

Patricia Villen

Reasearcher and PhD in Sociology
University of Campinas
Brazil

More ‘Polanyi all over the World’: 

No post found